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The doctoral thesis based monographic articles present d is a collection of four 
complementary papers: Corruption and Size Decentralisation; Flawed 
Decentralisation and Corruption in Venezuela; Structural Consolidation of 
Venezuela’s Political Institutions; and Stagflation n Neopopulist Venezuela and 
the Integration of Latin America’s Left. The very brief introduction before the 
first paper and the general conclusions after the fourth paper justifies the 
coherence and unity of the work, mainly by relating the research within some of 
the larger empirical and theoretical debates of the area. Overall, the research lies 
at the intersection of economics, public administration, planning and 
development, and political science. The keywords or primary subfields of 
interest are: corruption, decentralisation, Venezuela, populism and inflation. 
Summarising in one short and easy sentence, the main find ng strongly supports 
the argument that the consolidation of unpopulated subnational units into 
relatively more autonomous and democratic organisations of governance is a 
viable institutional reform to strengthen accountability and transparency in 
corrupt countries. The country of study –Venezuela– is an interesting and 
significant case in view of the broad political and economic changes that have 












La tesi doctoral monogràfica basada en articles que es presenta és un compendi 
de quatre papers complementaris: Corrupció i Descentralització Administrativa; 
Descentralització viciada i Corrupció a Veneçuela La Consolidació Estructural 
de les Institucions Polítiques a Veneçuela, i Estagflació a la Veneçuela 
neopopulista i la Integració de l'Esquerra en Llatí Amèrica. La introducció que 
precedeix el primer paper i les conclusions generals a partir de la quarta paper 
justifica la coherència i unitat del treball, i relaciona la investigació amb els 
debats teòrics de l'àrea. En línies generals, la tesi es troba en la intersecció de 
l'economia, l'administració pública, la planificació i el desenvolupament, i les 
ciències polítiques. Les paraules claus de la investigació són: corrupció, 
descentralització, Veneçuela, populisme i inflació. El resultat principal que la 
investigació ofereix és una sòlida evidència empírica en referència a la reducció 
de governs subnacionals, sota un context democràtic i autonòmic, com una 
reforma institucional viable per enfortir la transparència i la responsabilitat en 
els països corruptes. El país d'anàlisi, Veneçuela, és un cas significatiu a vista 















La tesis doctoral monográfica basada en artículos que se presenta es un 
compendio de cuatro papers complementarios: Corrupción y Descentralización 
Administrativa; Descentralización Viciada y Corrupción en Venezuela; La 
Consolidación Estructural de las Instituciones Políticas en Venezuela; y 
Estanflación en la Venezuela Neopopulista y la Integración de la Izquierda en 
Latín América. La introducción antes del primer paper y las conclusiones 
generales después del quinto paper justifican la coherencia y unidad del trabajo, 
y relaciona la investigación con los debates teóricos del área. En líneas 
generales, la tesis se encuentra en la intersección de la economía, la 
administración pública, la planificación y el desarrollo, y las ciencias políticas. 
Las palabras claves de la investigación son: corrupción, descentralización, 
Venezuela, populismo e inflación. El resultado principal que la investigación 
ofrece es sólida evidencia empírica en referencia a la reducción de gobiernos 
subnacionales –bajo un contexto democrático y autonómico como una reforma 
institucional viable para fortalecer la transparencia y la responsabilidad en los 
países corruptos. El país de análisis –Venezuela es un caso significativo en vista 









GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 
 
 
This Doctoral thesis studies the relationship betwen corruption and decentralisation, 
focussing on the size of the territories in terms of population per regional government and on 
the lack of revenue autonomy. It is not that decentralisation in general is related to corruption, 
but that excessive size decentralisation and insufficient fiscal decentralisation is related to 
corruption. The study is then qualitatively completed with the political-economic analysis of 
the case of Venezuela, which shows the flaws of decentralisation in that country, as well as 
the effects of populism on inflation and its impact on the integration phenomenon of Latin 
America.2  
It all started with a book recommendation by my tutor Pere Puig Bastard: ‘The Elusive 
Quest for Growth’ by William Easterly (2002). The book turned out to be a pivotal event in 
my life as a researcher. Chapter 12 was my first experience with the theories of corruption. 
Latter I came across with the seminal works of Klitgaard (1991), Rose-Ackerman (1999), 
Banerjee (1997), Tanzi (1998), Bardhan (1997), and mainly Shleifer and Vishny (1993) who 
introduced the logical argument that increasing the quantity of independent subnational 
governments, could also increase total bribery. This idea led to the second general area of the 
literary review process: the decentralisation of government. (Second line of Figure 1.1).  
The literary review of decentralisation and corruption found a rising theoretical 
tension present in the literature. For the first time, the debate is no longer a one-sided 
monograph that supports the association between decentralisation and decreasing corruption 
(Huther and Shah, 1998; De Mello and Barenstein, 2001; Fisman and Gatti, 2002). To the 
best of my knowledge, the debate got serious 15 years ago, when two brave authors (Tanzi, 
1995; Prud’homme, 1995) convincingly pointed out that in developing countries, 
decentralisation reforms are generating more harmful consequences than beneficial spill-over 
                                                
1 Since the central chapters of this PhD thesis consists of four journal-type-long papers, the introduction is 
summarised at its maximum expression. For a more in-depth detailed description of the individual contents, refer 
to the abstracts and introductions of each paper. (The same applies to the conclusions).   
2 I appreciate the comments of an anonymous thesis evaluator for helping shape from a different perspectiv  a 
concise delimitation of the general objectives presented here and the last paragraph of the general int oduction, 
which explains the overall structural and internal organisation of the thesis.  
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effects. Surprisingly, it took the academic community at least five years to empirically sustain 
that decentralisation (especially political decentralisation) may well deteriorate the quality of 
government (Treisman, 2002). Possibly, the most relevant argument to explain this 
phenomenon is that in weak institutional environments, decentralisation tends to encourage 
corruption (Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). 
Decentralisation is measured in several ways. From the most widely used fiscal 
decentralisation (the power to collect revenues and execute expenditures), to the equally 
important decision decentralisation (the power to legislate without central intervention). And 
all the combinations in between. The first paper, ‘Corruption and Size Decentralisation’, 
focuses on the interaction between corruption as the dependent variable and a relatively 
unstudied measure of decentralisation, which I define as ‘size decentralisation’, as the main 
independent variable.  
Statistical evidence reported in the first paper (next chapter) found that countries 
which have more first-tier subnational governments relative to their population are more 
corrupt. These findings support the argument that decreasing the quantity of subnational 
governments by consolidating poor and unpopulated units into relatively more autonomous 
organisations of governance is a viable institutional reform to improve accountability in 
already corrupt countries.  
The paper that follows the general research on corruption and decentralisation starts a 
sequence of three case studies on Venezuela. As a qualitative progression to this first, the 
second paper is titled ‘Flawed Decentralisation and Corruption in Venezuela’. Different from 
the first paper, the second paper is based on primary data (mainly group interviews) and uses 
local governments in Venezuela as the unit of analysis. The specific findings identified four 
decentralisation factors that increase bureaucratic corruption and mismanagement at local 
levels of government in Venezuela: municipal atomisation, increasing local bureaucracy, lack 
of revenue autonomy, and the creation of community councils.  
As an answer to these relevant issues, two viable dec ntralisation-related policies 
would consolidate poor and unpopulated units into more autonomous governments, and allow 
more flexible changes to the rate of at least one important local tax. Broadly speaking, the 
second paper (‘Flawed Decentralisation and Corruption in Venezuela’) supports the growing 
tendency in the recent literature that links fiscal decentralisation to decreasing corruption, and 
political decentralisation to increasing corruption (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Fan, 
Lin, and Treisman, 2009). The second paper also briefly describes the evolution and nature of 
high corruption in Venezuela. 
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The third and fourth papers came as a necessity to thoroughly comprehend the case of 
Venezuela from a political and economic perspective. The third paper titled ‘Structural 
Consolidation of Venezuela’s Political Institutions’ mainly focuses on the slow pace of 
political party institutionalisation. It also describes two relevant issues: (1) the dramatic 
polarisation of the political landscape beyond reason ble boundaries; (2) and the 
consolidation of the PSUV (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela) as a leftwing 
redistributive political party.  
The fourth paper titled ‘Stagflation in Neopopulist Venezuela and the Integration of 
Latin America’s Left’ focuses on two common causes of high inflation and slow economic 
growth, which is the result of the extreme populist chavismo government: exchange rate 
uncertainty and low private investment. It also challenges the collapsing four-phase classical 
theory of populism made famous by Sachs (1989), with the main argument that neopopulism 
can beat hyperinflation by financing the expanding public spending programs with internal oil 
funds, instead of foreign debt and seigniorage. The cas  of stagflation in Venezuela is 
particularly significant, because it has a direct impact on the integration phenomenon of Latin 
America’s plural lefts, which has already started with the one-by-one acceptance of ALBA 
member countries into MERCOSUR. First in line is Venezuela.   
Following the work of Ellner (2010), the third and fourth papers clearly emphasize the 
pragmatic decision-making model over the social-prioritisation model. That is, it supports the 
importance of state institutionalisation and production efficiency, instead of social national 
planning targeted at development and social objectiv s. Similarly, the predominant criteria 
used to evaluate the political system that has recently merged in Venezuela is the liberal 
democracy thesis, which stresses checks and balances d warns against excessive executive 
power and centralism.3  
The thesis is organised in two distinct parts. The first two papers are about corruption 
and decentralisation (in general and in Venezuela). The last two papers are mainly about 
politics and economics in Venezuela (inflation, populism, the party system, and the impact of 
Venezuela on the integration phenomenon of Latin America). The thesis, however, is 
structured in a way that it is easy to follow, where one issue leads to another. This logical 
sequence is graphically explained in Figure 1.1. 
 
                                                
3 The alternative theory to liberal democracy is radic l democracy, which highlights the benefits of the majority 
rule by encouraging the participation of the popular sectors of society (inspired by the formulations f Jean-
Jacques Rousseau). 
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Statistical tests based on newly collected cross-sectional data suggest that countries which 
have more first-tier subnational governments relative to their population are more corrupt. I 
measure the strength of association between “corruption” and the variables “population per 
regional government” and “average area of first-tier unit,” both individually and combined as 
the interaction effect “size decentralisation,” in 100 randomly selected countries. Two 
theoretical arguments may explain these associations: (i) the greater the quantity of first-tier 
subnational units with monopolistic powers, such as legal and regulatory sanctions, the 
greater the incentives for bribery and extortion; and (ii) elected authorities and public servants 
of smaller regional governments are more vulnerable to capture by a corrupt private elite, 
especially when control and accountability mechanisms are weaker than national ones. This 
paper also provides some support for existing corruption heories, namely that wealthy 
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4 This is a revised version of the paper “An Empirical Study on Decentralisation and Corruption” presented at 
the EGPA general conference in Madrid 2007. Comments from Leo Huberts are included in this final version. I 
also gratefully acknowledge the contributions of professors Pere Puig, Nuria Agell, Fernando Ballabriga, Jan 
Hohberger, and especially Jorge Streb (though the views and content expressed herein are the sole responsibility 
of the author). 
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2.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
Decentralisation, or the process of devolving powers to regional and local governments by 
shifting the structure of accountability from the national to the subnational level (Tiebout, 
1956; Burki, Perry, and Dillinger, 1999), tends to be associated to encouraging the efficiency 
and responsiveness of government (Oates, 1972), developing institutional and technological 
innovations (Beasley and Case, 1995), improving public accountability (Seabright, 1996), and 
controlling corruption (Huther and Shah, 1998; de Mllo and Barenstein, 2001). However, 
recent evidence also suggests that certain measures of d centralisation such as increasing the 
quantity and variety of first-tier subnational governments may increase the incentives that 
drive corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Bardhan, 2002).  
The plausible link between decentralisation and corruption (defined as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain” by Transparency International) is a relevant issue that 
requires further exploration and questioning. Prud’homme (1995) makes an interesting 
comparison between Western medicine and decentralisation. He argues that Western medicine 
is highly effective, but only when it is correctly applied to the appropriate illness, at the right 
time, and in the proper dosage. If these conditions are not met, then secondary harmful effects 
will probably be worse than the disease itself. Unfortunately, in the majority of cases, 
decentralisation is prescribed in excess, with the presence of abusive regulations, without the 
financial or administrative capabilities needed, under inadequate institutional and democratic 
controls, and with inefficient public servants and bribe-thirsty elected authorities. 
Defining decentralisation is a difficult task. This is due mainly because the definition 
of decentralisation must first discuss the deep relationship between decentralised and federal 
states. According to Riker (1964), a federal constitution has at least two levels of government 
affecting the same land and people, each level has at least one area of action in which it is 
autonomous and there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) 
regarding each government’s autonomy. Lijphart (1984) simplifies this concept by suggestion 
that federalism is a constitutionally guaranteed division of power between central and regional 
governments. Incidentally, decentralisation is commonly defined as “the process of devolving 
political, fiscal, and administrative powers to subnational units of government” (Burki, Perry, 
and Dillinger, 1999: 3). The similarity between thewo concepts is remarkable. Prud’homme 
(1995: 201) actually defines decentralisation using the definition of the theory of pure fiscal 
federalism: “that is, a system in which pure local governments raise pure local taxes and 
undertake pure local expenditures without the benefit of central government transfers.”   
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Separating decentralised and centralised states from federal or unitary constitutions is 
almost an impossible task; given that there can be both centralised and decentralised 
federations, and centralised and decentralised unitary states (Lijphart, 1984). Joumard and 
Kongsrud (2003) demonstrate that the extent of decentralisation is not always encouraged by 
a federal structure and not always restrained by unitary institutional structure. In their study 
they found that some unitary countries (e.g., Denmark and Sweden) were more decentralised 
than the countries identified as federal (e.g., Germany, Mexico, and USA). Italy, for example, 
"though politically decentralised, is not considered a federation since the article in its 
constitution that enumerates the matters on which regional legislatures can legislate (Article 
117) stipulates that they can legislate only ‘within the limits of the fundamental principles 
established by the laws of the State’ and ‘provided that such legislation is not in contrast with 
the interests of the Nation or of other Regions’. Regional laws must not contradict 
fundamental principles established by national laws, and so regional autonomy is limited.” 
(Treisman, 2000: 432). A similar argument could be made for Mexico, Pakistan, and 
Malaysia, which are highly centralised bureaucracies with federal constitutions. A converse 
argument holds for Finland. 
Is decentralisation only bad for developing countries? In the majority of cases, the 
overall extent of decentralisation’s rate of success appears to be lower in developing 
countries. A comprehensive theoretical rationale that explains in part this phenomenon is that 
designing decentralisation policy “is particularly difficult in developing countries because 
institutions, information and capacity are all very weak. The cross-cutting nature of 
decentralisation, the importance of local institutions in influencing the impact of 
decentralisation and the limited empirical evidence on what works and what does not make 
the design and implementation of decentralisation a considerable challenge (for example, 
matching expenditures and revenues at each level of government, providing a regulatory 
framework that imposes a hard budget constraint on sub ational governments, and 
incorporating local participation and accountability in decentralisation). Evidence suggests 
that the problems associated with decentralisation in developing countries reflect flaws in 
design and implementation more than any inherent outcome of decentralisation.” (Litvack, 
Ahmad, and Bird, 1998: 7-8).  
On the other side, it is impossible to argue that te specific impact of size 
decentralisation (positive or negative) on corruption is more significant in developing 
countries, because the theoretical evidence regarding th s relevant issue is limited. 
Statistically, I ran several regression models controlled by a wide range of factors in two 
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subset samples of developing and developed countries.5 I found that the overall fit of the 
models and the estimated values of the parameters ar  similar in the three scenarios, including 
the whole sample of countries. I also found that in all scenarios the correlations do not vary 
substantially between the dependent variable “corruption” and the two main independent 
variables “population per regional government” and “average area of first-tier units.” From 
now on I will only make reference to the whole sample of countries. 
Figure 2.1 shows dispersion graphs between the depen nt variable “corruption” 
measured by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the two main independent variables. 
The unconditional analysis of the tendency lines clarly shows upward slopes, especially 
“population per regional government,” which provides some initial support to the specific 
hypothesis that countries with more population per regional government tend to be less 
corrupt since their CPI is relatively higher (higher CPI scores imply less corruption). On the 
other hand, countries which have more regional or first-tier subnational governments relative 
to their population tend to be more corrupt since their CPI is generally lower.  
 
 
Figure 2.1  Corruption and Indicators of Size Decentralisation 
 







0 1000000 2000000 3000000 4000000










0 50000 100000 150000 200000





Note: The first graph does not show the three outliers (Germany, UK, and USA). The second graph does nt 
show Australia and Canada. Their effects, however, ar  computed in the tendency lines. 
                                                
5 The whole sample of 100 countries was divided in two subset samples of 79 developing and 21 developed 
countries based on the 2009 Human Development Index (HDI) list of developed countries by the UN. The HDI 
is arguably the most comprehensive mean to distinguish whether the country is developed or not, since t is a 
comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living for countries worldwide. 
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The association between the dependent variable “corruption” measured by the CPI and 
the two main independent variables “population per regional government” and “average area 
of first-tier unit” (as well as their interaction eff ct “size decentralisation”) is the analytical 
focus of the regressions tests.6 This does not imply that I do not control for other measures of 
decentralisation (e.g., fiscal, decision, government ti rs, and electoral decentralisation. The 




Hypothesis 1  
Countries which have more first-tier subnational governments 
relative to their population are more corrupt. 
Hypothesis 2  
Countries which on average are divided into geographic lly 
small first-tier subnational governments are more corrupt. 
Hypothesis 3  
Countries which on average have geographically large fi st-tier 
subnational governments and also have a large population per 




Therefore, based on the proposed three hypothesis, the primary objective of this 
quantitative study is to support the plausible association between the dependent variable 
“corruption” and the main independent variables “population per regional government” and 
“average area of first-tier unit” shown in Figure 2.1, both individually and combined in their 
interaction effect defined as “size decentralisation.” The secondary objective is to examine the 
classical theories of corruption by testing several xplanatory factors, including democracy, 
education, income inequality, share of Protestant population, GDP per capita, liberty of press, 
openness to trade, and total population. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes th  data. The third 
section runs a series of regression tests to examine the relationship between the dependent 
variable “corruption” and the two main independent variables “population per regional 
                                                
6 In view of the fact that the theoretical relationship between decentralisation and corruption in general t rms has 
been thoroughly analyzed over the last few decades; namely, the institutional benefits of administrative and 
decision-making autonomy such as the power to tax at  subnational level of government. 
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government” and “average area of first-tier unit.” The quantitative findings are robust to a 
wide range of controls (including all of those that ve been used in the recent cross-country 
literature on corruption) and provide strong support f r the specific hypothesis that countries 
which have more first-tier subnational governments relative to their population are more 




2.2   DATA 
 
Using recent cross-sectional data on a random sample of 100 countries summarised in Table 
A2.4 (found in the appendix after the references list), I test various arguments about how 
increasing the quantity of first-tier subnational governments affects corruption. Specifically, I 
test the relationship between “corruption” as the dependent variable and two specific sub-
measures of “size decentralisation” defined as “population per regional government” and 
“average area of first-tier unit” as the main independent variables. (First-tier subnational unit 
and regional government are used interchangeably throug out the study). 
 
 
2.2.1   Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable “corruption” is measured with the 2009 Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) by Transparency International (TI). The CPI is “the best-known” index available 
(Tanzi, 1998: 577), and has been used in a number of studies, including Gupta et al., (1998), 
Alesina and Weder (1999), and Treisman (2000). However, as its name implies, the index 
measures the perception of corruption (on a scale of 0 t  10, with higher scores corresponding 
to better corruption ratings), not the actual level of corruption itself. The “corruption” variable 
and the two main independent variables “population per regional government” and “average 
area of first-tier unit” are free of endogeneity problems, because it is not plausible that the 
elements consulted to compile the index were influeced by the countries’ administrative 
divisions.  
I tested the validity of the dependent variable with great success against six 
endogenous government performance variables. Four indexes from the 2008-2009 Global 
Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum): “property rights”, “strength of auditing 
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and reporting standards”, “judicial independence” and “reliability of police services.” And 
two indicators from the 2008 Worldwide Governance Research Dataset (policy research 
working paper 4978): “regulatory quality” and “government effectiveness.” The 
unconditional bivariate correlation coefficients ranged anywhere from .75 to .95. These 
extremely high correlations confirm the dependent variable as an accurate measure of 
corruption. In fact, it should not come as a surprise that property rights, strength of auditing 
and reporting standards, judicial independence, reliability of police services, regulatory 
quality, and government effectiveness, are all highly correlated between themselves and with 
the CPI, given that they are all just another name for the lack of corruption. Tanzi (1998) best 
explains this rationale: As a way of life in highly corrupt countries, corruption is hardly ever 
reported or penalised. Corrupt police officials are by nature not reliable. The legal processes 
in these countries tend to be rigid and obsolete. Regulations and taxes are generally confusing, 
some are not public, and they are sometimes modified w thout previous notification. Laws are 
so complicated that only trained lawyers can understand them. The social costs for accusers 
are high. Personal freedom and basic rights such as private property are constantly threatened 




2.2.2   Main Independent Variables  
 
The first main independent variable “population perregional government,” shown in Table 
A2.5, is measured dividing a country’s total population (numerator) by its total number of 
first-tier subnational governments (denominator). A country is commonly divided in two 
subnational tiers of government: regional and local. A country, however, can be divided in 
three subnational tiers: provinces or states (regional government), counties (intermediate 
government), and municipalities (local government). For the purpose of this analysis, when a 
country is divided in three or more tiers, the information on the first-tier (provinces or states 
in the previous example) will be used as the denomiator. If a country’s administrative 
division includes only one subnational tier, then this information will be used as regional 
governments (e.g., Kuwait’s six Governorates).7  
                                                
7 I use the definition of tiers or levels of administration for both governments with or without legislative councils 
and with or without elected leaders. 
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The information for total population is the 2009 Population Division of the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The total number of regional governents 
is taken from the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 3166 subdivision 
codes. Recent versions of the Larousse Atlas of Countries of the World and the National 
Geographic Atlas were used as corroborating sources of data. From the sample taken, I 
assume that regional governments of all countries ar  endowed with a minimal degree of 
autonomy. Naturally, this autonomy varies from country to country, sometimes tremendously. 
For example, the delegates chosen by the central government in Russia have considerably less 
autonomy than elected officials in Spain’s autonomous communities. 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, “population per regional government” is expected 
to enter the “corruption” function with a strong positive coefficient, indicating that countries 
with more population per unit of first-tier subnational government are relatively less corrupt, 
since their corruption ratings are better (higher). One theoretical rational that explains this 
association is that “stronger personal links between bureaucrats and their constituents under 
decentralisation might make it easier for corrupt individuals to collaborate, and smaller 
jurisdictions may make bribery more affordable and limit the resources available for fighting 
it. In addition, smaller jurisdictions may encourage more-detailed regulation of economic 
activity, encouraging corruption.” (Arikan, 2004: 182). 
The second main independent variable “average area of first-tier unit” is measured 
dividing the country’s total area in square kilometers (land and internal waters) by the total 
number of first-tier units (regional governments). The information for total area is the 2008 
United Nations Statistic Division. Similar to the variable “population per regional 
government,” and consistent with the second hypothesis, the variable “average area of first 
tier unit” is expected to enter the regression with a positive coefficient, indicating that 
countries which on average have geographically large fi st-tier subnational jurisdictions are 
less corruption. One logical argument that explains this plausible association is that the 
benefits derived from the economies of scale diminishes in geographically small first-tier 
subnational governments. 
If the hypotheses hold true, then why not ask if large populations decrease corruption? 
Most academics argue that highly populated countries end to be less corrupt. This is due not 
only because “larger countries might adopt more decentralised fiscal systems to better cater to 
the diverse preferences of their citizens while, at the same time, economies of scale might 
arise in the fight against corruption” (Fisman and Gatti 2002b: 330); but also because 
according to an industrial development model by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny’s (1989), 
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market size determines the extent to which firms can benefit from positive spillovers, which 
in part possibly explains the relatively greater economic development (and less corruption) 
found in large countries (e.g., USA and Japan).  
On the other hand, an alternative rationale argues that highly populated countries 
could actually be more corrupt, since large population emerges from a trade-off between 
economies of scale in supplying public goods and the greater cultural-ethnic heterogeneity 
cost present in populated countries. In practice, this trade-off is usually dominated by the 
heterogeneity factor (e.g., the former Soviet Union), which increases the incentives of corrupt 
bureaucrats to favor their own reference group (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997), and encourages 
the armed conflicts and political instabilities that generates corruption (Mauro, 1995). In line 
with these theoretical arguments, Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (1997) suggest that large 
countries, in terms of population, can afford to be closed, while small countries face stronger 
incentives to liberalise trade. Therefore, based on this reasoning, highly populated countries 
should have a disadvantage against corruption becaus  openness to trade decreases corruption 




2.2.3   Different Dimensions of Decentralisation 
 
Orthodox theory assumes that decentralisation encourages competition among subnational 
governments (Tiebout, 1956; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), and interjurisdictional 
competition in turn is associated to improving three levant factors that disciplines 
government and decreases the level of corruption: accountability (Tabellini, 2000), 
bureaucracy (Bahmani and Nasir, 2002), and efficiency (Jin, Qian, and Weingast, 1999). In 
fact, “the basic model of interjurisdictional competition predicts a negative relationship 
between decentralisation and corruption” (Fisman and Gatti, 2002a: 26), as subnational 
populations observe and compare the performance of officials or bureaucrats across 
jurisdictions the level of corruption decreases (Dincer, Ellis, and Waddell, 2010). The logic is 
simple. Subnational governments should compete to attract capital from residents and 
businesses by providing public goods and services more efficiently. For example, if a corrupt 
subnational government steals and wastes resources or over-regulates businesses in order to 
extract bribes, taxpayers and firms should exercise their free option of moving to areas with 
more efficient governments with fewer regulations. The two most well-known measures of 
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decentralisation are generally associated to improving subnational institutions. These 
beneficial measures are: (i) fiscal decentralisation, or the constitutional authority to collect 
taxes and execute public expenditures by subnational governments; and (ii) decision 
decentralisation, or the scope of issues on which regional and local governments can decide 
autonomously without being overruled by higher-tier governments. 
For the purpose of this study, the information for “ iscal decentralisation” is the most 
recent estimates of the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (IMF). It measures regional 
government revenue and expenditure as a percentage of total revenue and expenditure. To be 
consistent with the units defined by “size decentralisation,” I will only measure information 
on the first-tier subnational jurisdiction or regional government. The variable “fiscal 
decentralisation” does not measure any information corresponding to the second or third level 
of subnational governance, which are commonly referd as intermediate and local 
governments. The proxy that I propose for “fiscal decentralisation” attributes two-thirds 
weighting to revenue and one-third weighting to expense. I emphasize the income side 
because the incentives created by subnational revenu  generation encourage a series of 
beneficial spillover effects on regional economic prosperity (Weingast, 2009). In the 
regression model, the variable “fiscal decentralisation” is expected to enter the “corruption 
function” with a strong positive coefficient, indicating that more fiscally decentralised 
countries have better (higher) corruption ratings. The anticipated findings should support the 
theory that fiscal decentralisation decreases corruption (Huther and Shah, 1998; De Mello and 
Barenstein, 2001; Fisman and Gatti, 2002b; Dincer et al., 2010). A commonly used argument 
that explains the theory is that “bureaucrats in a fiscally decentralised economy” have fewer 
incentives to engage in rent-seeking behavior (Arikan, 2004: 192).   
Decision decentralisation is defined by the dummy variable “federal status.” It 
measure decision-making autonomy at a regional leveof government. I use the classification 
of federal countries by the independent organisation The Forum of Federations to measure the 
variable “federal status.” The information regarding a country’s federal status has traditionally 
been used in the academic literature to measure decision decentralisation, since the primary 
characteristic of federalism is a constitutionally guaranteed division of power between 
national and subnational governments (Lijphart, 1984: 170), in which at least one tier of 
government has at least one autonomous area of actin (R ker, 1964: 11). The imperfect 
dummy that I constructed took the value “2” for federal countries and “1” for unitary states. 
And since federalism has theoretically been associated to decreasing corruption (Hayek, 
1948), as autonomous subnational officials with constitutional powers to legislate have 
 23 
greater access to relevant local information that en bles providing public services more 
efficiently (Fisman and Gatti, 2002b), the control variable “federal status” is expected to enter 
the regression with a positive coefficient (indicatng that federal countries have better 
corruption ratings). 
 In addition to “fiscal decentralisation” and “federal status,” I also test “electoral 
decentralisation.” This dimension of decentralisation is defined as the constitutional right to 
democratically elect subnational authorities. A priori, it is possible to constrain corruption 
with institutions of accountability from below, as democratic forces should punish corruption. 
“The intuition is that, under decentralisation, politicians are held directly accountable for their 
actions” (Fisman and Gatti, 2002a: 26). In the regression model, “electoral decentralisation” 
is expected to share a positive relationship with “corruption,” since it is measured by the 
interaction effect between the variable “federal sttus” and the variable “democracy” (which I 
formally define next). This positive relationship implies that countries with more electoral 
control have better (higher) corruption ratings. 
 
 
2.2.4   Other Explanatory Variables 
 
“Democracy” is measured by the 2008 Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index. The 
index focuses on electoral processes and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of 
government, generalised participation, and politica culture. It ranges from full democracies 
(scores of 8-10) to authoritarian regimes (scores below 4). A priori, democracy decreases 
corruption, since democratic institutions improve economic policies and outcomes (Besley et 
al., 2005), encourages power of speech (Besley and Burgess, 2002), increases the 
participation in a generalised interpretation of the rule of law (Bardhan, 2005), “and when it 
works well, it provides citizens a means to express choices and to hold public officials 
accountable” (Weingast, 2009: 280). Treisman (2000) quantified the effect of democracy on 
corruption by sustaining that more than 40 consecutive years of democracy should decrease 
corruption by about 10%; The variable “democracy” should enter the regression model with a 
strong and significant positive coefficient, indicat ng that full democracies (scores of 8-10) 
have better (higher) corruption ratings.         
“Education” is measured by the 2008 United Nations Education Index, which 
attributes two-thirds weighting to the adult literacy rate and one-third weighting to the 
combined gross school enrolment ratio. The education index’s highest possible score is 1, 
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implying perfect education attainment. In the analysis, the variable “education” should also 
enter the regression model with a positive coefficient, since well-educated societies condemn 
corruption more vigorously (Ades and Di Tella, 1997).   
“Inequality” is measured by the 2008 CIA World Factbook Gini Inequality 
Coefficient. The Gini coefficient is a measure of stati tical dispersion of income inequality. It 
ranges from 0 to 1. Low coefficients refer to equal distributions, with 0 corresponding to 
complete equality. While higher coefficients represent unequal distributions, with 1 indicating 
complete inequality. The variable inequality is anticipated to enter the regression model with 
a negative coefficient, indicating that more equal societies (low Gini coefficients) have better 
(higher) corruption ratings; given that unequal societies are usually governed by a corrupt 
elite (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, 1998),  
“Protestantism” is measured by the share of Protestant religion in the country. The 
information used for Protestantism is the USA State Department’s 2004 International 
Religious Freedom Report. Protestantism includes Evangelical, Quaker, Assembly of God, 
Anglican, Episcopalian, Baptist, Church of God, Churc  of the Nazarene, Congregationalist, 
Church of Christ, Lutheran, Calvinist, Holiness, Mennonite, Methodist, Pentecostal, 
Presbyterian, and Reformist Churches. Treisman (2000) quantifies the effect of Protestantism 
on corruption by sustaining that an increase of 5% to 10% in the Protestant population should 
decrease corruption by about 11%. One plausible argument to explain this phenomenon is that 
Protestants are generally more responsible for theiactions and sins, while Catholics, as a 
converse example, tend to highlight the sinful weaknesses of the individual and the need for a 
forgiving and protecting Church. In the regression model, “Protestantism” and “corruption” 
are expected to share a positive relationship.   
“GDP per capita at nominal value and at purchasing power parity (PPP)” is measured 
by the 2008 IMF World Economic Outlook Database. GDP per capita at nominal value 
measures the value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year, 
converted at market exchange rates to current U.S. dollars, divided by the average population 
for the same year. Alternatively, GDP per capital a PPP estimates are arguably more useful in 
cross-country analyses because they take into account the countries’ relative cost of living and 
inflation rates, rather than just using exchange rat s which may distort the real differences in 
income. In theory, poor countries are more corrupt (Gould and Amaro-Reyes, 1983). This is 
due mainly because corruption decreases investment rates (Mauro, 1995), which is an 
essential determining factor for economic growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Wei (1999) 
quantifies the effect by sustaining that corruption acts like an arbitrary tax equal to 20% of 
 25 
total business returns. The variable “GDP per Capita at PPP” is expected to enter the 
regression model with a strong positive coefficient, implying that wealthier countries are less 
corrupt.  
“Press freedom” is measured by the 2009 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom 
Index. The index refers to the amount of freedom journalists and the media have in each 
country, and the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. (Lower 
scores correspond to better press freedom ratings). “Press freedom” should enter the 
regression model with an inverse coefficient, since the freedom to report corrupt individuals is 
a key factor to prevent future acts of corruption (Brunetti and Weder, 1998). 
“Trade freedom” is measured by the 2009 Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street 
Journal Trade Freedom Index. The index is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services. The index uses a 
scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represent the maximum expression of openness to trade. 
“Trade freedom” and “corruption” are anticipated to share a positive relationship, given that 
countries which are more open to foreign trade tendo be less corrupt because exposure to 
imports disciplines the market (Ades and Di Tella, 1996). 
“Tiers of subnational governance” is compiled by the ISO 3166 subdivision codes. 
Treisman (2002) empirically sustains (using World Bank indicators) that corruption increases 
from .16 to .21 points in a 3.5 scale for each additional tier of government. One logical 
rationale that explains this phenomenon is that as vertical divisions of government increases, 
the waste of public resources resulting from the eff cts of duplication also increases. In the 
regression model, “tiers of subnational governance” and the dependent variable “corruption” 
are likely to share a negative relationship, which implies that countries divided in more tiers 
of subnational governance have worst (lower) corruption ratings. A commonly used 
theoretical rationale to sustain this inverse relationship is the “overgrazing” problem of 
different tiers of government competing to extract bribes from the same economic actor 
(Treisman, 2000: 433). 
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MAIN EFFECT      
Corruption 100 3.81 1.98 1.30 9.40 
Population per Regional Government 100 1,264,777 1,141,554 52,000 6,893,523 
Average Area of First-Tier Units 100 49,515 125,694 321 961,503 
Democracy 100 5.54 2.17 1.52 9.53 
Education 98 0.79 0.20 0.27 0.99 
Inequality 98 41 9 24 62 
Protestantism 100 13% 18% 0% 91% 
GDP per Capita (PPP) 99 11,875 12,202 400 46,381 
GDP per Capita (Nominal Value) 99 12,039 16,483 138 62,097 
Press Freedom 100 21 25 0 116 
Trade Freedom 97 76 10 50 90 
MEASURES FOR LACK OF CORRUPTION      
Property Rights 79 4.32 1.05 2.10 6.50 
Strength of Auditing and Reporting Standards 79 4.56 0.80 2.80 6.30 
Regulatory Quality 100 -0.06 0.98 -2.13 1.91 
Government Effectiveness 100 -0.11 0.96 -1.48 2.19 
Reliability of Police Services 79 4.00 1.17 2.00 6.50 
Judicial Independence  79 3.60 1.30 1.40 6.70 
DECENTRALISATION MEASURES      
Fiscal Decentralisation 64 16% 14% 1.43% 54% 
Tiers of Subnational Governance 100 3 0,91 1 4 
Federal Status 100 1.1 0.30 1 2 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS      
Total Population 100 23,974,957 37,949,640 520,000 308,493,000 




2.3   METHODS AND FINDINGS 
 
Initial estimates of the unconditional bivariate correlation matrix (shown in Table 2.2) is 
consistent with the hypothetical framework, because the main independent variables 
“population per regional government” and “average area of first-tier units” generates 
significant and positive coefficients of .48 and .31, respectively, with the dependent variable 
“corruption”. (Taking into account that extremely hig  coefficients tend to be more 
problematic and that “population per regional government” and “average area of first-tier 
units” have relatively lower correlations with all explanatory variables, which should 
strengthen the future interpretation of the main independent variables as significant estimators 
of corruption). Hypotheses 1 and 2 are further margin lly reinforced since, on average, the 
variables “total population” and “total area” per country (not shown Table 2.2) share a 
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relatively less significant relationship with “corruption,” compared to the two main 
independent variables. Bivariate coefficients of .25 for “total population” compared to .48 for 
“population per regional government,” and .14 for “total area” compared to .31 for “average 
area of first-tier units.” (“Total population” and “total area” are formally controlled in the 
regression model). 
The grouping of the factors, based solely on Table 2.2, also implies that high 
corruption is mainly present in weak institutional environments of poor countries governed by 
authoritarian regimes. And that corruption could aditionally be linked to other significant 
indirect determinants. These vary from inheriting a non-Protestant, uneducated and unequal 
society, or to experience a lack of openness to trade and liberty of press. (The negative 
correlation of “inequality” with “corruption” implies that lower Gini coefficients refer to more 
equally distributed countries, while higher CPI refers to less corrupt countries (the same 
applies to “press freedom,” countries with more librty of press –lower indexes– have better –
























































































































Corruption 1          
Population per Regional 
Government 
0.48 1         
Average Area of First-
Tier Unit 
0.31 0.26 1        
Democracy 0.73 0.29 0.15 1       
Education 0.54 0.18 0.10 0.57 1      
Inequality -0.44 -0.18 -0.05 -0.25 -0.44 1     
Protestant Religion 0.39 0.24 0.15 0.37 0.07 0.04 1    
GDP per Capita (PPP) 0.85 0.51 0.30 0.67 0.66 -0.51 0.25 1   
Press Freedom -0.48 -0.14 -0.07 -0.72 -0.19 0.10 -0.35 -0.44 1  





2.3.1   Regressions Tests 
 
I ran a series of regression tests with “corruption” as the dependent variable. The log is used 
to normalise the data of “population per regional government”, “GDP per capita” (nominal 
and PPP), “average area of first-tier units”, “total population,” and “total area.” As in 
numerous other studies, logs are used to avoid giving excessive weight to extremely high 
observations, which is precisely the case when dealing with population, geographic area, and 
GDP. (The significance of the estimates are based on White-corrected standard errors).  
The first column of Table 2.3 shows the explanatory variables effect on the 
“corruption” function. It is important to highlight that “democracy”, “Protestantism”, and 
“GDP per capita at PPP” have strong positive slope coefficients at less than 1%. (I also tested, 
without any relevant results to report, the effect of nominal GDP per capita instead of PPP, 
given that PPP are estimates rather than hard facts and hould be used with caution, since its 
measurements tend to vary substantially depending on the source of data). In general, the 
overall fit of the model is consistent with existing corruption theories because it explains 
about 70% of the variation in “corruption.” That is, wealthy Protestant societies that rely on 
democratic institutions are in a better position to report and punish corruption (Mauro, 1995; 
Gould and Amaro-Reyes, 1983; Wei, 1999; Treisman, 2000). The puzzling inverse 
relationship between quality of education and decreasing corruption could be somewhat 
explained because the inherence of excellent public edu ational systems in former communist 
countries came along with a highly corrupt bureaucrcy. (The direction of “education,” the 
low coefficient of “inequality,” and the insignificance of “press and trade freedom” are 
subject to further investigation beyond the aims of this study).    
When the main independent variables “population per regional government” and 
“average area of first-tier units” entered the regression, the goodness of fit improves .4 
percentage points. The direct effect of “population per regional government” is highly 
significant. (The null hypothesis that the true slope coefficient is zero is clearly rejected, given 
that “population per regional government” and “corruption” are uncorrelated in only fourteen 
out of ten thousand occasions). These findings provide strong support for the first hypothesis 
that countries with more population per regional government have better (higher CPI) 
corruption ratings. The size of the partial slope co fficient implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in “population per regional government” will be associated to an 
improvement in the country’s corruption rating by about 100% of a standard deviation, 
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assuming that all other factors affecting corruption are held constant. (The true value of the 
coefficient of “population per regional government” lies within the 95% confidence interval 
between .41 and 1.63). On the other hand, the marginal coefficient of “average area of first-
tier units” could indicate that its effect on corruption is partially captured by “population per 
regional government,” which could introduce a host of multicullinearity problems, as both 
variables measure similar effects on corruption. Consequently, I ran an additional regression 
(not shown in Table 2.3), excluding “population perr gional government,” and the parameter 
of “average area of first-tier unit” dramatically improves to .35 (reinforced at a p-value of 
.05). These results provide some support for the second hypothesis that countries which on 
average are divided into geographically small first-tier subnational governments are more 
corrupt.  
The fourth column in Table 2.3 reports the direct effect on corruption of three specific 
measures of decentralisation. However, only “tiers of ubnational governance” is significant 
at less than 5%. The size of the coefficient implies that if a country decreases its tiers of 
subnational governments by one unit, ceteris paribus, the corruption ratings should improve 
by .44 points (on a scale of 0 to 10). For example, if Venezuela were to decrease its number of 
subnational governments from four to three, its forecasted mean corruption score would 
improve from 1.9 to about 2.4. The theoretical rationale for this phenomenon could be that as 
competition between different autonomous governments to extract bribes from the same 
economic actor often leads to the problem of “overgrazing” (Treisman, 2000: 433). “Fiscal 
decentralisation” and “federal status,” on the other hand, appear to be insignificantly related to 
corruption, which contradicts classical theories for reasons that are beyond the scope of this 
study. I also tested an interaction term defined as “electoral decentralisation” by multiplying 
“democracy” times “federal status.” The interaction term entered the regression with a 
positive coefficient of .49, with a p-value of .06; which provides some support to the 
theoretical argument that having a democratic governm nt closer to the citizens is easier to 




















    1.02***  1.30  1.22**   Population per Regional 
Government  (3.30) (0.78) (2.54)  
 0.02 0.43 0.28  
Average Area of First-tier Unit 
 (0.09) (0.18) (0.90)  
   0.34***    0.26**    0.26**   0.31*  0.34* 
Democracy 
(3.26) (2.51) (2.50) (1.86) (1.91) 
   -3.06***    -2.22**    -2.22**   -3.41**   -3.02* 
Education 
(-2.79) (-2.11) (-2.10) (-2.22) (-1.75) 
   -0.04***     -0.04***     -0.04***   -0.04**     0.05**  
Inequality 
(-2.83) (-2.79) (-2.78) (-2.57) (-2.44) 
   2.19***     2.25***     2.27***   1.81**    2.08**  
Protestantism 
(3.20) (3.52) (3.47) (2.35) (2.46) 
   2.20***     1.94***     1.95***     2.31***     2.37***  
GDP per Capita (PPP) 
(5.20) (4.81) (4.77) (3.35) (3.07) 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Press Freedom 
(-0.04) (-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.94) (-0.65) 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Trade Freedom 
(0.90) (1.11) (1.11) (1.06) (0.78) 
  -0.07   Interaction (Pop. per Region & 
Ave. Area of First-tier Unit)    (-0.17)   
   0.41 0.80 
Fiscal Decentralisation 
   (0.34) (0.58) 
     -0.44**  -0.35* 
Tiers of Subnational Governance 
   (-2.45) (1.70) 
   -0.68 -0.42 
Federal Status 
   (-1.47) (0.80) 
    0.33 
Total Population 
    (0.69) 
    0.24 
Total Area (Km2) 
    (0.68) 
Observations 94 94 94 63 63 
Adjusted R-squared 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.72 
 
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corr cted for heteroscedasticity. In all cases, the computed f-values (between 15 and 
40) clearly exceed the critical f-values at 1%; hence, the null hypothesis that the coll ctive impact of all explanatory variables is 
simultaneously equal to zero is rejected. Significance: * p < 10%; ** p < 5%; *** p < 1%. 
 
 31 
Additionally, I computed a logarithmic weighted average of six measures and sub-
measures of decentralisation defined as the “extent of decentralisation,” and tested its effect 
on the multiple regression model. Given that the proxies for “population per regional 
government” and “average area of first-tier unit” explain similar effects of the variation in 
“corruption,” each were assigned with a 15% weight. T e same applies to “federal status” and 
“electoral decentralisation”. “Fiscal decentralisaton” and “tiers of subnational governance,” 
on the other hand, made up for the remaining 40%, evenly distributed with 20% each. In line 
with the theory that the different measures and sub-measures of decentralisation are somewhat 
independent of each other and do not move in tandem (Sharma, 2006), the imperfect proxy 
“extent of decentralisation” entered the regression model with an insignificant coefficient. 
The logic behind these findings could be that some measures of decentralisation improve 
corruption ratings such as “electoral decentralisation,” and some measures of decentralisation 
worsen corruption ratings such as “tiers of subnation l governance.” Hence, it is not plausible 
to accurately explain the overall effect of decentralisation on corruption, because its 
individual measurements tend to cancel each other out.  
The fifth column reports the direct effect of “total population” and “total area” on the 
model. I excluded “population per regional governmet” and “average area of first-tier unit” 
to avoid severe problems of multicollinearity. The strength of the direct association of “total 
population” and “total area” with “corruption” turned out to be insignificant. It should be 
noted that “GDP per capita (PPP)” is highly significant throughout the regressions tests. The 
size of the coefficients imply that a one standard deviation increase in “GDP per capita 
(PPP)” will be associated to an improvement in the country’s corruption rating by more than 
200% of a standard deviation. As a final point, I would like to add that the specific hypothesis 
that countries which have more first-tier subnational governments relative to their population 
are more corrupt is also reinforced because the variance inflation factor (VIF) of “population 
per regional government” is constantly below what is commonly agreed on as the barrier for 
multicollinearity of 4. (Naturally, the VIF of “population per regional government” 
dramatically improves when “average area of first-tier unit” and/or “total population” are/is 







2.4   CONCLUSIONS 
 
It is a complex task to measure the extent of decentralisation. And it is even harder to measure 
the overall impact of decentralisation on corruption. This is due mainly because 
decentralisation is defined and measured differently i  different studies (Sharma, 2006). For 
example, some decentralisation-related studies use the Government Finance Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a general measure for the extent of decentralisation and 
its overall impact on corruption such as the case of Fisman and Gatti (2002a; 2002b). 
However, in reality this variable is only valid as n imperfect proxy for fiscal decentralisation, 
since it does not include information on the level of autonomy of subnational governments in 
terms of their revenues or expenditures, which is important information when analysing 
decentralisation. Which country is more decentralised? One that has subnational powers to tax 
and spend (fiscal decentralisation), but the rulers are directly appointed by national 
headquarters (lack of electoral decentralisation or deconcentration of power), or another 
country where subnational governments are financed by funds and transfers by the central 
government (fiscal centralisation) but are endowed ith complete autonomy to legislate 
(decision decentralisation). In addition to the problems of accurately measuring and defining 
decentralisation, its different measures and sub-measur s are somewhat independent of each 
other and do not move in tandem. 
In this paper I do not intend to capture the overall effect of decentralisation on 
corruption. I only intend to capture the effect of two specific sub-measures of size 
decentralisation. In particular, I found that the association between the dependent variable 
“corruption” and “population per regional government” is highly significant and is robust to 
control for a wide range of potential sources of omitted variable bias,8 which provide strong 
support for the first hypothesis that countries which have more first-tier subnational 
governments relative to their population are more corrupt. The channels that rationalise the 
above-mentioned hypothesis suggest that the benefits of having a  regional government closer 
to the citizens, which in theory should increase the controls of corruption, is dominated by the 
argument that in smaller jurisdictions corruption is less costly. It appears to be the case that 
public servants in small jurisdictions tend to be captured more easily by the corrupt private 
                                                
8 I also found that fully democratic wealthy countries with high share of Protestantism and less tiers of 
government are less corrupt. On the other hand, the negative sign of “education” is subject to further 
investigation because it does not support the classi l theories of corruption, as is the case with the insignificant 
effect of three traditionally significant controls of corruption: income inequalities, liberty of press, and openness 
to trade. 
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elite (Prud’homme, 1995). This is due mainly because regional control and accountability 
mechanisms (such as legal and regulatory sanctions, c des of conduct, whistleblowing, and 
independent watchdogs in the public sector) are weaker compared to national ones (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 2006). And also because, public servants in regional governments are 
relatively more unreliable, underpaid, uncooperative and unmotivated in comparison to their 
national level counterparts (Bardhan, 2002). Besides, family and personal ties between the 
private sector and corrupt officials tend to be closer in smaller jurisdictions (Tanzi, 1995). 
Another rationale that explains the association betwe n “corruption” and “population per 
regional government” is that the greater the number of fi st-tier subnational units with 
monopolistic regulatory powers to impose independent bribes, the greater the total number of 
bribes in the country (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
The direction of causality presents a significant limitation that is very hard to solve. 
This is why all decentralisation and corruption studies must rely on the underlying theory. 
One statistical solution to this endogenous problem is to develop a research design that 
observes changes in corruption over time and then to relate these changes to decentralisation. 
For example, it would be feasible, though not entirly accurate, to examine the 
decentralisation variable a few years before the corruption variable. By doing so it may be 
plausible to verify the influential causality of decentralisation on corruption (Treisman, 2000).  
However, even if a correct research design were to be developed, it is impossible to 
completely separate decentralisation from corruption, because the interaction between the two 
variables is the result of an extremely complex and continuously changing phenomenon that 
involves several economic, political, cultural, and historical factors. In fact, separating 
corruption from anything related to governance is very difficult because it appears that 
corruption is an integral part of the government. As Bardhan (2002: 203) correctly points out: 
“Before being too quick to claim that decentralisation brought about certain outcomes, it is 
worth considering that decentralisation may have result d from ongoing political and 
economic changes that also affected these same outcomes. Separating decentralisation from 
its political and economic causes, so that decentralisation is not just a proxy for an ill-defined 









Table A2.4  Definition of the Data 
 
Variable Interpretation Source Year 
Corruption Perception of corruption, not the actual level of corruption. Transparency International 2009 
Population per Regional 
Government 
Total population divided by total number of regional governments 
(first-tier subnational unit). 
UN Department of Economic & 
Social Affairs, and ISO 3166 
Subdivision Codes.  
2009 
Average Area of First-Tier 
Unit 
Total area (km2) divided by total number of regional governments 
(first-tier subnational unit) 




Electoral processes, pluralism, generalised participation, 
functioning of government, civil liberties, and political culture. 
Economist Intelligence Unit index 2008 
Education 
Two-thirds weighting to adult literacy rate and one-third to 
combined gross school enrolment ratio. 
United Nations index 2008 
Inequality Statistical dispersion of income inequality. 
CIA World Factbook Gini inequality 
coefficient 
2008 
Protestantism Share of Protestant Religion in the Country 
International Religious Freedom 
Report (USA State Department)  
2004 
GDP per Capita (PPP) 
Value of goods and services divided by population (takes into 
account relative cost of living and inflation rates).  




Freedom of journalists and media, and efforts made by 
governments to see that press freedom is respected. 
Reporters Without Borders  2009 
Trade Freedom Measures the absence of tariff and no-tariff barriers. 
Heritage Foundation and The Wall 
Street Journal Trade Freedom index 
2009 
Property Rights Protection of property rights, including financial assets. 
Global Competitiveness Report 
(World Economic Forum) 
2008-
2009  
Strength of Auditing and 
Reporting Standards 
Financial auditing and reporting standards regarding company 
financial performance. 
Global Competitiveness Report 
(World Economic Forum) 
2008-
2009  
Regulatory Quality Obstacles generated by excessive regulations.  
Worldwide Governance Research 
Dataset (World Bank) 
2008 
Government Effectiveness 
Quality of public management, credibility in implemntation of 
public policies, and capabilities of public employees.  
Worldwide Governance Research 
Dataset (World Bank) 
2008 
Reliability of Police 
Services 
Police services reliability to enforce law and order.  
Global Competitiveness Report 
(World Economic Forum) 
2008-
2009  
Judicial Independence  
Judiciary independency from influences of government, citizens, or 
firms. 
Global Competitiveness Report 




Two-thirds weighting to revenue and one-third to expense (regional 
level of government). 




Tiers of Subnational 
Governance 
Total number of vertical subnational levels of government. ISO 3166 Subdivision Codes 2009 





Table A2.5  Main Independent Variables 
 
  Administrative Division Nº of Total Total  Population  Average 
Country First-Tier Subnational Governments First-Tier Population Area per Regional Area of First- 
  (Regional level between central and local) Units (2009 est.) (km2) Government Tier Unit 
Afghanistan 34 Provinces 34 28,150,000 652,230 827,941 19,183 
Albania 12 Counties 12 3,170,000 28,748 264,167 2,396 
Algeria 48 Provinces 48 34,895,000 2,381,740 726,979 49,620 
Angola 18 Provinces 18 18,498,000 1,246,700 1,027,667 69,261 
Argentina 23 Provinces, 1 Federal District 24 40,134 425 2,780,400 1,672,268 115,850 
Armenia 10 Regions, 1 City 11 3,230,100 29,743 293,645 2,704 
Australia 6 States, 2 Territories  8 22,117,000 7,692,024 2,764,625 961,503 
Belarus 6 Oblasts  6 9,671,900 207,600 1,611,983 34,600 
Belgium 3 Regions  3 10,827,519 30,528 3,609,173 10,176 
Benin 12 Departments 12 8,935,000 112,622 744,583 9,385 
Bolivia 9 Departments  9 9,879,000 1,098,581 1,097,667 122,065 
Bulgaria 28 Regions 28 7,576,751 110,879 270,598 3,960 
Burkina Faso 45 Provinces 45 15,757,000 274,200 350,156 6,093 
Burundi 16 Provinces 16 8,303,000 27,830 518,938 1,739 
Cameroon 10 Regions 10 19,522,000 475,440 1,952,200 47,544 
Canada 10 Provinces, 3 Territories 13 33,968,000 9,984,670 2,612,923 768,052 
Central African Rep. 16 Prefectures, 1 Capital 17 4,422,000 622,984 260,118 36,646 
Chad 22 Regions 22 11,274,106 1,284,000 512,459 58,364 
Chile 13 Regions 13 17,020,000 756,102 1,309,231 58,162 
Colombia 32 Departments, 1 Capital District 33 45,267 000 1,141,748 1,371,727 34,598 
Costa Rica 7 Provinces  7 4,579,000 51,100 654,143 7,300 
Cote d'Ivoire 16 Regions 16 21,075,000 322,463 1,317,188 20,154 
Croatia 20 Counties, 1 City 21 4,435,056 56,594 211,193 2,695 
Cuba 14 Provinces, 1 Special Municipality 15 11,2040 0 110,860 746,933 7,391 
Czech Republic 14 Regions, 1 Municipality 15 10,513397 77,276 700,893 5,152 
Denmark 5 Regions  5 5,532,531 43,094 1,106,506 8,619 
Dominican Republic 29 Provinces, 1 District 30 10,09 , 00 48,380 336,333 1,613 
Ecuador 22 Provinces 22 14,113,000 276,840 641,500 12,584 
El Salvador 14 Departments 14 6,163,000 20,720 440,214 1,480 
Eritrea 6 Provinces  6 5,073,000 121,320 845,500 20,220 
Estonia 15 Counties 15 1,340,415 43,211 89,361 2,881 
France 22 Regions, 4 Overseas Departments 26 65,073,482 640,053 2,502,826 24,617 
Georgia 9 Reg., 2 Autonomous Republics, 1 City 12 4,385,400 69,700 365,450 5,808 
Germany 16 Lands 16 81,789,573 357,114 5,111,848 22,320 
Ghana 10 Regions 10 23,837,000 238,533 2,383,700 23,853 
Greece 13 Administrative Regions 13 11,306,183 130,800 869,706 10,062 
Guatemala 22 Departments 22 14,027,000 108,430 637,591 4,929 
Guinea 7 Governorates  7 10,069,000 245,857 1,438,429 35,122 
Guyana 10 Regions 10 762,000 214,696 76,200 21,470 
Haiti 9 Departments  9 10,033,000 27,560 1,114,778 3,062 
Honduras 18 Departments 18 7,466,000 111,890 414,778 6,216 
Iraq 18 Governorates 18 30,747,000 435,244 1,708,167 24,180 
Ireland 4 Provinces  4 4,459,300 70,273 1,114,825 17,568 
Israel 6 Districts  6 7,509,000 22,072 1,251,500 3,679 
Italy 20 Regions 20 60,231,214 301,336 3,011,561 15,067 
Jamaica 14 Parishes 14 2,719,000 10,831 194,214 774 
Japan 47 Prefectures 47 127,530,000 374,744 2,713,404 7,973 
Jordan 12 Governorates 12 6,316,000 91,971 526,333 7,664 
Kazakhstan 14 Regions, 2 Cities 16 15,776,492 2,724,900 986,031 170,306 
Kuwait 6 Governorates  6 2,985,000 17,820 497,500 2,970 
Kyrgyzstan 7 Regions, 1 City  8 5,482,000 199,951 685,250 24,994 
Laos 16 Provinces, 1 Capital City 17 6,320,000 236,800 371,765 13,929 
Lebanon 8 Governorates  8 4,224,000 10,452 528,000 1,307 
Liberia 15 Counties 15 3,476,608 111,355 231,774 7,424 
Libya 34 Municipalities 34 6,420,000 1,759,540 188,824 51,751 
Lithuania 10 Counties 10 3,329,227 65,300 332,923 6,530 
Malaysia 13 States, 3 Federal Territories 16 28,306,700 330,803 1,769,169 20,675 
Mali 8 Regions, 1 District  9 14,517,176 1,240,000 1,613,020 137,778 
Mauritania 12 Regions, 1 District 13 3,291,000 1,025,520 253,154 78,886 
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Moldova 10 Districts, 2 Territories, 1 City 13 3,567,500 33,846 274,423 2,604 
Morocco 16 Economic Regions 16 31,698,000 446,550 1,981,125 27,909 
Mozambique 10 Provinces, 1 City 11 20,226,296 801,590 1,838,754 72,872 
Netherlands 12 Provinces 12 16,582,600 37,354 1,381,883 3,113 
New Zealand 2 Islands  2 4,350,600 270,467 2,175,300 135,234 
Nicaragua 16 Departments, 2 Autonomous Regions 18 5,743,000 130,373 319,056 7,243 
Niger 7 Departments, 1 Urban Community  8 15,290,00 1,267,000 1,911,250 158,375 
Panama 9 Provinces, 5 Districts 10 3,454,000 75,417 345,400 7,542 
Papua New Guinea 1 District, 19 Provinces 20 6,732,000 462,840 336,600 23,142 
Paraguay 17 Departments, 1 Capital City 18 6,349,000 406,752 352,722 22,597 
Peru 24 Departments, 1 Constitutional Province 25 29,132,013 1,285,216 1,165,281 51,409 
Poland 16 Provinces 16 38,100,700 312,685 2,381,294 19,543 
Romania 40 Departments, 1 Municipality 41 21,466,174 238,391 523,565 5,814 
Russia 21 Rep, 6 Terr., 50 Reg., 10 Dist., 2 Cities  89 141,915,979 17,098,242 1,594,562 192,115 
Rwanda 4 Provinces, 1 Town Council   5 9,998,000 26,338 1,999,600 5,268 
Saudi Arabia 13 Provinces 13 25,721,000 2,149,690 1,978,538 165,361 
Senegal 14 Regions 14 12,534,000 196,722 895,286 14,052 
Sierra Leone 1 Area, 3 Provinces  4 5,696,000 71,740 1,424,000 17,935 
Slovakia 8 Regions   8 5,421,937 49,037 677,742 6,130 
South Korea 9 Provi., 6 Metropolitan Cities, 1 Capit l 16 48,333,000 99,828 3,020,813 6,239 
Spain 17 Autonomous Communities 17 45,967,632 505,992 2,703,978 29,764 
Sri Lanka 9 Provinces  9 20,238,000 65,610 2,248,667 7,290 
Sudan 26 States  26 39,154,490 2,505,813 1,505,942 96,377 
Suriname 10 Districts 10 520,000 163,820 52,000 16,382 
Syria 14 Provinces 14 21,906,000 185,180 1,564,714 13,227 
Tajikistan 1 Autonomous Region, 2 Regions  3 6,952,000 143,100 2,317,333 47,700 
Tanzania 26 Regions 26 43,739,000 945,087 1,682,269 36,350 
Thailand 75 Prov., 1 Metropolitan Administration 76 63,389,730 513,120 834,075 6,752 
Togo 5 Regions  5 6,619,000 56,785 1,323,800 11,357 
Trinidad and Tobago 11 Regions, 5 Municipalities 16 1,339,000 5,130 83,688 321 
Tunisia 24 Governorates 24 10,327,800 163,610 430,325 6,817 
Turkey 81 Provinces 81 71,517,100 783,562 882,927 9,674 
Turkmenistan 5 Regions  5 5,110,000 488,100 1,022,000 97,620 
Uganda 80 Districts 80 32,710,000 241,550 408,875 3,019 
Ukraine 24 Regions, 1 Republic, 2 Cities 27 46,011,345 603,500 1,704,124 22,352 
United Kingdom 9 Regions  9 62,041,708 242,900 6,893,523 26,989 
USA 50 Sates, 1 District, 6 Outlying Areas 57 308,493 000 9,629,091 5,412,158 168,931 
Venezuela 23 States, 1 Federal District 24 28,627,000 912,050 1,192,792 38,002 
Vietnam 64 Provinces 64 85,789,573 331,212 1,340,462 5,175 
Yemen 19 Governorates, 1 City 20 23,580,000 527,968 1,179,000 26,398 
Zambia 9 Provinces  9 12,027,000 752,612 1,336,333 83,624 
 
Note: The total sample is constituted by 100 randomly selected countries. The sample, however, makes no clear 












FLAWED DECENTRALISATION  







This multiple case study focuses on the following four factors, which are all related to flawed 
decentralisation, that increase bureaucratic corruption at local levels of government in 
Venezuela: (1) municipal atomisation, i.e., newly created local units of government in 
relatively poor and scarcely populated small territo ies; (2) increasing local bureaucracy as 
measured by public salaries and number of bureaucrats; (3) vertical fiscal imbalances due to 
the absence of revenue autonomy; and (4) the creation of community councils, which 
introduce new tiers of undemocratic, dependent governm nts. A viable government measure 
that would address these salient factors would be to consolidate small units and allow more 
flexible changes to the rate of at least one important local tax. 
 
 
KEYWORDS -- decentralisation · corruption · Venezuela · bureaucratic mismanagement · 
ethics 
  
                                                
9 The literary review of this case study titled ‘Public Performance and Decentralisation in Emerging Countries’ 
was presented at the 10th European Academy of Management (EURAM) general conference in Rome 2010. An 
approximation of the findings titled ‘Why is Flawed Decentralisation Generating Corruption in Venezuela’ was 
presented at the 27th European Group for Organisational Studies (EGOS) colloquium in Goteborg 2011. The
author gratefully acknowledges the support of ESADE professors Pere Puig Bastard and Nuria Agell, thoug  the 
views and content expressed are the sole responsibility of the author. 
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3.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Why has flawed decentralisation worsened corruption in Venezuela? This inductive research 
question is addressed as part of an ongoing project that began in 2005. The aim of the 
research is to show that some specific components of decentralisation in Venezuela have 
aggravated corruption through four causal mechanisms: increasing the number of 
municipalities, increasing the size of the local public sector work force, forcing municipalities 
to rely heavily on central government money transfers, and giving rise to a third subnational 
tier of government. The country examined in the study, Venezuela, poses issues that are 
interesting to the empirical literature by virtue of the broad political changes that have taken 
place there in recent years. 
 In this paper I demonstrate these points through a descriptive account based on group 
and individual interviews, as well as on published t xts available in Venezuela. I also use this 
account to support an analytical claim that a viable government initiative to reduce the 
number of subnational units and increase revenue autonomy would decrease corruption. The 
focus groups took place in Margarita Island, Nueva Esparta State, and the personal semi-
structured interviews were conducted on site at two municipalities, central government 
offices, and one community council. The research process separated and treated these 
locations as independent sub-cases of the general case study on flawed decentralisation and 
corruption in Venezuela.  
The research developed around two conceptual links: (1) that corruption leads to 
flawed decentralisation and (2) that flawed decentralisation may increase corruption in an 
already corrupt environment, especially when local mechanisms of control and accountability 
(e.g., independent whistleblowers and regulatory sanctions) are weaker than their counterparts 
at the central or national level. Throughout the paper, corruption is defined as the misuse of 
power for personal gain, while decentralisation is defined as the devolution of power to 
subnational governments. 
The paper advances the literature in several ways. While some academics trained in 
the deductive methodology may question the validity of qualitative research, hard data at the 
micro-level are unique, necessary, and very challenging to gather in developing countries. 
Additionally, we do not adequately understand the causative factors that are generating local 
government corruption and mismanagement in developing countries. Therefore, more 
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evidence from case studies is needed before we can discern the direction of future research. 
As Fan, Lin, and Treisman (2009: 33) acknowledge, “the direction of causation is open to 
question for all the dimensions of decentralisation examined.”  
The paper is organised in seven short sections. The next section examines theories 
regarding corruption and decentralisation and describes the unit of analysis (local governance 
in Venezuela). The third section explains the methodol gy and defines the dependent variable 
of the case study (i.e., high corruption in Venezuela). The fourth section introduces an 
approximation of the findings (i.e., indirect causes of high corruption in Venezuela). The fifth 
section analyses the four explanatory factors of interest (municipal atomisation, increasing 
local bureaucracy, lack of revenue autonomy, and creation of community councils). The sixth 
section offers specific guidance to practitioners by formulating three viable government 




3.2   REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
3.2.1   Corruption and Decentralisation Theories 
 
Corruption is the misuse of public power for personal gain. This definition has been widely 
used by Transparency International (TI), although TI now uses “abuse” instead of “misuse,” 
“entrusted” instead of “public,” and “private” instead of “personal.” According to Tanzi 
(1998), the harmful effects of corruption on the quality of government are significant because 
corruption undermines the essential government obligations to respect contracts, protect 
private property, and deliver impartial justice.10   
Previous studies have shown that corruption increases consumer price inflation 
(Cukierman et al., 1992), raises real interest rates (Bahmani and Nasir, 2002), consolidates 
socioeconomic inequalities (Alonso-Terme et al., 1998), encourages unproductive public 
policy choices such as less spending on education and more spending on defense (Mauro, 
1998), diminishes the legitimacy of governments to the point of instigating civil wars 
                                                
10 Some well-known corrupt activities are pay-offs, bribery, collection of charge fees, illegal gifts, illic t 
contributions, tax evasion or fraud, nepotism or pat onage, unlawful appropriation of public funds or state 
property, abuse of public authority, traffic of influences, acceptance of compensation and gifts, use of privileged 
information, and any other activity that influences the political and public system with the objective of obtaining 
either direct or indirect benefits (Harch, 1993). 
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(Klitgaard, 1990), and functions as an arbitrary tax (amounting to 20% of total business 
returns) that significantly inhibits the rate of investment (Wei, 1999) and that decreases 
economic growth by approximately 0.5% annually (Mauro, 1995).  
Decentralisation is the transfer of decision-making powers, including real control over 
local revenues, to democratically elected subnationl tiers of government. Decentralisation is 
commonly associated with improving public accountability (Seabright, 1996), strengthening 
institutional and technological innovations (Besley and Case, 1995), increasing the 
responsiveness of government (Maskin et al., 2000), and encouraging economic growth (Qian 
and Roland, 1998; Jin et al., 1999; Akai and Sakata, 2002). 
Decentralisation programs involve a division of powers (subnational units and 
government tiers) in the fiscal, legislative, electoral, personnel, control, and administrative 
domains. Fiscal decentralisation is the capacity to aut nomously collect taxes and execute 
subnational expenditures. Legislative decentralisation is decision-making autonomy at 
subnational levels of government. Electoral decentralisation is the constitutional right to 
democratically elect subnational government authoriies. Personnel decentralisation is the 
proportion of public servants belonging to subnational governments in relation to their 
national level counterparts. Control decentralisation is the right to veto national public 
policies by subnational governments. Subnational-unit decentralisation relates to the number 
of government units at a horizontal level, whereas government-tiers decentralisation relates to 
the number of government units at different vertical levels.11      
The relationship between corruption and decentralisation deserves special attention 
because it has become an unsettled question in the literature. Classical theory tends to suggest 
that public expenditure at subnational levels of government and perceived corruption are 
inversely related (Huther and Shah, 1998; de Mello and Barenstein, 2001; Fisman and Gatti, 
2002a). These groundbreaking papers, however, only define fiscal decentralisation from the 
expenditure side and do not include the devolution-of-revenue effect. Further, Huther and 
Shah (1998) do not perform any statistical controls, whereas de Mello and Barenstein (2001) 
only control for population and per capita GDP. Although Fisman and Gatti’s (2002a) 
research includes a wide range of controls (including per capita GDP, civil liberty, population 
density, ethnic diversity, openness to trade, governm nt size, and colonial history), the effect 
                                                
11 This paper focuses on four components of decentralization as listed below with the specific feature in 
parentheses: fiscal (lack of revenue autonomy), electoral (creation of community councils), subnational units 
(municipal atomization), and personnel (increased local bureaucracy). 
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of the Protestant tradition was omitted. According to Treisman (2002), the inclusion of this 
variable decreases the significance of the regression . 
 
 
3.2.2   Weak Assumptions Regarding Decentralisation 
 
Dating back to Tiebout’s (1956) seminal work, the majority of empirical studies have 
exaggerated the theoretical merits of decentralisation. This exaggeration is based mainly on 
the shaky assumption that decentralisation increases competition among subnational 
governments and that inter-jurisdictional competition generates a long list of beneficial 
spillover effects on governance. 
The subnational competition assumption takes for granted the proposition that 
government responsibilities are perfectly defined. In reality, “if decentralisation creates 
multiple tiers of government, it could weaken accountability, since voters would have greater 
difficulty attributing blame for failures and credit for successes” (Fisman and Gatti, 2002a: 
328). Classical theories of decentralisation also assume that subnational information is 
relatively more accessible to local officials (Inman nd Rubinfeld, 1996, 1997). This 
assumption is also unsustainable for several reasons. The majority of national-level agents are 
residents of subnational governments; thus, they have exactly the same capacities as local 
officials to perceive and understand heterogeneous regional and local information (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee, 2006). Furthermore, national governm ts’ economies of scale are likely to 
produce institutional advantages in obtaining and comprehending all types of information 
(Prud’homme, 1995). 
The theories of decentralisation are also based on the unrealistic assumption that 
subnational governments are divided and organised according to the needs and preferences of 
their constituents. In reality, the regional and local governments of developing countries are 
divided mainly on the basis of their potential income rather than on the basis of qualitative 
differences such as ethno-linguistic or geographical differences (Prud’homme, 1995). In the 
specific case of Venezuela, the first-tier division of government could ideally be organised 
into nine administrative regions corresponding to climatic and bio-geographical regions, but 
the nation has actually been divided into twenty-three states plus the capital district. More 
than four decades ago, the nine regions were already divided by a 1969 decree on 
regionalisation that institutionalised a process of regional development; however, in practice, 
this decree has never been put into effect. The nin regions that should have been 
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institutionalised by the 1969 regionalisation decre are far more internally homogeneous than 
the actual 24 first-tier subnational division. (The hypothetical nine regions are shown in Table 
A1 after the reference list).  
Fifty years after the publication of Tiebout’s piece, its theoretical assumptions about 
decentralisation are starting to generate more doubts than answers. The first real challenge to 
orthodox theory was Tanzi’s (1995) suggestion that institutional imperfections might exist in 
the production, administration, and distribution of public goods and services at subnational 
levels of government. In accordance with these arguments, Bardhan (1997) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) suggested that an increase in the number of local governments with a 
monopoly of regulatory power increases the total number of bribes. Bardhan (2002) later 
added that subnational governments of developing countries usually do not fulfill government 
objectives. Even if they harbor good intentions andre staffed by the appropriate public 
personnel, subnational governments of developing countries usually do not have sufficient 
income, constitutional authority, or administrative capacity to finance their responsibilities 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). 
 
 
3.2.3   Unit of Analysis: Decentralisation of Local Governance in Venezuela 
 
Modern local governance in Venezuelan started in 1958 with the birth of the current 
democracy, and with the promulgation of its basic law, the Constitution of 1961. In the 
following years, no major modifications arose in the processes of reforming local 
governments. However, in the mid-eighties the falling prices of oil and the economic 
programs promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), called the “Economic 
Package,” led to a severe political, economic, and democratic crisis associated with a massive 
popular revolt called “El Caracazo.” As a partial response to the severe institutional and 
democratic crisis in Venezuela, a decree calling for local elections was first introduced on 
June 15, 1989, and the first democratic election at a local level was carried out in 1992. Prior 
to that date, the President of the Republic designated the municipal mayors, and these mayors, 
in turn, named the members of the legislative councils a cording to regional constitutions.  
In the Presidential elections of 1998, six years after the first democratic elections at 
the local level, a popular movement of the Marxist left-wing group, led by Army Lieutenant 
Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías, succeeded in taking natio l office for the first time after more 
than four decades of bipartidism dominated by rightwing politicians. This situation brought 
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forth a total rupture of the traditional political structure. Subsequently, the process of drafting 
a new constitution was initiated in 1999, and the current Constitution was approved in 
December of the same year by a public referendum.  
Based on this new legal framework, a group of laws wa subsequently introduced to 
regulate public administration in Venezuela. Among these laws, two are particularly notable: 
the Organic Law of Public Administration (official gazette number 37,305; 17 October 2001), 
which establishes the principles and bases for regulating the organisation and functioning of 
Venezuela’s public administration, and the Organic Law of Planning (official gazette number 
5,554; 13 November 2001), which establishes the parameters for the organisation and 




3.3   METHODOLOGY 
 
3.3.1   Research Philosophy 
 
The research developed through several rounds of original fieldwork during which new local 
hard data were collected at the local level of government. The primary data collection 
techniques were semi-structured interviews and focus groups. The decision to rely on semi-
structured interviews rather than questionnaires wa necessary, not only because busy 
politicians and bureaucrats often prefer to be interviewed rather than to fill in a questionnaire; 
but also because public officials, who are deluged with paperwork, tend to treat a 
questionnaire as just another low priority piece of paperwork. In contrast, an in-depth 
interview can be a pleasant and informative interlude in a day otherwise dominated by 
paperwork. In total, 71 individuals from all sectors of society were interviewed or participated 
in the focus group exercises. The study scored high in validity tests because the data reflect 
reality in Venezuela. However, the study scored low in reliability tests because the 
methodology does not allow the findings to be replicated in other regions of the world. 
Despite the problems of access resulting from the sensitivity of the topic (corruption) 
to the gatekeepers (public officials and political authorities), the pool of respondents was well 
balanced: approximately 45% from the PSUV (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela), 
approximately 30% from the opposition, and approximately 25% from the community. Some 
of the more frequent elite respondents include the following: Alejandro Feo, opposition 
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municipality mayor of Naguanagua; Ibrain Velásquez, chavista municipality mayor of 
Gaspar-Marcano; David Baez, community leader and Justice of the Peace; Ricardo Gutierrez, 
former Vice-President of the National Assembly; and José Khan, Director of the Central Bank 
and Minister of Basic Industries and Mining.  
Access to the elite respondents was made possible through an anonymous common 
acquaintance. The introductions provided by this comm n acquaintance established 
familiarity and increased the willingness of the respondents to express their ideas and 
differences freely; moreover, this situation allowed the researcher to get close enough to the 
respondents to obtain valid data. Furthermore, according to Morgan (1993), a familiar 
environment is crucial to understand the intrinsic meaning of a specific phenomenon. For the 
purpose of this research, the interviews were conducte  on site, and the focus groups occurred 
at two specific locations in Porlamar and Juan Griego, state of Nueva Esparta.12   
The research identified the following consequences related to flawed decentralisation 
that contribute to bureaucratic corruption at local levels of government in Venezuela: 
municipal atomisation, increasing local bureaucracy, lack of revenue autonomy, and the 
creation of community councils. The independent sub-cases used to identify and explore these 
relevant issues are the municipalities of Gaspar-Marcano and Naguanagua, a sample from the 
national government, and a community council in Nueva Esparta state. Particular emphasis is 
given to the two municipalities because local governments are the first and most important 
locus of interaction between citizens and the public sector (Holden et al., 2003). 
The cases are considered to be sensible units of observations because they resemble 
the political landscape in Venezuela. The municipality of Gaspar-Marcano has a 
predominately poor total population of 31,959, most of whom are dedicated to traditional 
fishing, and it is run by Ibrain Velásquez, a veteran leftwing chavista leader. Naguanagua, 
with a total population of 168,000, consists primarily of rich neighborhoods in the industrial 
state of Carabobo and is run by a newcomer, Alejandro Feo, who is backed up by a centre-
right political party in the opposition bloc called Project Venezuela, which is not linked to the 
traditional parties AD (Acción Democrática) and COPEI (Comité de Organización Política 
Electoral Independente). Approximately two-thirds of the sample taken from the central 
government consists of PSUV members, which is the chavistas united political party, while 
the remaining one-third are mostly bureaucrat old-timers who profess no political affiliation 
but are known to be the remaining survivors of a four-decade unchecked bipartidism.  
                                                
12 The author appreciates the staff of the restaurants formerly called Margaritaville and Bongo Beach (where the 
focus groups took place) for setting up a comfortable nd relaxed atmosphere.   
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It is hard to estimate the political affiliation ofthe individuals interviewed from the 
community council. The first impression would indicate that most community councils are 
deconcentrated organisations of PSUV headquarters, since the financial bottom-line must be 
approved by the central administration. In summary, the sub-cases are comparable units of 
observation that behave similarly to the political onsequences of flawed decentralisation.       
 
 
3.3.2   Dependent Variable: High Corruption in Venezuela 
 
Venezuela’s corruption perception index (CPI), as repo ted by Transparency International, 
has worsened from a very low starting point of 2.7 in 1995, to 2.6 in 1999, 2.5 in 2002,  2.3 in 
2004, 2.0 in 2007, 1.9 in 2009, and slightly up to 2.0 in 2010. (The CPI ranges from zero to 
ten, with lower scores corresponding to worsening corruption ratings.) The World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Research Dataset and the Global Competitiveness Report by the 
World Economic Forum both corroborate that notion that corruption in Venezuela has 
become a generalised problem.  
According to Tanzi (1998), high corruption and weak public institutions are strongly 
associated. Tanzi (1998) argues that institutional weaknesses can be summarised as inefficient 
penalty and tax systems, poor bureaucratic quality, lack of checks and balances, rigid and 
obsolete regulations and authorisations, and lack of transparency in rules and processes. These 
institutional weaknesses are all present in Venezuela. Therefore, it should not come as a 
surprise that the high rate of corruption in Venezuela is associated with weak public 
institutions. In the specific case of Venezuela, the following problems are evident: an unstable 
legal framework, price controls on basic goods and services, over-reliance on oil for public 
revenues, severe market distortions through dual exchange rate, repeated attacks against press 
freedom, lack of judicial autonomy, nationalisation of the economy’s strongest industries, 
substantial trade barriers, constant threats to personal security, rigid labor laws, complex rules 
and regulations, crumbling infrastructure, and an increasingly powerful chavismo 
administration that resembles an unprecedented mix of Bolivar’s nationalism, Peron’s 
populism, Allende’s socialism, and Castro’s communism.  
The 2010-2011 Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum 
(Almunia et al., 2010) ranks Venezuela dead-last out of 139 countries in judicial 
independence, property rights, favoritism in decision  of government officials, burden of 
regulations, and efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes and challenging 
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regulations. These sub-indicators are also essential components of the general indicator 
“Public Institutions,” in which Venezuela also ranks last. Venezuela’s “voice and 
accountability” scores on the 1996-2008 Governance I dicators by the World Bank 
(Kaufmann et al., 2009), which are scaled between -2.5 and 2.5 with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes, also decreased from a low starting point of 
0.08 in 1996 to -0.62 in 2008. “Regulatory quality” also significantly worsened from -0.10 in 
1996 to -1.44 in 2008. “Rule of law” took an even larger drop over the same period from 0.60 




3.4 INDIRECT CAUSES OF HIGH CORRUPTION IN VENEZUELA 
 
In addition to the weakness of public institutions, high corruption in Venezuela can also be 
explained by eight indirect factors. The first five factors come from the literature, while the 
remaining three were derived from the interviews. (It should be noted that some of the causes 
presented next are controversial hypotheses which in many cases have not been proven and 
might even be offensive to some cultures):  
i) Tropical location: Venezuela is geographically located in a tropical poverty trap, and 
poverty drives corruption (Mauro, 1995; Glaeser andSaks, 2006). Sachs (1997) reports that 
annual growth rates of tropical countries between 1965 and 1990 were 1.3% lower than the 
growth rates in nations further away from the Equator. An argument that explains this 
phenomenon is that the equator region has historically witnessed a series of tropical disease 
outbreaks, which tend to lethally infect healthy, productive males who work in the 
countryside.  
ii) Spanish colonisation: Venezuela was colonised by Spain rather than by Great 
Britain. The logic behind the Spanish colonisation hypothesis is that the British common law 
system encouraged watchful societies because it more efficiently protected the private 
property held by the aristocrats against expropriation or regulation by the monarchy 
(Treisman, 2000).  
iii) Oil dependency: Venezuela’s economy is highly dependent on oil, which accounts 
for at least 90% of total exports and more than half of federal income. Easterly (2001) argues 
that economic dependence on natural resources generat s corruption mainly because of the 
corrupt incentives associated with the distribution of exploration rights.  
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iv) Lack of democracy: Venezuela’s form of democracy undermines key mechanisms 
of control and accountability such as independent whistleblowers and watchdogs. According 
to the Economist Intelligence Unit's 2008 Democracy Index, Venezuela is somewhere 
between a “flawed democracy” and an “authoritarian egime,” with a score of 5.34 on a scale 
from zero to ten.  
v) Low Protestant religious background: Venezuela has a relatively low Protestant 
population of less than 30% according to the 2004 US State Department's International 
Religious Freedom Report. Treisman (2000) quantified the effect of the Protestant religion on 
corruption, revealing an increase of 5% to 10% in the Protestant population decreases the 
level of corruption by approximately 11%. The reasons for this phenomenon are beyond the 
scope of this study.  
vi) Cultural/traditional injustices: In all interviews, at least half of my interviewees 
spent several minutes at the beginning of our conversations (always related to the general 
causes of high corruption in Venezuela), giving unsolicited descriptions of the injustices 
suffered by the bulk of the population. For example, Justice of the Peace and community 
council treasurer David Baez was quick to note another root cause of corruption in Venezuela: 
“After winning the election, they [political officials] are socially expected to repay their 
supporters, become a big man in their town, and recover the personal costs of running an 
expensive political campaign.” (Interview with David Baez, No 10.1, August 7, 2007).13  
vii) Corrupt idiosyncrasies: Ricardo Martinez (personal assistant to the Mayor of 
Gaspar-Marcano), added that from an “idiosyncratic” perspective the incoming Mayor has no 
choice but to hire his own supporters if the previous Mayor came from the opposition. 
Further, because the law prohibits the firing of bureaucrats, it should not come as a surprise 
that the bureaucracy is over-saturated. In Mr. Martinez’s own words: “We immediately had to 
bring in our own people at first because we had problems even in printing daily memos due to 
the constant sabotage by the opposing bureaucracy th t had governed here (municipality of 
Garspar-Marcano) for 16 straight years (four consecutive terms).” (Interview with Ricardo 
Martinez, No 15.1, January 9, 2009).14  
viii) Low public salaries: Low-level employees of the two municipalities interviewed 
tend to agree that a significant institutional root cause of corruption in Venezuela is that “the 
                                                
13 Transcripts or copies of notes of the author’s interviews are available on request by referring to the interview 
number. 
14 The current “Ley Orgánica del Trabajo” (Organic Law of Work, or LOT) of 1997, which is fundamentally the 
same as the original Law of 1936, practically prohibits (namely through articles 8, 105, 116, 127, 450, 449, 655, 
and 656) the firing of bureaucrats without strong ad irrefutable justification, citing employees’ immobility and 
stability as two keystones of long-term public lifecareers.      
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salaries paid here are eaten up by inflation and never cover employees’ basic needs; this is 
why at the end of the month (for example) traffic police officers find creative ways to increase 
their income” (Interview No 13.2, 2008). When questioned about salary in subsequent open-
ended interview sessions, over 90% of low-level personnel believed that corruption is morally 
acceptable if an official’s salary is not commensurate with his or her responsibility.  
One significant problem with public salaries in Venezuela is that increases are not 
evenly distributed. As a result, low-level public employees end up underpaid. In Venezuela 
from 2008 to 2009, salaries paid to government directors increased 42% and salaries paid to 
deputies in the National Assembly increased 44%, but the salaries of low-level workers 
increased only 17% for the same period (Tejero, 2010a). Thus, salary increases for low-level 
workers were below the 2009 inflation rate of 25%. 
Mookherjee and Png (1995) explain how higher public salaries can control corruption, 
applying an economic cost-benefit analysis to a case in which a public official monitors a 
polluting private firm. Let us suppose that an inspector from the environmental ministry visits 
the polluting private firm and that the firm has exc eded the legal levels of pollution. In this 
case, the public inspector will receive a reward in the form of a high salary as a work 
incentive, and the polluting firm will receive a fine as punishment. However, if the public 
inspector accepts a bribe and is discovered, then the public inspector and the corrupt firm will 
both suffer a penalty. Facing this typical case of corruption, only one of the following three 
possibilities will occur: First, if the fine is less than the bribe, then the firm prefers to pollute 
and pay the fine instead of paying an illegal and costly bribe. Second, if the penalty for the 
public inspector exceeds the bribe, then the public inspector will likely comply inefficiently 
with his/her functions to avoid unnecessary risks. Third, if the salary reward for the public 
inspector is greater than the costs associated with receiving a bribe, then the public inspector 
will probably reject future bribes and the environment will not suffer.   
 
   
 
3.5   FINDINGS REGARDING FLAWED DECENTRALISATION 
 
On top of the direct cause (weak public institutions) and the eight indirect causes mentioned 
in the previous section, high corruption in Venezuela could also be triggered by the following 
four interlinked factors related to flawed decentralisation: (1) an excessive number of 
municipalities; (2) an excessive number of local public personnel; (3) a lack of local revenue 
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autonomy; and (4) a lack of subnational democracy. In all cases, the common pattern when 
any of these factors is present is a weakening of accountability and, ultimately, an increase in 
incentives for corruption. Refer to Figure 3.1. (Figures and tables are found at the end of this 
paper, after the references list). 
 
 





The four flawed decentralisation factors identified n this case study are all interlinked 
among themselves in such a way that one issue leadsto another. Focusing on one or two 
factors, and not looking at the whole picture, would be insufficient to fully understand the 
research question: Why has flawed decentralisation w rsened corruption in Venezuela? For 
example, the first key concept discussed is the atomisation of local governments into small, 
non-viable units that are corrupt and ineffective. More municipalities lead, in turn, to increase 
the total amount of local bureaucracy, which increases the prevalence of rigid and obsolete 
municipal processes. In addition to the bureaucratic burden, efficiency is severely 



















bureaucracy and complete tasks once and for all,” one respondent nicely explained, “new 
forms of political participation had to be created” (Interview with community council 
secretary, No 9.2, August 4, 2007). The creation of ew forms of political participation, in 
turn, raises the question: Are community councils a further atomisation of local government? 
 
 
3.5.1   Municipal Atomisation 
 
The first scenario in which decentralisation can fail involves the atomisation of local 
government. As the term is used here, atomisation of local government refers to newly created 
local units of government in relatively poor and scarcely populated small territories. 
Throughout Latin America, atomisation of local government appears to be the rule and not the 
exception. For example, in Bolivia more than half of all municipalities have populations of 
less than 10,000 inhabitants, but such small municipalities account for only 9% of total 
population. In Ecuador, approximately two-thirds of local governments or cantons have 
populations of less than 50,000 inhabitants, and the vast majority of them are less than 25 
years old. The number of cantons in Ecuador has almost doubled during the last few decades 
from 113 to 219. In northwestern Europe, by contrast, the tendency is to reduce the number of 
local governments. For example, in Great Britain, the number of local governments has been 
reduced from 2,000 to approximately 500; in Germany, the number has been reduced from 
24,000 to 3,500; in Austria, the number has been reduc d from 4,000 to 2,300; and in 
Sweden, the number has been reduced from 2,500 to 270. This trend is also common in 
France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. 
The findings from the focus group discussions indicate that local government 
atomisation is linked to increasing corruption. Nagu nagua municipality Mayor Alejandro 
Feo nicely described this phenomenon in one of my interviews with him: “Only a few 
municipalities are rich and powerful; but the remaining vast majority is relatively poor, 
geographically small, newly created, and scarcely populated.” (Interview with Alejandro Feo, 
No 12.0, January 17, 2008). In Venezuela, one municipal ty in particular (Maracaibo) has a 
population of 1.5 million inhabitants. Three municipalities have populations of approximately 
800,000 inhabitants. Seven municipalities have populations of approximately 300,000 
inhabitants. However, the remaining 324 municipalities are remarkably poor and have 
relatively small populations. In fact, quite a few municipalities have populations of less than 
5,000 inhabitants. The mean population of the 335 municipalities in Venezuela is 
 51 
approximately 87,000 inhabitants. This observation is i line to the findings by Fan, Lin, and 
Treisman (2009: 33), which strongly argue that smaller local units are associated with more 
frequent and costly corruption; hence, “reducing the size of the lowest-level local units may 
also be a bad idea.” 
The main concern is that poor and unpopulated municipal ties increase all types of 
incentives for corruption due to their disadvantages in economies of scale, which in turn cause 
elected officials and public personnel of relatively small jurisdictions to be more vulnerable to 
capture by corrupt, local, private elites. This problem is particularly severe when local 
mechanisms of control and accountability are weaker than the corresponding mechanisms in 
the national government. Aside from the fact that smaller subnational governments tend to 
lack the capacity to coordinate central public policies effectively, in cases where vertical 
divisions of government increase, there is a tendency for the waste of public resources to also 
increase due to duplication. When respondents in this s udy were cued about municipal 
atomisation, this last point was strongly emphasized n all of my personal interviews and 
focus group discussions.  
 
 
3.5.2   Increasing Local Bureaucracy 
 
Midway into the research, the attention shifted from municipal atomisation to increasing local 
bureaucracy. When asked why municipal atomisation generates corruption and 
mismanagement, the most frequently repeated answer (ov  74%) to this pivotal question was 
that municipal atomisation indirectly drives corruption by increasing the total number of 
public personnel at subnational levels of government. In fact, every knowledgeable person 
interviewed strongly agreed on one particular point: municipal atomisation creates more 
patronage positions that are sold to local interests for funding associated with re-election 
purposes.  
These arguments help to understand the quantitative findings by Fan, Lin, and 
Treisman (2009), who documented the proposition that larger subnational bureaucracies are 
associated with more frequent and costly bribery. The relationship between higher 
government employment and increasing corruption was particularly strong among 
bureaucracies at the subnational level. On the other hand, the relationship does not necessary 
apply to higher employment by the central government or to total public employment, 
particularly if the findings relating to different developing countries are evaluated separately. 
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In Latin America, Chile is the only country to set limits on the size of the local-level 
public workforce relative to the size of the population (Nickson, 1998). This limit is 1 local 
government employee per 500 citizens. The 5 municipalities in the Caracas Metropolitan 
Area, on the other hand, average 1 local government employee for every 145 citizens. In 
Baruta, the ratio is 1 local government employee for every 312 citizens; in Libertador, the 
ratio is 1 public employee for 206 citizens; in El Hatillo, the ratio is 1 public employee for 
147 citizens; in Sucre, the ratio is 1 public employee for 89 citizens; and in Chacao, the ratio 
is 1 public employee for 59 citizens (Rodríguez, 2003). The number of citizens per public 
employee in these municipalities is, on average, lower than the 280 citizens per public 
employee observed in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Zo e and well below the 500 citizens 
per employee limit that was set by law in Chile (Nickson, 1998). In a similar study of 
municipalities in less developed states, the citizens per public employee ratios were even 
worse: 127 citizens in Amazonas, 124 citizens in Delta Amacuro, and 102 citizens in Nueva 
Esparta (González, 1998).   
In addition to the exceedingly large local bureaucrcy, the raw number of national 
level public personnel in Venezuela has almost doubled during the last decade; from 
1,293,227 employees in 2000, to 2,730,185 in 2008, and to 2,317,822 in 2010 (Caripa, 2008; 
Tejero, 2010b). In 2007, national level public personnel in Venezuela constituted 17% of the 
total labor force, and public employee salaries alone represented 19% of the total public 
budget (Tejero, 2007). In 2008, this share fell back to 17%; however, in 2009, this share 
rebounded to well over 23% of the total public budget (Tejero, 2009a). The greatest increase, 
in terms of number of workers, came from the oil company PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela 
S.A), whose workforce almost doubled from a total number of 49,180 workers in 2005 to 
91,949 workers in 2009 (Armas, 2010). By the end of 2010, PDVSA estimated that it had 
123,177 employees.   
It is important to note that local bureaucracy, as the term is being used here, refers to 
an excessive number of corrupt bureaucrats performing unnecessary governmental tasks that 
reflect rigid and obsolete rules and regulations at local levels of government. This definition, 
however, does not correspond to the classical definition of bureaucracy. Max Weber (1978) 
defined bureaucracy as an organisation with a hierarchical structure designed to coordinate 
many individuals in the pursuit of large-scale administrative tasks and organisational goals. 
“Weber was not simply an advocate of bureaucracy and its efficiency but also fundamentally 
critical and fearful of it” (Swedberg, 2005: 20). In reality, a bureaucracy is comprised of many 
departments and hierarchies that are structured in such a way that the ruler or elected official 
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is the principal, while the bureaucrat is the agent. Bureaucrats usually have their own personal 
objectives that are distinct from those of the ruler, and these distinct objectives give rise to 
agency problems. Like employees in any other organisation, government agents are also 
interested in their own welfare.     
 
 
3.5.3   Lack of Local Revenue Autonomy  
 
Local governments have assumed greater responsibilities that require the expenditure of 
funds, but they have experienced very little financi l autonomy. Most expenditures are still 
financed by constitutional funds and transfers from the national administration. In most cases, 
as much as 80% of the total local budget is financed by funds and transfers. The link between 
a lack of tax revenue autonomy and corruption has been well documented. More specifically, 
some models predict that the level of decentralisation relating to expenditure and revenue 
generation influences the extent of bureaucratic corruption (Fisman and Gatti, 2002b: 25-26). 
According to Fan, Lin, and Treisman (2009: 32), “giving local governments a larger stake in 
locally generated income can reduce their bribe extraction. Other things equal, in a country 
(such as Finland) in which subnational revenues came to 15% of GDP, the probability that 
firms would say they “never” had to make unofficial p yments to get things performed was 
.14 higher than in countries (such as Luxembourg) where subnational revenues were only 5% 
of GDP.”  
The reason that the lack of local revenue autonomy in developing countries such as 
Venezuela increases corruption is because it tends to i tort the optimal efficiency 
equilibrium between marginal costs and marginal profits, which is achieved through a gradual 
process of adjusting expenditures to benefits at the margin. That is, funds and transfers from 
the national administration significantly disrupt the government-enhancing decentralisation 
effects that result from a balance between effort and performance (Persson and Tabellini, 
2000) and thus undermine a key mechanism for controlli g corruption (Fisman and Gatti, 
2002b). Fisman and Gatti (2002a: 329) explain this p enomenon very well: “fiscal 
decentralisation, particularly to the extent that devolution of revenue raising and expenditure 
power corrects vertical fiscal imbalances across levels of government, is often quoted as an 
important ingredient for accountability and, ultimately, good governance.”  
The academic literature reveals a strong consensus on this matter. In an already 
corrupt political environment (such as Venezuela’s local governments) fiscal decentralisation 
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tends to have a significant negative relationship with corruption (de Mello and Berenstein, 
2001; Fisman and Gatti, 2002a; Arikan, 2004), but this positive effect occurs only when 
expenditure decentralisation (i.e., the power to spend) is accompanied by the devolution of 
subnational revenue generation (i.e., the power to tax) (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006).  
In relation to the specific case of Venezuela, the consensus that emerged in most of the 
focus group discussions (namely the focus groups in two municipalities) was that funds and 
transfers from the central government are not a source of corruption in themselves even 
though such funds and transfers generally constitute more than 80% of local budgets that are 
reported in Venezuela. This level of transfer actually exists in most European countries. 
Interestingly, the analysts who conducted the focus groups and explained the results to me 
suggested that Venezuela’s governmental transfers do not comply with a series of conditions 
that are generally present in countries that already h ve a well-developed political 
environment with strong independent public institutions. The interviewees claimed that 
government transfers do not necessarily increase corruption because the transfers are (1) 
transparent, (2) stable over time, (3) contract-based, (4) disbursed pursuant to allocation 
formulas that do not discourage local fiscal effort, and (5) disbursed automatically pursuant to 
objective indicators and not on an ad hoc or case-by-case negotiable basis.  
In effect, if the five conditions are satisfied, there is nothing wrong with consistent 
inter-governmental transfers. However, meeting all of these five conditions is impossible in 
an already highly corrupt political system with precarious public institutions, which is the 
case in Venezuela. Recently, the decrease in checks and balances that has occurred in the 
Chávez era is making it more difficult to efficiently comply with any of the conditional terms. 
In fact, every person interviewed, including members of the sample drawn from the central 
government, concur that government transfers in Venezuela do not efficiently comply with 
any of the five conditions. 
 
 
3.5.4   Creation of Community Councils 
 
The last decentralisation-related cause of corruption is the creation of a third subnational tier 
of government below the regional (state) and local (municipality) levels of government. 
Community councils are unelected, bottom-up institutions in which small groups of people 
(usually 200 to 400 families in the cities and 100 to 200 families in the rural areas) can 
exercise a united voice and obtain direct financial access to public decisions and resources.  
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A distinctive characteristic of community councils is that all members are on equal 
footing and are called “spokespeople” (Ellner, 2010: 90-91). Ellner adds that the wide-range 
of activities promoted by community councils demonstrates their ability to assume diverse 
responsibilities. To date, after approval in community assemblies, much of the money 
received and expended by community councils has been us d to construct priority public 
works projects such as community centers, roads, siewalks, family housing, and loans for 
small local businessmen. 
Community councils do have the potential to become a pivotal tool in Latin American 
politics. In reference to community councils, Petras (2007: 2) suggested that “the most 
important political change is the creation of new locally based forms of political 
representation in which elected community and communal institutions will be allocated state 
revenues rather than the corrupt, patronage-infested municipal and state governments.” In 
theory, to encourage decentralised decision-making w th community participation regarding 
public affairs is a relevant issue and requires more academic attention because the 
performance of citizen participation (Behn, 2002) and evaluation measures (Swindell and 
Kelly, 2000) have traditionally been neglected. However, the dark side of community 
councils is that these councils can be manipulated from above and may be detrimental to the 
proper democratic process. 
The data from the focus group interviews demonstrates that the main problems with 
community councils in Venezuela are straightforward. In the first place, community councils 
weaken established subnational institutions such as loc l and regional governments by 
introducing a third, semi-deconcentrated tier of government that is actually subject to the 
approval and discretion of an increasingly powerful national government. In the second place, 
a priori, democracy at any level should always be considered the best option for selecting 
officials because democracy improves economic policies and outcomes (Besley et al., 2005), 
encourages power of speech (Besley and Burgess, 2002), and fosters participation in a 
generalised interpretation of the rule of law (Bardhan, 2005). In the third place, the creation of 
dependent new tiers of government encourages collusion between agencies in the vertical 
bureaucratic hierarchy and overgrazing by different autonomous governments that all 
compete to extract bribes from the same economic actors.  
Approximately two thirds of the answers I obtained from the focus groups in response 
to a cue about mismanagement problems in community councils involved some combination 
of the three arguments mentioned above. (The specific question was: In what sense do 
community councils generate mismanagement?) The latter two arguments, which are 
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discussed below, comprised 18% of all coded answers: 11% for the fourth argument and 7% 
for the fifth argument. The fourth argument suggests that community councils could work but 
only in a developed environment with solid institutions, which is not the case in Venezuela. 
The fifth argument suggests that the creation of communal councils represents an attempt by 
Chávez and other national politician to weaken opposition-controlled subnational 
governments.    
Surprisingly, based solely on the group interview rsults, mismanagement problems 
generated by the creation of community councils were not recognised as a significant 
contributing factor for the increase in corruption until I specifically asked: “Do you think that 
corruption will increase with the creation of community councils?” Naturally, interview 
respondents from the community council and from the national government sample did not 
considered corruption to be a significant problem, but approximately half of the chavista 
municipality respondents and a vast majority of the respondents from the opposition 
municipality believed that the creation of community councils will end up increasing 
incentives for corruption.  
The scope of these arguments matches the theories of d centralisation and corruption. 
Treisman (2002) reports (on the basis of World Bank indicators) that GNP decreases 
approximately 27% and corruption increases (by betwe n 0.16 and 0.21 points on a 3.5 scale) 
for each additional tier of government. Fan, Lin, ad Treisman (2009: 32) also argued that “in 
countries with a larger number of administrative or g vernmental tiers, reported bribery was 
both more frequent and more costly to firms.” The eff ct was more significant in developing 
countries with weak institutions, which is precisely the case in Venezuela. (Table 3.1 shows 
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3.6   GUIDANCE FOR PRACTITIONERS 
 
Questions regarding specific guidance to practitioners were asked near the end of every 
interview session and focus group discussion. The following three viable government 
measures emerged as the most frequently repeated suggestions to reverse the weakening of 
subnational institutions (which ultimately leads to m re incentives for corruption) generated 
by flawed decentralisation: 
  
(i) The first measure is to decrease the number of subnational governments by 
consolidating poor and unpopulated units into governance organisations that would be 
relatively more accountable. Fortunately, decreasing the number of subnational 
governments seems to fit perfectly in the chavismo nationalistic agenda. During his 
third presidential mandate speech to the National Assembly on January 10, 2007, the 
inflammatory and confrontational President of Venezuela raised the following 
questions: “Does Venezuela need to be divided politically and territorially as it is 
now? Is it necessary to have so many municipalities?” The fact that the President 
posed these questions indicates that it might be politically feasible to decrease the 
number of subnational governments in Venezuela despite the significant social cost 
that would result from laying off many public employees. According to unofficial 
data, at least 100,000 subnational public servants will be laid off (El Nacional, 2007: 
A2) and 200 municipalities will eventually disappear (Acosta-Ramírez, 2007: A2) if 
President Chávez’s promised structural reforms to reorganise Venezuela’s geopolitical 
administration are ultimately institutionalised. Thus far, these proposals already have a 
theoretical name: “la nueva geometría del poder” (the new geometry of power).  
 
(ii) Parallel to the decrease in the number of subnatio al governments, a 
straightforward government measure to indirectly control corruption would be to 
empower the newly consolidated regional and local units to change sales and property 
tax rates. Together, these two taxes account for approximately 13% of total municipal 
revenues. It should be noted, however, that the respondents were divided in their 
opinions about fiscal revenue autonomy. Naturally, the chavistas municipality 
personnel interviewed strongly argued in favor of “not changing the status quo,” but 
the anti-chavistas municipality personnel complained that the national government 
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was arbitrarily withdrawing access to locally generat d revenue to build dependence 
on the largesse of the national government.  
 
(iii) In reference to community councils, it should be noted that two characteristics 
will definitely not change in the near future. First, community councils will never 
become democratic and autonomous subnational units of governance because 
community councils were founded as a deconcentrated ag ncy of an increasingly 
powerful central government. Second, community counils are “here to stay,” as 
mentioned by every interviewee and emphasized by President Chávez on repeated 
occasions.15 Taking these issues into consideration, community coun ils will at least 
need to work side by side with elected local officials and municipal staff in a way that 
is consistent with the citizen-initiated performance assessment model proposed by Ho 
and Coates (2004). Not working side by side with elected officials and municipal staff 
was most likely the main reason for the failure of the community councils’ 
predecessor, consejos locales de planificación (local public planning councils). As 
Wilpert (2005: 22) correctly notes in reference to local public planning councils: “This 
is something that never existed before and was badly needed because local 
government was one of the main areas of corruption—a d still is because the Planning 




3.7   CONCLUSION 
 
Evidently, an appropriate balance of decentralisation is necessary for the efficient functioning 
of the government. In developed countries with independent and strong institutions (such as 
the case of Switzerland), devolving subnational powers to local democratic institutions tends 
to improve the quality of government. This is due mainly because (simply through sheer 
proximity) local officials can be held more accountable by their constituents for their 
performance (Oates, 1972); and also because, in a mobile society competition among 
subnational governments may encourage the incentives to be more responsive (Tiebout 1956).  
                                                
15 At his third inauguration Presidential mandate speech in 2007, President Chávez said: “Progressively, the 
constituted national power must decentralise the political, social, economic, and administrative authority to 
community councils.” 
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The problem is that in an already highly corrupt environment with weak institutions 
(such as the case of Venezuela), decentralisation programs could be generating more harmful 
consequences than beneficial spill-over effects; namely by increasing the incentives that drive 
corruption. The issue is that highly corrupt countries like Venezuela do not comply with a 
series of basic prerequisites to realising the potential benefits of decentralisation. Among 
these prerequisites are strong institutions, such as horizontal accountability; low levels of 
informality in society; no major policy distortions; clarity in the distribution of attributions for 
each tier of government (who does what and is accountable for that); a reasonable match 
between responsibilities and resources; clear and enforceable contracts between the central 
and local tiers of government; and depoliticised public administration. Clearly meeting these 
conditions is impossible in highly corrupt and developing countries such as Venezuela    
Therefore, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the sources of corruption 
in developing countries (which is an important research topic in Venezuela and elsewhere) 
and suggests that flawed decentralisation may well contribute to the problem. Specifically, the 
paper examines the interaction between decentralisation nd corruption in Venezuela, with a 
clear focus on four explanatory factors: (1) municipal atomisation, which refers to newly 
created local units of government in relatively poor and scarcely populated small territories; 
(2) increasing local bureaucracy as measured by public salaries and number of bureaucrats; 
(3) lack of local revenue autonomy; and (4) the creation of community councils, which 
introduce new tiers of undemocratic, dependent governm nts.  
As mentioned in the previous section, a viable governm nt measure relating to 
decentralisation that could be initiated to control c rruption would be to decrease the number 
of local governments by consolidating poor and unpopulated units into organisations of 
governance that would be relatively more accountable. More specifically, this policy, as 
applied to Venezuela in particular and possibly in other Latin American countries, would 
reverse the harmful consequences that are produced by municipal atomisation, and it would 
enhance local bureaucratic efficiency. Another practic l and straightforward fiscal policy to 
reduce corruption would be to empower regional and local units to change the rates of at least 
one important tax. Changing the sales or property tax rate in Venezuela should be enough to 
correct vertical fiscal imbalances and encourage institutional innovations such as income tax 
initiatives. 
The specific findings in this paper about contemporary Venezuela support the strong 
empirical findings of Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) and Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009), 
which indicate that fiscal decentralisation reduces orruption while political decentralisation 
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tends to increase corruption. The main argument used by those authors to support these 
conclusions is that uncoordinated rent-seeking behavior increases when government 
structures become more complex. That is, increases in the number of governmental units and 
in the number of public sector employees with pockets to fill increases the risk that the rents 
of office will be overgrazed. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a better 
understanding of these arguments and to elaborate on a few other potential arguments.  
One way to understand the lack of revenue autonomy argument is to apply the 
microeconomic efficiency principle of optimising fiscal accounts to the point of equilibrium, 
which is found somewhere between marginal profits and marginal costs. This efficient 
equilibrium can only be achieved when the benefits of public programs are adjusted in 
accordance with the necessary expenditure of resources; however, making this type of 
determination requires information that the national government often lacks or obtains only 
after a delay. In theory, increasing subnational revenue collection “encourages citizens to 
keep government officials in check and therefore decreases corruption” (Fisman and Gatti, 
2002a: 334). 
The paper also introduces several valid reasons for the highincidence of corruption in 
Venezuela. Each of the reasons involves a powerful xplanation of the impact of flawed 
decentralisation, which includes weak public and democratic institutions, cultural and 
idiosyncratic factors, and the low pay structure of municipal employees. The aim of this 
inductive paper, however, is not to separate and test the explanatory power of these factors 
from those attributed to flaws in decentralisation.  I stead, the aim and scope of this research 
is to investigate less obvious factors of corruption by understanding the meaning to the 
question: Why has flawed decentralisation worsened corruption in Venezuela? 
As a final point, a fundamental question remains: Can Hugo Chávez decentralise 
subnational revenue autonomy in a way that makes regional and local units in Venezuela 
more efficient and possibly less corrupt without succumbing to the temptation to make his 
own power greater in the process? The answer to this question is highly uncertain because, 
thus far, the caudillo-type authoritarian and nationalistic personality of Mr. Chavéz has sent 
the wrong signals. Another uncertainty that Venezuela faces is whether Hugo Chávez and 
other national politicians will benefit by reversing municipal atomisation, in which case, this 
paper might be deemed just another sham discussion. (The research findings are summarised 
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Venezuela’s political institutions have mutated from a subsidised coalition that almost 
privatised the oil industry, to a populist nationalism that is polarising society to the brink of 
civil war. In this paper, I briefly examine chavismo in Venezuela as a new and unusual 
revelatory phenomenon and the most extreme case of leftwing populism in Latin America. 
The within-case analysis addresses the extreme polarisation of the political landscape and the 
consolidation of the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Political Party of 
Venezuela, or PSUV) as the united leftwing redistributive party. The specific findings suggest 
that despite the polarisation drawback, Venezuela’s political institutions have finally taken the 
first out of four steps towards a constructive democracy. The next three steps or phases are 
equally relevant: (1) the PSUV needs to evolve intoan institutionalised phenomenon –beyond 
the nominal leader– with clear division of power and strong internal debate; (2) the multi-
diverse opposition needs to unite behind a fresh new leader –under one political organisation– 
with a defined ideology more relevant than the single bonding effect of removing Chávez; (3) 
and in time, democratic institutions would need to consolidate through the elected transfer of 
power. The focus of the paper is on the first phase.               
 
 
KEYWORDS -- Venezuela · chavismo · polarisation · PSUV · puntofijismo 
                                                
16 An earlier version titled ‘Public Sector Reforms in Latin America’ was presented at the ‘6th International 
Conference on Accounting, Auditing and Management in Public Sector Reforms’ in Copenhagen 2010. 
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4.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
How is the chavismo popular movement in Venezuela reforming orthodox plitical 
institutions? Few articles have addressed this question. The majority of which, including 
academic pieces, regularly criticise the harmful consequences of a big populist government. 
On the other hand, a handful of authors have been more constructive by focusing on the slow 
pace of institutionalisation; while some independent and alternative publications tend to 
highlight the significant social improvements of slashing poverty in half and improving 
socioeconomic inequalities all the way to becoming the most equalitarian country in Latin 
America. But none, or at least to the best of my knowledge, explores the conflicting forces 
between a highly polarised political landscape and the structural consolidation of the Partido 
Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Political Party of Venezuela, or PSUV).   
Over the turn of the century, Venezuela’s political institutions have in fact experienced 
structural transformations of revolutionary magnitude, to the point of dividing the last half-
century in two democratic periods. The Chávez era is called chavismo. And the pre-Chávez 
era is called puntofijismo, which was a profit sharing democratisation pact between the two 
dominant political parties Acción Democrática (Democratic Action, or AD) and Comité de 
Organización Política Electoral Independente: Partido Social Cristiano (Committee of 
Independent Electoral Political Organisation: Social Christian Party, or COPEI). AD was 
supposedly the redistributive political option.   
Chavismo offered real redistribution; and more. Chavismo captivated the poor and 
excluded left with the Bolivarian ideology, which is inspired on the writings and actions of 
independence hero Simón Bolívar, civil war leader Ezequiel Zamora, and Bolívar’s tutor 
Simón Rodríguez (Sanoja, 2009: 401). The combinatio of the three was too much for the 
opposition to handle. Bolívar contributed with nationalism and independence from imperial 
dominance; Zamora chipped in with social justice and the unity of the peasants with the army; 
and Rodríguez was responsible for education of the masses and the search for a unique 
identity.  
On the contrary, the opposition offered a handshake agr ement between Henrique 
Salas Römer (governor of industrial Carabobo state) and Irene Sáez (mayor of upper class 
Chacao municipality and former Miss Universe). Fourteen years after the 1998 Presidential 
election, which marked the end of puntofijismo and the beginning of chavismo, the opposition 
is still offering more of the same in a slightly improved version. Old-timers like Henrique 
Salas Römer is now replaced by the tandem of elite-poster boys Henrique Capriles Radonsky 
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(Miranda state governor) and Leopold Lopez (former Chacao municipality mayor). Based on 
all recent polls, more likely than not, the greater pa t of the middle class and almost the 
totality of the upper class will buy whoever steps in; but not the majority of the poor.      
The rise of class politics in Venezuela is to some ext nt an explanatory factor for the 
democratic success of Chávez. Before the 1998 Presidential election, the poor did not vote in 
mass; given that the few available voting centers were too far away from the barrios in order 
to accommodate the middle and higher classes, and also because the lack of political interest 
was generalised to the extreme of not even been registered to vote. Another explanation of the 
rise of chavismo is the general discontent with the decaying puntofijismo’s institutions, the 
socioeconomic crisis, and the chavismo ability to recycle and adapt to existing ideas (Sanoj , 
2009: 405).   
I expand on these accounts by suggesting that for the 2012 upcoming Presidential 
election, the opposition is two steps behind the c avismo. As a matter of fact, the political 
opposition to the government in Venezuela –recently renamed to Mesa de la Unidad 
Democrática (Coalition for Democratic Unity, or MUD)– would first need to unite behind a 
new and undisputed leadership with a clearly defined id ology. Something that Chávez 
offered more than ten years ago with the Bolivarian ideology of social justice, regional 
integration, USA independence, and equality. The next step for the opposition, after the 
extremely difficult task of uniting 28 political parties (including the Marxist-Leninist Red 
Flag), is to consolidate under one political rightwing organisation that could balance the 
impact of the PSUV in the political equation. There a  no easy choices here, because 
democracy is dependent on constructive competition. The opposition in Venezuela needs to 
unite beyond the common bounding hate to Chávez.   
This paper also advances Buxton’s (2005) the arguments that the puntofijismo profit-
sharing succession of governments was equally authoritarian and illegitimate compared to the 
chavismo administration. And that all public institutions at the end of the century were in a 
sclerotic state of decay due to the colonisation of the dominant political parties AD and 
COPEI. This paper matches these assertions and updates the data by describing the 
consolidation of the PSUV during the November 2008 subnational election. I also argue that 
through the consolidation of the PSUV, Venezuela’s political institutions have taken a 
gigantic leap forward. The focus of the analysis is that the “structural” consolidation of the 
PSUV is dependent on three factors. First, PSUV’s internal voices have to be harnessed rather 
than suppressed. Second, PSUV’s headquarters has toenforce a clear division of power 
between the central government, the state, and the public administration. And third, the PSUV 
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political party has to institutionalise into an independent phenomenon beyond its founding 
leader bonding effect. 
The paper is structured as the typical case study; where the cas  description precedes 
the theory (Siggelkow, 2007: 20). The following section evaluates the consequences of the 
chavismo administration, without demonising the failures or p traying a rosy depiction of the 
successes. After the general case description, the aim is to contribute with the unsettled 
chavismo debate, going beyond the specifics of government prformance by pinpointing the 




4.2   ASSESSING THE CHAVISMO GOVERNMENT 
 
Between 1958 and 1998, only the second administration of legendary AD leader Carlos 
Andrés Pérez (1988–1992) pitched itself as neoliberal (Buxton, 2005: 340).  Although none of 
the puntofijismo governments could be considered socialist/redistributive. The end result of 
Pérez’s second administration of extreme policy adjustment was a massacre called Caracazo 
in 1989, and two failed coups in 1992, which ultimately led to the impeachment of the 
President. In reality, only the Presidencies of Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964) and Raúl Leoni 
(1964-1969) had a centrist position; but after that, Venezuela became increasingly more 
market oriented. From a practical perspective, it is hard not to label a government as 
neoliberal, if its economic policies are clearly monopolised by the business elite. In the case 
of Venezuela, it is a fact that during the puntofijismo alternation of governments the media 
and food industries openly appointed and dismissed ex cutive ministers at their discretion. 
However, at the 1998 Presidential election, everything changed when the chavismo 
popular movement rose to political power with a young Hugo Chávez leading the way. To 
some, the godlike presence of President Chávez presents the only hope of a desperate poor, 
and the shining champion of a left that refuses to die in Latin America. To others, Chávez is a 
Marxist-communist totalitarian with no intention of stepping down from power, nor releasing 
the institutional control over the oil rich revenues of Venezuela. Chávez has been called the 
new Bolivar, Castro’s successor, an authoritarian dctator, a charismatic leader, a crafty 
politician, a buffoon, and most of all a ranting populist (Sylvia and Danopoulos, 2003: 63).  
The chavismo phenomenon in Venezuela is without a doubt of the populist variety, 
because it “relies on a charismatic mode of linkage between voters and politicians, a 
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relationship largely unmediated by any institutionalised party, and that it bases itself on a 
powerful, Manichaean discourse of ‘the people versus the elite’ that encourages an ‘anything 
goes’ attitude among Chávez’s supporters” (Hawkins, 2003: 1137). However, different from 
previous popular movements rise to political power in the region, such as Salvador Allende in 
Chile, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, or Juan Perón in Argentina; the 
chavismo ideology is firmly rooted on the “leftist-nationalist” writings of independence hero 
Simón Bolívar (Hawkins, 2003: 1153).  
Wood (2009: 145) argues that the chavismo phenomenon is not a mere historical 
regression to the caudillos of the 19th century or the charismatic figures of the 20th, but rather 
represents a new and genuinely radical mass movement based on state intervention by way of 
nationalising the economy’s commanding heights and increasing el poder del pueblo through 
community councils and small-scale cooperatives. Aggressive nationalisations and power to 
the people combined pose a more direct challenge to existing oligopolies than Perón would 
ever have considered mounting.  
 
 
4.2.1   Good Chavismo 
 
The first half of the decade-long chavismo government was by no means a walk in the park. A 
new Constitution, an oil executive sabotage, one coup d’état, two bosses’ lockouts, and eight 
democratic elections are the political highlights from 1998 to 2005. The second half of the 
chavismo administration was a complete different story, despite the costly long-term effects 
of the destabilising coups, strikes, and oil sabotage. Since the oil strike seven years ago, GDP 
in Venezuela doubled. Low oil prices and a 10% production cut decreased GDP 3.3% in 2009 
and 1.9% in 2010. So far, parallel to the rebound in oil prices, year 2011 has experienced a 
4.5% annualised growth for the first trimester.17  
More relevant than growth, poverty decreased from 54% in 2003 to 26% in 2008, 
extreme poverty rate plunged from 43% in 1996 to 7% in 2008, and unemployment fell from 
17% in 1998 to about 7% in 2008 (Petras, 2008: 1). According to the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (National Institute of Statistics, or INE), in 2011 poverty decreased to a 
remarkable 23% and extreme poverty to 6%. Even more impressive, on 24 October 2008, in 
the middle of the worst worldwide financial crisis ince the Great Depression, foreign 
                                                
17 For a thorough assessment on Venezuela’s socioeconmic indicators, refer to Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval 
(2009). 
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reserves in Venezuela surpassed for the first time US$40 billion (Venezuelan Central Bank, or 
BCV).  
Poverty reduction is mainly attributed to the fact that real social spending per person 
has increased 314% since 1998, to reach a striking 21% of total GDP in 2006 (Weisbrot and 
Sandoval, 2008: 11). In 2009, social spending constituted about one-fourth of federal budget 
(INE). The highlight of Venezuela’s social spending s without a doubt on education, as it has 
grown from 1.5% of total GDP in 1998, to 7% in 2008 (INE). Education spending increase 
has in fact multiplied school matriculations from 668,109 students in 1998 to 2,135,146 in 
2007 (Páez, 2008: 2), and improved literacy rate from 90% in 1999 to 93% in 2008 (INE). In 
support of these statistics, an April 2008 Gallup srvey places Venezuela on top of the Latin 
American region in children’s opportunities to learn nd grow. And the 2008 UNESCO 
Education for All Global Monitoring Report titled “Education for All by 2015: Will we make 
it?” held on the premises of the BCV and presented by Edouard Matoko affirms that access to 
education in Venezuela is nearly 100%. 
The beneficial spill-over effects of increasing social spending are also reflected on 
technology and health. Technology spending increased from 0.29% of GDP in 2005, to 1.74% 
in 2006, and to 2.69% in 2007 (Chacón, 2009). Two specific examples from the area of 
technology are: (1) on 10 January 2009, when Venezuela officially entered the space race by 
assuming total control of its first orbiting satellit ; (2) and on 8 May 2009, when the first 600 
Venezuelan cars came out of the assembly line ready to hit the streets (González, 2009: 16).  
From a health related perspective, the flagship c avismo social program, Missión 
Barrio Adentro, institutionalised a network of health clinics in low-income neighborhoods, 
where Cuban doctors treat the poor for free (Brouwer, 2009). The official estimate of health 
related Cuban personnel working in Venezuela totals 29,996. Divided in 13,020 doctors, 
2,938 dentists, 4,170 nurses, and 9,868 other health related personnel (Díaz-Rangel, 2008: 
15). Misión Barrio Adentro has in fact had a tremendous impact on reducing infant mortality 
rates –one year of age or younger per 1,000 live births– from 23 in 1998, to 15 in 2008 (INE).  
The inequalities decrease in Venezuela also deserves special recognition. Official data 
–audited by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean– 
sustain that the Gini coefficient inequalities indicator improved from 51 in 2002, to 41 in 
2009. To grasp the magnitude of the decrease in inequalities, consider a similar movement but 
in the opposite direction for the USA during a period of significant upward redistribution of 
income from 40 in 1980 to 47 in 2005 (Weisbrot, 2008: 4). Equally important, the chavismo 
administration pegged for the first time social security pensions, which by the way has tripled 
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the number of recipients (Ellner, 2010: 92). The United Nations Human Development Index 
(HDI) also dramatically improved from 0.66 –medium range– in 2000, to 0.74 –high range– 
in 2011. As a matter of fact, for the past five years (2006-2011), Venezuela’s HDI country 
ranking has jumped seven places. 
Undeniably, the socioeconomic beneficial effects of the chavismo administration are 
not only based on favorable oil prices over the turn of the century; but also, to recapture 
sovereignty over oil –which constitutes for more than 90% of total exports (INE)– by 
charging higher royalties and nationalising strategic oil-related firms. The combination of 
worldwide high oil prices between 2000 and 2006 and the recapture of oil sovereignty fuelled 
a public budget bonanza that increased fiscal expenses at an average annual rate of 73% 
between 2004 and 2008 (Figueroa, 2008: 8).  
Parallel to the steep increase in oil revenues, for the first time in history, Venezuela 
also broadened its client base beyond USA; pulling off igantic joint exploration deals with 
heavyweight countries such as China, Brazil, and Russia. China alone, accounts for roughly 
17 of Venezuela’s total oil exports (INE), which rep sents about 4% of energy-hungry 
China’s total oil imports. The significance of broadening the client base has nothing to do 
with the economic principal of diversifying the market. It is more related to minimising the 
threat of foreign invasion. Venezuela owns the largest proven crude oil reserves with 297 
billions of barrels; second is Saudi Arabia with 265; third and fourth are Iran and Iraq with 
about 150 each (Últimas Noticias, 2011: 19). In addition to oil, Venezuela also owns the 
eighth largest proven natural gas reserve. Fiscal gas revenues in Venezuela have in fact 




4.2.2   Bad Chavismo 
 
Unfortunately, the “bad” consequences of the c avismo administration on governance are 
even more impressive. When asked by reporter Patricia Janiot of CNN on 3 February 2009; 
what grade would Simón Bolívar give to the decade long chavismo government rule? Chávez 
answered that Bolívar would probably mark him with 55 out of 100. If the undisputed leader 
barely approves his term in office based on his ownsta dards –assuming that a fail score is 
below 50– one could imagine what the real grade is.  
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The astonishing increasing rates of crime and corruption are two distinctive 
characteristics of the Chávez administration, and are slowly becoming the downfall of the 
chavismo popular movement astronomical rise to power. According to data by the Cuerpo de 
Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas (Criminal and Penal Scientific Body of 
Investigation, or CICPC); during the last decade 101, 41 people were killed, a rate of 842 per 
month or 28 per day (Escalona, 2009a: 44); and 2,003 people were kidnapped, a rate of 200 
per year or 17 per month (Escalona, 2009b: 32). And according to the 2010 Observatorio 
Venezolano de Violencia (Venezuelan Observatory of Violence, or OVV) Report –on data 
from the Interior and Justice Ministry, the National Statistic Institute, the Central University 
of Venezuela, and the Center for Peace– the amount of homicides in Venezuela spiraled from 
19 per 100.000 in 1997, to 48 per 100.000 in 2007, and to 75 per 100.000 in 2009.  
The main cause of the homicides increase directly points to the free traffic of guns in 
the street, estimated between nine and 15 million peces or a rate between two and three per 
home; and to homicide impunity, estimated to be at an outrageous 94% in 2008 (Isoliett, 
2010: 13). In absolute terms, homicides have increased from 6,583 in 1999, to 11,313 in 
2005, to 14,735 in 2007, and to 19,133 in 2009 (OVV). These statistics catapults Venezuela 
alongside civil war drug infested nations such as Guatemala, Colombia, El Salvador, and 
Mexico, as the most dangerous Latin American countries. Recent data by the World Health 
Organisation presented on the 2012 Seguridad, Justicia y Paz Report supports this statement. 
According to the mentioned report, Venezuela is the fifth most dangerous country in the 
world in terms of total homicides per populations, ju t below Colombia, which is number six, 
and slightly above Guatemala and El Salvador (Seguridad, Justicia y Paz; 2012: 23).18  
Parallel to the crime increase, the Venezuelan governm nt was hammered on the 2008 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) Report, and on the 2009 Report by the autonomous body of the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) for the protection of human rights called the Inter 
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Even though the HRW report fails to 
meet the most basic standards of academic rigor, some of its conclusions are meaningful; 
namely that judicial power has lost independence and that key institutions have weakened. 
The second –IACHR– report also draws attention to the grave institutional crisis in 
Venezuela, which prevents the proper application of the rule of law and the adoption of the 
necessary measures that would provide for the effective exercise of fundamental rights.  
                                                
18 Available at: http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx/biblioteca/summary/5-prensa/145-san-pedro-sula-
honduras-la-ciudad-mas-violenta-del-mundo-juarez-la-segunda  
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Rising inflation is an additional factor that has significantly undermined the 
performance of the chavismo administration. Consumer price inflation has steadily increased 
from 14% in 2005, to 17 % in 2006, 23% in 2007, 31% in 2008, 25% in 2009, 26% in 2010, 
and to an eye-popping 28% for 2011 in times of strong worldwide deflationary pressure 
(INE). And since the exchange rate has remained fixed most of the time, national production 
has become increasingly uncompetitive, which puts incredible pressure to devalue the 
“unofficial” exchange rate. The devastating high rates of inflation in Venezuela are in fact 
flushing down the toilette the recent economic improvements; measured by GDP increase, 
unemployment decline, poverty reduction, and inequalities decrease.  
And last but not least, according to the reliable anti-corruption international 
organisation Transparency International (TI), the Venezuelan Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) has worsened from a very low starting point of 2.7 in 1995, to 2.6 in 1999, 2.5 in 2002, 
2.3 in 2004, 2.0 in 2007, 1.9 in 2009, and slightly up to 2.0 in 2010. (The CPI ranges from 
zero to ten, with lower scores corresponding to worsening corruption ratings.). The World 
Bank Worldwide Governance Research Dataset and the Global Competitiveness Report by 
the World Economic Forum corroborate the fact that corruption in Venezuela has become a 
generalised problem that is tearing down the moral values of society. Shockingly, based on 
TI, only the exceedingly poor Haiti separates the oil-rich Venezuela from the dishonourable 
title of the most corrupt country in America. 
Generalised corruption, homicide impunity, unstable legal framework, galloping 
inflation, crumbling infrastructure, insufficient housing, price and exchange rates controls, 
and a nationalistic discourse that resembles Mussolini’  fascism, are the most well-known 
shortcomings of the Chávez administration. However, at least to the best of my knowledge, a 
significant harmful effect of the chavismo popular movement rise to power that deserves more 
academic attention is the increasing polarisation of the political landscape, which could 
eventually open the door to another coup d'état.  
The polarisation virus in Venezuela appears to be adirect consequence to four factors: 
(1) the inflammatory and confrontational chavismo rhetoric; (2) an anything-goes government 
style that bends the law to their own will; (3) hysterical reactions by an irrational opposition 






4.3   VENEZUELAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
 
It is nearly impossible to make sense of the Venezuelan government, because mainstream 
media and academic publications tend to publish contradictory accounts on the subject 
(Wilpert, 2005: 21). The polarisation of information in Venezuela has in fact stretched reality 
to the brink of civil war. According to the 2009 Index of Political Instability by The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Venezuela is the 29th country with the greatest political 
instability in the world. The 2009 Global Peace Index (GPI) by the Institute for Economics 
and Peace, also downgrades Venezuela as the 120th least peaceful nation.  
 The November 2008 subnational election in Venezuela is a perfect example of the 
polarised political forces stretching the truth in opposite directions beyond reconcilable 
boundaries. One extreme of the relative truth exaggerated the landslide nationwide victory 
and understated the stunning defeats in the capital region of three chavistas top subnational 
leaders: Jesse Chacón in the predominately poor municipality of Sucre, Aristóbulo Istúriz in 
capital city Caracas, and Diosdado Cabello in the populous Miranda state. In normal 
circumstances, the electoral outcome at a local, city, and regional level of government in the 
capital region should had been enough to inspire a complete renovation of top rank officials in 
the PSUV organisational structure.  
 Unfortunately, the needed renovation of PSUV subnatio l leadership will not happen 
in the near future. The main reason why the needed renovation will not happen in the near 
future is that Chávez’s massive grassroots popularity support is an impressive phenomenon 
rarely seen in democratic history. Twelve years after his meteoric rise to political power, at no 
point in time, has any political leader –internal or external– come close to Chávez in terms of 
popularity in opinion poll surveys. Poll surveys by Datanálisis supports this statement by 
sustaining that Hugo Chávez is by far the undisputed leader of PSUV with 51%; followed in 
the distance by Diosdado Cabello with 13%, Jesse Chacón with 7%, Jorge Rodríguez with 
6%, and Aristóbulo Istúriz with 5% (Díaz-Rangel, 2009: 13).  
 Anti-chavistas, on the other side, distort what really happened on Election Day. Some 
used misleading titles: “Chavez Supporters Suffer Dfeat in State and Municipal Races” (The 
New York Times, 24 November 2008). Others even published twisted data: “Nationwide, the 
opposition won 52% of the popular vote against the government's 48%” (Vargas Llosa, 2008: 
1). Official results –conceded by both sides, corrobo ated by exit polls, and confirmed by 
international observers– portray another story. At a regional level of government, Chávez 
supporters won 17 out of 22 states up for grabs, including the vast majority of legislating state 
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councils. At a local or municipal level, chavismo won 263 out of 326 offices in play. This 
accounts for thirteen more than the record breaking previous subnational election in 2004. In 
total, more than five million or 53% of the electoral base elected chavistas candidates. And 
less than four million or 42% voted for an opposition alliance; which is made up mostly of 
political parties Un Nuevo Tiempo (A New Time, or UNT), Primero Justicia (Justice First, or 
PJ), Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela (Christian Democratic Party, or COPEI), Acción 
Democrática (Social Democrats, or AD), and Podemos (former left wing faction of 
Movement Towards Socialism, or MAS). The remaining 5% –the difference between 53% 
and 42%– is accounted to an independent third sector; constituted at that time mainly by 
chavismo dissidents, such as Patria Para Todos (Fatherland for Everyone, or PPT) and 
Partido Comunista de Venezuela (Communist Venezuelan Party, or PCV). Refer to Table 4.1 
for a summary of the results. 
 
 
Table 4.1   2008 Subnational Election Results 
 







PSUV 5.016.539 45,39 17 1 263 
UNT 1.214.406 10,99 1   8 
AD 798.674 7,23 1   16 
PJ 618.832 5,6 1   4 
COPEI 471.163 4,26 1   11 
PV 331.410 3 1   1 
PPT 196.790 1,78     5 
Podemos 194.842 1,76     2 
ABP 59.853 0,54   1   
Others 2.150.165 19,45     16 





Critics of the chavismo government also argue that the wealthiest and most populated 
states Zulia, Miranda, and Carabobo, are now in hands of the opposition. They claim that 
Chávez supporters lost three states compared to the2004 election. From two, Nueva Esparta 
and Zulia; to five states, Carabobo, Miranda, Nueva Esparta, Táchira, and Zulia. “It is quite 
clear that the opposition, which is not represented in Congress and was until last week 
confined to two states, will now have something of an institutional power base” (Vargas 
Llosa, 2008: 1). The first argument, however, tends to forget that the opposition governs less 
than a third of Venezuela's 26 million people, including the vast minority of state capitals. 
And the second argument overlooks the five chavistas dissident governors in Aragua, 
Carabobo, Sucre, Trujillo, and Guárico. If these states are factored in the equation, chavismo 




4.4   CONSOLIDATION OF THE PSUV 
 
Who won or lost the 2008 subnational election in Veezuela is irrelevant to the fact that for 
the first time in ten elections, the chavismo phenomenon was united as a single revolutionary 
political party to overcome the problems generated by a rigid bureaucracy and to articulate 
popular support with the chavistas base. Before 2008, the chavismo movement was made up 
of a conglomerate of leftwing political parties led by Movimiento Quinta República (Fifth 
Republic Movement, or MVR). After 2008, former chavistas who did not belong to the PSUV 
were either outcast into an independent third sector or perate with little voice in the 
opposition alliance, such as the cases of PPT and Podemos.   
The consolidation of the PSUV, however, is just a hint of what a healthy democracy 
should taste like. Based on liberal democratic standards, the real test will come when 
institutional checks on power are enforced by separating key positions from political ties, 
such as the attorney general and the national controller (Ellner, 2010: 79). More often than 
not, when the judiciary, congress or electoral administration raises objections to government 
policy, the President threatens reprisal and dismisal (Buxton, 2005: 330). As mentioned 
before, an unconditional factor for the continuity and “structural” consolidation of the 
chavismo phenomenon is that PSUV’s internal voices should be harnessed rather than 
repressed.  
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Ten years after the puntofijismo debacle, the PSUV is slightly ahead in the quest to 
become an institutionalised political party. Not only because the PSUV has one recognizable 
leader and a clearly defined ideology called Socialism of the Twenty First Century, which is 
primarily based on three Bolivarian principals: equality, nationalism, and regional integration. 
But also because, the PSUV has institutionalised a bottom-up method of selecting political 
candidates; in sharp contrast to the opposition’s marked top-down approach (Ellner, 2010: 
81). It is also fair to say that the opposition organised a successful Presidential primary 
election on February 2012  
Another relevant shortcoming of the PSUV is that the only factor that keeps the 
organisation together is the common allegiance to Chávez (Hawkins, 2003: 1139). To evolve 
into an institutionalised political party –beyond structural consolidation– the PSUV must rely 
on a set of rules rather than the whim of its leader for governing itself. However, this scenario 
is hypothetical at best; because Chávez appears to be immune to the typical popularity 
decline. The latest demonstration of popular support for the undisputed party leader was on 
February 2009, with a commanding 55% approval in a referendum to include the unpopular 
possibility to run for consecutive Presidential terms. Compared to the previous similar 
Constitutional reform on December 2007; the February 2009 election represented a 44% 
increase in total votes for chavismo; from 4,370,392 to 6,130,482. The opposition alliance, on 
the other hand, increased only 15%; from 4,504,353 to 5,193,839. Although for the first time 
in twelve elections during the last decade, the politica  opposition in Venezuela surpassed the 
five million vote’s barrier. Naturally, the 2012 Presidential primary elections had a smaller 
showing, but it is worth mentioning that it surpassed the three million votes.   
The road ahead for the opposition is longer and fill with more batches compared to the 
PSUV. This is due mainly because the opposition is a complex organisational mixture made 
up mostly of rightwing political parties with contradictory ideologies –except to remove 
Chávez from power– and antagonist leaderships of wide generational gaps, old-school AD 
and COPEI versus new- school UNT and PJ. It is widely b lieved that the opposition alliance 
is also sponsored by private NGOs such as Súmate, heavyweight players in the media 
business such as CNN and The New York Times, and some-say foreign intelligent agencies 
of unfriendly governments. To survive, the oppositin n Venezuela would need to converge 
under one political party with a defined ideology beyond the glue-effect irrational singular 
objective of removing Chávez. 
Furthermore, in a constructive democracy, left and right political forces would 
eventually have to alternate power. In Spain, for example, the Partido Socialista Obrero 
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Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, or PSOE) and the Partido Popular (People’s 
Party, or PP) have alternated political power since the end of Franco’s military rightwing 
dictatorship nearly four decades ago. And this alternation of Presidential office has 
encouraged a series of beneficial spillover effects on governance based on a constructive 
competitive cycle. In the case of Venezuela, the alt rnation of power will only become a 
reality when an opposing leader backed up by united political party defeats the PSUV in a 
nationwide Presidential democratic election. So far, this scenario is only hypothetical at best.   
Despite the fact that Venezuela’s political institutions are decades behind compared to 
Spain, the consolidation of the PSUV and the first step to unite the opposition is a gigantic 
institutional leap forward compared to the non-aggression democratisation pact –based on 
sharing oil rent and state appointments– of the past called Punto Fijo (in reference to the city 
where it was signed). The Punto Fijo pact turned out to be a powerful subsidised coalitin 
between the two dominant parties, which governed without competition through compromise 
and shared spoils (Sylvia and Danapoulos, 2003: 64-65). Naturally, to govern without 
opposition diverted oil riches from trickling down to the bottom of Venezuelan society, 
driving poverty and inequalities to unbearable limits.  
The collapse of puntofifismo came as a consequence to the institutional decay, the 
excessive bureaucratisation, and the massive corruption (Buxton, 2005: 337). It should be 
noted, however, that the origins of puntofijismo was very promising since, at the beginning, 
puntofijismo was grounded on deep ideological differences between the parties (Heath, 2009: 
188). AD represented the workers and peasants, advoc ting state intervention and land 
redistribution. COPEI represented the interests of he church, the businesses, and the social 
elite. However, somewhere down the line, in 1979 with the government of Luis Herrera 
Campins, the two parties succumbed to the corrupting powers of unlimited Petrodollars 
(Sanoja, 2009: 400). 
 
         
 
4.5   CONCLUSION 
 
From 1958 to 1998, Venezuela experienced a succession of governments controlled by the 
economic and social elites that followed a laissez-faire capitalist agenda. In fact, the rightwing 
democratic subsidised coalition that governed Venezuela for nearly four decades, was a strong 
supporter of the Washington consensus; to the extreme of almost privatising the oil industry 
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(PDVSA) by the end of the century in times of triple-digit inflation, devastating poverty, high 
unemployment, and a profound socioeconomic division between the rich and the poor (Heath, 
2009: 190). The legal instrument for the privatisation of PDVSA was an IMF sponsored 
program called Apertura Petrolera (Oil Opening) –in effect from 1996 to 1998– which was 
designed by planning Minister Teodoro Petkoff and approved by President Rafael Caldera.  
In 1998, at the epicentre of a complete lack of authority and legitimacy, Venezuela’s 
40-year flirt with a market-oriented economy ended abruptly when Chávez swept the 
Presidential elections. Regrettably, so far, the new chavismo political era is generally 
repeating the institutional shortcomings of the puntofijismo governments. Twelve years of 
chavismo administration and more than half of that of complete institutional control, the 
bottom line is still the same: political institutions are increasingly weak and party leadership 
(cogollos) is responsible for all strategic decisions.  
How democracy and institutions are to be reformed in the best interest of all 
Venezuelan citizens? (Buxton, 2005: 346). The answer to this question is appears to be easy: 
the consolidation of the PSUV has to become a structu al and institutional phenomenon. That 
is, the PSUV has to encourage internal voices mainly by enforcing the badly needed division 
of power, and after that, the PSUV has to evolve beyond the nominal leader unmatched skill 
to galvanise popular support and preserve cohesion. The next frontier to conquer for the 
PSUV, after taking the colossal step of the structural institutionalisation, would be to 
consolidate a constructive democracy by handing over in a democratic election Presidential 
office to a united centre-right political party with a clearly defined ideology and an undisputed 
leader. For the specific case of Venezuela, in two or three Presidential elections from now –
assuming that Chávez will defeat cancer and fulfil survey polls expectations by sweeping the 
2012 Presidential elections– one of today’s rising star in the opposition alliance, maybe 
Henrique Capriles, Leopoldo López or María Corina Mchado, would have to defeat in a 
democratic election the best the PSUV has to offer, maybe today’s pragmatic managers José 
Vielma Mora or Rodrigo Cabezas. Once again, there are no easy choices here. Machiavelli 
once said (1950: 21): “It must be considered that tere is nothing more difficult to carry out, 
nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of 
things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only 






STAGFLATION IN NEOPOPULIST VENEZUELA  






The defining principals of Latin American leftwing governments are regional integration, 
redistribution, community participation, anti-neoliberalism, and a nationalistic ideology to 
dictate its own political and economic agenda, or at le st to be free from the onerous terms set 
by international organisations. However, starting with chavismo in Venezuela, leftwing 
governments in the region have so far not lived up to their potential. In spite of this inevitable 
bumpy start, the unprecedented simultaneous rise to power of Chávez, Lula- Rousseff, 
Kirchner-Fernández, Evo, Correa, Tabaré-Pepe, Lugo, Ortega, Humala, Funes, and Zelaya, 
could end up playing a pivotal role in political history; but only if Latin America’s plural lefts 
converge on the path to a united post free trade agreement world. This study argues that 
Venezuela holds the key to overcome the sharp differences between the moderate Latin 
American left and the radical left. Namely by proposing that before the acceptance of 
Venezuela into MERCOSUR or the implementation of the SUCRE as a hard currency among 
ALBA members, the Venezuelan government would need to moderate its inflationary 
economy towards the encouragement of private investm nts and the stabilisation of the highly 
uncertain exchange rate system.   
 
KEYWORDS -- regional integration · leftwing governments · Bolivarianism · Venezuela ·  
populism · inflation. 
 
 
                                                
19 A preliminary version was presented at ‘The First Global Dialogue on Ethical and Effective Governance’ 
general conference in Amsterdam 2009. Comments from Susan Rose-Ackerman and Leo Huberts have been 




5.1   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Es una idea grandiosa pretender formar de todo el Mundo Nuevo en una sola 
nación con un solo vinculo que ligue sus partes entre sí y con el todo. Ya que tiene 
un origen, una lengua, unas costumbres y una religión, debería, por consiguiente, 
tener un solo gobierno que confederase los diferents estados que hayan de 
formarse.” (Carta de Jamaica, Simón Bolívar, 1815). [Actual words]  
 
“It is a grandiose idea to form one nation out of the New World with one link that 
binds the parts together and to the whole. Since it has a common origin, language, 
customs and religion, should therefore have only one government to confederate the 




The Congress of Panamá, organised by Venezuelan indepe ence hero Simón Bolívar in 
1826, is the starting point of a Latin American unity. Almost two hundred years later, 
December 2011 in Caracas witnessed the comeback of Bolívar’s dream with the constitutional 
summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados 
Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, or CELAC). The CELAC has become the converging forum 
of political dialogue for 33 countries in the Americas, excluding the US and Canada. And is 
perceived as an alternative to the US dominated Organisation of American States (OAS). 
CELAC’s first institutional steps were taken during the XX and XI “Rio Group” summits of 
Santo Domingo in 2008 and Playa del Carmen, Mexico, in 2010.20  
However, the CELAC cannot be considered a fundamental far-reaching plan, because 
similar to other integration attempts such as the Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del 
Caribe in 1975 and the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración in 1980, the CELAC is 
basically a forum of dialogue. In sharp contrast, the Mercado Común del Sur (Southern 
Common Market, or MERCOSUR) is in effect an institutionalised up-and-running regional 
trade arrangement. The general objective of this paper is to explore the prospect of integrating 
the member nations from the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 
                                                
20 Conservative President Felipe Calderón of Mexico was the head of State who proposed the creation 
of the CELAC at the Santo Domingo summit in 2008.    
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(Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, or ALBA) into MERCOSUR. That is, 
the central consistent statement throughout the manuscript is that an economic union 
independent of US hegemony has to be the principal go l of a unified Latin American 
movement taking in the moderate left (MERCOSUR) and the more radical left (ALBA). 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay have member status at MERCOSUR. 
Venezuela signed a membership agreement in 2006, that was soon approved by national 
governments and parliaments all member nations, except the slightly rightwing dominated 
Paraguayan parliament. ALBA is constituted by Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Cuba, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and Honduras 
before the 2009 coup d'état. ALBA’s observer states r  Uruguay, Paraguay, Haiti, Surinam, 
Santa Lucia, and Grenada. The integration of MERCOSUR and ALBA would in fact create a 
supergiant block of about 350 million consumers distributed in a natural-resource-rich total 
area of more than 14 million km2.  
The integration of Latin America’s plural lefts is a feasible phenomenon due to the 
unprecedented simultaneous democratic rise to political power of ten leftwing governments in 
the region. (Table 5.1 maps the Latin American governments by ideology in 2011). On top of 
these unprecedented and remarkable coincidences, the historical heritage of Bolivarianism is 
also playing a key role as a converging factor, more relevant than the goodwill of the 
governments in power. 
The integration of Latin America’s plural lefts is also a feasible phenomenon because 
contrary to the general coverage in mainstream media, high social spending governments in 
Latin America have earned the popular support to undertake unprecedented structural reforms 
aimed at regional integration. This is due mainly because those countries that are governed by 
leftwing governments in the region tend to perform better on inequality and democratic 
indicators, which are considered crucial to governme t stability (Latinobarómetro Report, 
2011: 34). In fact, eight out of the first ten countries ranked in the following key indicators are 
governed by leftwing governments: justice in income distribution; country governed for the 
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Source: Prepared by the author based on the 2011 Latinob rómetro Report (page 13). 
Notes: Political parties’ affiliation in parenthesis. (Sebastián Piñera ran for Presidential 




The study also discusses how the implementation of the Sistema Único de 
Compensación Regional (SUCRE) as a hard currency among ALBA members would he p 
control inflation in Venezuela, mainly by stabilising the highly uncertain exchange rate 
system. The SUCRE is extremely important to the intgration phenomenon of Latin 
America’s leftwing governments because it could be us d as a platform for ALBA to enter 
MERCOSUR as a bloc and not country by country starting with Venezuela. The assertions 
about the specific case of Venezuela are applicable to all Latin American nations, both 
expansionary and disciplinary governments, which have suffered from past episodes of high 
inflation.  
Methodologically, the integration of Latin America’s plural lefts is explored in this 
descriptive case study using secondary sources of longitudinal data collection techniques such 
as surveys, archival and documentary data, semi-structured interviews, and discourses. The 
choice of using a classic single case study approach is to examine a contemporary 
phenomenon in its real-life context with unclear boundaries between phenomenon and context 
(Yin, 1981: 59). This situation is clearly the case with the leftwing writings of Bolívar –which 
are mainly based on the unification of Latin America– and the unstoppable regional 
integration phenomenon that is sweeping the region by surprise. Furthermore, classic single 
case studies are used to gain a deep understanding of a particular social setting (Dyer and 
Wilkins, 1991: 614), such as the simultaneous rise to political power of several leftwing 
governments in the region, from the strident populist chavismo movement in Venezuela to the 
institutionalised political party system in Brazil. Many classic single case studies, however, 
are fundamentally multiple case studies that employ the comparative multiple-case logic or 
replication and extension to develop theoretical insight (Eisenhardt, 1991: 626). 
The paper is organised in six sections. Section II reviews neoliberalism and populism 
as two conflicting but sometimes complementary extreme ideologies. The review of the 
literary adopts a historical realist assumption that e construction of reality is shaped by 
sociopolitical and economic values. Section II explores the case of stagflation –namely high 
inflation– in populist Venezuela. The case of Venezuela argues that high inflation can be 
beaten by encouraging private investments and stabili ing the exchange rate system. Section 
III describes the feasibility arguments, with a focus on MERCOSUR and ALBA, the heritage 
of bolivarianism, and survey information from the 2011 Latinobarómetro Report. Section IV 
provides a theoretical framework, based mainly on Rdrik’s (2002) political trilemma, to 
critically asses the practical implications of insttutionalising a regional trade arrangement 
 84 
between ALBA and MERCOSUR. This section also reveals the implicit debates based on the 




5.2   THE EXTREMES: NEOLIBERALISM AND POPULISM  
 
Neoliberalism is explained in three words: liberalis t on, privatisation, and stabilisation 
(Wood, 2009: 139). Liberalisation opens the door to f ee trade by dismantling protectionist 
barriers. Privatisation ensures that goods and services are efficiently allocated through market 
mechanisms. And stabilisation tames the hyperinflaton plague that infected many Latin 
American economies during the 1980s through the strict enforcement of austerity measures 
such as slashing social spending.  
Neoliberalism brightest moment in Latin America came during the 1980s with the 
invasion of foreign debt just before the US decided to increase interest rates as a government 
measure to slow down domestic inflationary pressures. Naturally, the refinancing of debt that 
followed the interest rates hike was conditioned to a series of orthodox policies championed 
by the IMF and the World Bank –the primary architects of neoliberalism– known as the 
Washington Consensus, which were targeted to the expansion of commodity exports (Fridel, 
2006: 16). Not by chance, the 1980s is considered “the lost decade” in Latin America. 
Average per capita income declined by 0.9% per year, and more importantly, between 1983 
and 1992 the overall number of people living in poverty increased from 78 million to 150 
million (Cole, 2010: 318-319).  
In fact, the harmful consequences of the neoliberal xperiment in Latin America are 
just short of catastrophic. (Chile is possibly the lonely economic exception). From a political 
perspective, the initial bursts of the neoliberal model made no secret of their readiness to 
liquidate any leftwing redistributive movement –such as Salvador Allende in 1973– and 
install cruel military dictatorships –such as Augusto Pinochet from 1973 to 1990– for the sake 
of a commodity export-oriented economy by way of intense labor exploitation (Sader, 2008: 
7). 
From an economic perspective, Sader (2008: 7-8) points ut that the largest Latin 
American economies were the theatre for the most dramatic crises: Mexico in 1994, Brazil in 
1999, and Argentina in 2002. Hyperinflation was checked, but this was achieved at 
tremendous cost. For more than a decade, economic development was paralyzed, public 
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deficits spiraled, the mass of the population had teir rights expropriated, and worst of all the 
concentration of wealth grew greater than ever before. In the 1990s the share in national 
income of the bottom decile declined across much of t e region. In Brazil, it decreased from 
an already minuscule 0.7% to 0.6%, and in Peru and Mexico it remained stuck at 1% and 
1.4% respectively (Wood, 2009: 142). 
At the turn of the century, the neoliberal movement played its game-winning card at 
the 2001 Third Summit of the Americas of the OAS in Miami, with the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA). It should be noted at this point that the ultimate objective of the FTAA 
is to consolidate US hegemony across the region and to increase corporate profits within a 
neoliberal strategy of exogenous development based on trade and deregulation of competitive 
markets (Cole, 2010: 324). In other words, to guarantee business control of a territory that 
stretches from the Arctic to the Antarctic, with the free access, without difficulties, of 
products, services, technology, and capital for the US and Canada. In reference to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Cole (2010: 324) adds that while trade between 
the US and Mexico increased in 1995 by 23%, total output in Mexico fell by 7% that same 
year.  
Some brave authors have gone a step further by proposing that FTAs with the US is 
“the fundamental issue that divides Latin America today: the line that separates countries such 
as Chile, Mexico, Peru or Costa Rica, which have signed deals of this kind, from others such 
as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua or Cuba, 
that are more interested in regional integration. This is a completely different distinction to 
that between a ‘good’ or ‘moderate’ centre-left, and  ‘bad’ or radical left, cultivated by the 
Western media and formulated by figures such as Jorge Castañeda, spokesman of the Latin 
American right, in order to divide the left, co-opting the moderates and isolating the radicals." 
(Sader 2008: 19).  
FTA with the US is in fact the most reasonable cutting point for the left and the right 
in Latin America. But Sader’s (2008) proposition is incomplete, because leftwing 
governments in Latin America are sub-divided based on populism in two distinctive fronts 
and some grey area in between: the radical left or the social populism found in ALBA 
countries lead by Venezuela, the moderate center-left or the social democracy found in most 
MERCOSUR countries lead by the tandem Lula-Rousseff in Brazil, and Argentina 
somewhere in between. Rightwing governments of the present, on the other side, 
unanimously embrace a more moderate approach to neoliberalism as a common center-right 
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economic agenda, which is many times associated to liberal democracy, (Panama is possibly 
the lonely political exception). 
Populism is defined as a charismatic mode of linkage between voters and politicians, 
unmediated by any institutionalised political party and based on a powerful Manichaean 
discourse of “the people versus the elite” that encourages an “anything goes” attitude among 
supporters (Hawkins, 2003: 1137). Throughout history, leftwing populism has been 
particularly strong in Latin America, where many charismatic leaders have emerged in 
different countries since the beginning of the lastcentury. The list includes the three largest 
economies in the region: Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Juan Perón in Argentina, and Lázaro 
Cárdenas in Mexico. Smaller countries in the region have also witnessed how their history has 
been shaped by the assassination of legendary populist leaders such as Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 
Colombia more than six decades ago, which sparked the continent's longest-running armed 
conflict.  
As a socio-political movement that confronts the peopl  against the elite, populism 
addresses and represents the wellbeing and interests of the poor and repressed, including low 
level workers and indigenous groups (Kaufman and Stallings, 1991; Haggard and Kaufman, 
1991). As an economic movement, populism embodies th  truggle to reduce inequality 
through expansionary social policies financed with foreign debt and seigniorage that often 
lead to hyperinflation (Sachs, 1989; Fernández, 1991). Dornbusch and Edwards (1991: 11-12) 
argue that populism has four phases. At the initial ph se, real wages and demand increase, 
while inflation is suffocated with strict price controls and by preventing shortages with 
subsidised imports. At the second phase, real wages continue to rise, but the strong domestic 
demand and subsidies on wage goods generates a foreign exchange constraint. At this stage, 
inflationary pressures build up. At the third phase, inflation is soaring, shortages and strict 
controls are now a real threat to stability, and fiscal indiscipline deteriorates the deficit at an 
accelerated pace. At the final collapsing fourth phase of populism, real wages and private 
investments dramatically decline, and brain drain ctches up to a financially unsustainable 
capital flight. More often than not, an IMF neoliberal program protected by a rightwing 
military regime will be enacted.  
Populism, however, surprisingly holds the key to overcome the sharp differences 
between the moderate Latin American left and the radical left. This is due mainly because 
populism is opportunistic by nature, and hence not necessarily has to constantly follow 
expansionary macroeconomic policies which often lead to high inflation. Weyland (2003: 
1098) actually claims that populism and neoliberalism are compatible and even have some 
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unexpected affinities. Perhaps, the hard populist socialism found in oil-rich Venezuela can 
also learn from past populist mistakes and find a way to control runaway inflation. In this 
ideal scenario, the leading financer of the 21st Century Socialism movement would need to 
moderate its economic agenda, not political or social agenda, towards the encouragement of 




5.3   STAGFLATION IN POPULIST VENEZUELA 
 
The rise of leftwing populism in Venezuela and its impact on integrating the plural lefts in 
Latin America is an exceptional case to study. This unprecedented and unstudied 
phenomenon is grounded on two arguments. In the first place, according to the 
Latinobarómetro Report (2011: 101), Venezuela has ranked in the second place behind Brazil 
as the most influential country in Latin America for the past three years with a total response 
score of 11%, 9%, and 10% to the specific open-ended qu stion: “which Latin American 
country has most leadership in the region?” Naturally, the supergiant Brazil scored 18%, 19%, 
and 20% for the same period.21 This valuable information implies that Venezuela is the 
undisputed leader of the hard left in the region, which should not come as a surprise taking 
into consideration that oil revenues for the period 1998-2008 are estimated to be in the 
neighborhood of US$850 Billion (Lugo, 2009: 20). Part of the huge oil revenues has been 
well invested in exporting the Bolivarian ideology throughout Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  
The extreme case of populist Venezuela is also significa t because it could 
convincingly falsify the classical four phase theory f populism and even rewrite a fifth phase 
highlighted by poverty reduction as its main characteristic, instead of high inflation and slow 
economic growth. Sachs (1989: 14-15) argues that at the collapsing fourth phase of populism, 
governments implement exchange controls to ration the scarce foreign exchange that leads to 
a black-market premium. This situation in turn tends to raise the domestic price of imported 
goods that are paid mostly for on the margin with black-market dollars. The short-term result 
is a further anti-export bias, and the incentive for export under-invoicing and smuggling. 
Eventually these distortions prompt an official devaluation and a reunification of the 
                                                
21 As a curious note, although the question specifically states “Latin American country,” one of the 
answers has always been the US, which indicates that the respondents answer to leadership in general. 
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exchange rate for current account transactions. At the end, the economy is left with an 
expansionary monetary policy under floating exchange rates, leading to a sustained rise in 
inflation. 
Orthodox theory already assumes the association between populist policies and high 
inflation while defining the term populism as an approach that deemphasizes the risks of high 
inflation and deficit finance (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991: 9). This view is also supported 
by Haggard (2003: 417-418), who suggests that developing countries with soaring inflation 
have been those featuring urban labor movements mobilised into populist parties. Monetarists 
also consider inflation as a problem caused by the surplus of money supply and the excess 
demand of goods and services, which is typical in populist regimes. While Keynesians argue 
that inflation is the result of three pressures in the economy: (1) demand-pull inflation that 
comes from the increase in demand such as extensive government spending; (2) cost-push 
inflation that comes from the rise in production costs such as higher minimum wages; (3) and 
build-in inflation that comes as part of a vicious circle created by people’s expectations 
concerning higher prices and by the inertia of high inflation in the recent past. In all three 
Keynesian pressures, inflation is likely to rise with populist economic policies.  
In line with the theory, high inflation in Venezuela is mainly caused by two intrinsic 
factors: the oil rentier state effect and inflationary expectations. The logic behind rentier states 
is that oil revenues, which accounts to more than 90% of total exports, are captured by the 
government. This situation in turn fuels government consumption, which increase domestic 
inflation as an autonomous spending multiplier. In a useless attempt to control inflation, the 
Bolívar is artificially overvalued. The artificially overvalued Bolívar leads to a profit squeeze 
in the corporate sector and to a decline in the non-oil export production. At the end, 
uncompetitive national industries encourage greater dependence on the oil revenues that 
caused the rentier effect. The harmful cycle of oil dependency is reinforced by a wide spread 
between the official and black market rate, which further fuels inflation and strangles the 
development of other domestic sectors that would permit Venezuela to diversify its economy 
(Wood, 2009: 145).  
The second intrinsic cause is the expectation of high inflation or build-in inflation 
from a Keynesian perspective. In Venezuela, the economy has settled into a situation in which 
people expect inflation to persist, perhaps only because it has persisted in the past. The 
problem with expectation is that it is self-fulfilling, since the expectation that inflation will 
stay high causes it to stay high (Ball, 1993: 10). For example, if the majority of the people in 
Venezuela expect –with the aid of an openly anti-government private media– a 30% inflation 
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to continue in the future, not only firms will end up raising prices about 30% to compensate 
the 30% increase they expect from their competitors; but also, workers will demand a 30% 
wage increases to keep up with expected inflation. Ultimately, inflation will probably end up 
at 30%, fulfilling expectations. This pervasive cycle is aggravated because the persistence of 
high inflation creates the expectation of persistence, which in turn generates more persistence 
(Ball, 1993: 11). 
The key concern with high inflation is that it is particularly hard on the poor. Mainly 
because poor families do not own rent producing assets to fight against galloping inflation, 
and also because, poor families are required to use most of their income to buy inflationary 
food products, which tends to be higher than overall inflation. According to ex-Central Bank 
of Venezuela (BCV) Director, José Guerra, poor families use about half of their income to 
buy food products (Armas, 2011). High income families, on the other hand, use less than 15% 
of their income (Salmerón, 2010). In line with this arguments, the Centro de Documentación 
y Análisis para los Trabajadores (Documentation and Analysis Centre for the Workers, 
Cenda), reports that the minimum salary can only buy about half of the food basket, which 
implies that two minimum salaries are required to cover household food costs (El Universal, 
2010). 
As mentioned before, in Venezuela theory and data converge nicely. Parallel to the 
rise of the chavismo phenomenon, which is without a doubt of the populist variety (Stahler-
Sholk, Vanden, and Kruecker, 2007: 6), inflation rates in recent years have reached an 
unsustainable 23% in 2007, 31% in 2008, 25% in 2009, 26% in 2010, and 28% in 2011. 
Venezuela’s inflation rate is in fact the highest in Latin America and the second highest in the 
world behind Belarus.22 Despite a worldwide economic environment of strong deflationary 
pressures. (Last column of Table 5.2). High inflation, however, is not the only problem. The 
economy contracted -3.3% in 2009 and -1.9% in 2010, which represents seven consecutive 
trimesters of negative growth. (For the time being, the slow economic growth part of 
stagflation is no longer a problem, since the economy grew 4.2% in 2011 backed-up by the 
rebound of oil prices invested in construction). 
 
                                                
22 Data from the CIA Worldfactbook (accessed on 07 March 2012). Available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2092rank.html  
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Table 5.2   Socioeconomic Indicators in Latin America 
 
Index Year Index Year % Year % Year % Year % Year Index Year Index Year % Year % Year % Year % Year
Argentina 0,86 2000 0,88 2010 45,7 2009 15,0 2000 9,5 2006 -0,9 2000 6,3 2009
Bolivia 0,79 2000 0,81 2010 60,6 1999 54,0 2007 36,4 1999 31,2 2007 44,7 1999 58,2 2009 19,0 1990 4,8 2000 4,6 2000 3,4 2009
Brazil 0,82 2000 0,82 2010 37,5 2001 24,9 2009 13,2 2001 7,0 2009 60,7 1998 56,7 2005 9,3 2005 7,9 2008 7,1 2000 4,9 2009
Chile 0,80 2000 0,84 2010 20,2 2000 11,5 2009 5,6 2000 3,6 2009 57,1 2000 54,9 2003 8,3 2000 7,8 2008 3,8 2000 1,7 2009
Colombia 0,77 2000 0,82 2010 54,2 2002 45,7 2009 19,9 2002 16,5 2009 53,8 1996 58,5 2009 11,5 2005 11,7 2008 9,2 2000 4,2 2009
Costa Rica 0,74 2000 0,78 2010 20,3 2002 18,9 2009 8,2 2002 6,9 2009 45,9 1997 48,0 2008 5,2 2000 4,6 2007 11,0 2000 7,8 2009
Cuba 0,70 2000 0,85 2010 5,4 2000 1,8 2007
Dominican R 0,74 2000 0,75 2010 47,1 2002 41,1 2009 20,7 2002 21,0 2009 47,4 1998 49,9 2005 14,2 2000 15,6 2007 7,7 2000 1,5 2009
Ecuador 0,76 2000 0,80 2010 N/A 2002 42,2 2009 N/A 2002 18,1 2009 50,5 2006 47,9 2009 9,0 2000 6,9 2008 96,1 2000 5,2 2009
El Salvador 0,69 2000 0,73 2010 48,9 2001 47,9 2009 22,1 2001 17,3 2009 52,5 2001 52,4 2002 7,0 2000 6,6 2006 2,3 2000 0,4 2009
Guatemala 0,59 2000 0,68 2010 60,2 2002 54,8 2006 30,9 2002 29,1 2006 55,8 1998 55,1 2007 1,4 2000 1,8 2006 6,0 2000 1,9 2009
Honduras 0,68 2000 0,73 2010 79,7 1999 68,9 2007 56,8 1999 45,6 2007 56,3 1998 53,8 2003 4,2 2005 3,1 2006 11,0 2000 8,7 2009
Mexico 0,76 2000 0,81 2010 41,1 2000 34,8 2008 15,2 2000 11,2 2008 53,1 1998 48,2 2008 2,6 2000 4,0 2008 9,5 2000 5,3 2009
Nicaragua 0,65 2000 0,70 2010 69,3 2001 61,9 2005 42,4 2001 31,9 2005 60,3 1998 43,1 2001 9,8 2000 5,2 2006 7,1 2000 3,7 2009
Panamá 0,78 2000 0,81 2010 36,9 2002 26,4 2009 18,6 2002 11,1 2009 48,5 1997 56,1 2003 13,8 2000 6,8 2007 1,4 2000 2,4 2009
Paraguay 0,76 2000 0,77 2010 61,0 2001 56,0 2009 33,2 2001 30,4 2009 57,7 1998 53,2 2009 7,6 2000 5,6 2007 9,0 2000 2,6 2009
Perú 0,81 2000 0,83 2010 54,8 2001 34,8 2009 24,4 2001 11,5 2009 57,7 1998 49,6 2009 5,2 2000 7,0 2007 3,9 2000 3,0 2009
Puerto Rico
Uruguay 0,84 2000 0,89 2010 N/A 2002 10,4 2009 N/A 2002 1,9 2009 44,8 1999 45,2 2006 13,6 2000 7,6 2008 4,8 2000 7,1 2010
Venezuela 0,74 2000 0,86 2010 49,4 1999 27,6 2008 21,7 1999 9,9 2008 49,5 1998 41,0 2009 13,2 2000 7,4 2008 16,2 2000 27,0 2010
AVERAGE 0,75 2000 0,80 2010 49,4 2001 38,9 2008 24,6 2001 17,9 2008 52,7 1999 51,0 2006 9,2 2000 6,6 2007 11,7 2000 5,4 2009
N/A N/A N/A N/AN/A N/A N/A N/AN/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/AN/A N/A N/A N/A
PRESENT
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
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Extreme Poverty GINI Index Unemployment Inflation
 
Source: specific sources can be found underneath the corresponding demarcation criteria’s subtitles. 
 
 
It is fair to note that Table 5.2 also shows the populist beneficial spillover effects of 
increasing real social spending per person 314% from 1998 to 2006, to reach a striking 21% 
of total GDP (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 2008: 11). For example, the first column in Table 2 
shows that the Venezuelan Education Index by the UN Human Development Program 
improved tremendously during the Chávez years, from .74 in 2000 to .86 in 2010.23 However, 
improving education is not the greatest achievement of the chavismo government. Neither is 
cutting poverty, extreme poverty, and unemployment to about half. The greatest improvement 
of the chavismo era is decreasing the Gini inequalities coefficient from a mediocre score of 50 
in 1998 to becoming the undisputed leader in equality with a score of 41 in 2009.24 
                                                
23 The “Education Index” is the adult literacy rate with two-thirds weighting and the gross enrolment 
ratio with one-third weighting; the value of one is the highest possible theoretical score. 
24 The “GINI Index” measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a 
country; the more nearly equal a country's income distribution, the lower its GINI index. 
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The Venezuelan populist government has desperately tri d to defeat high inflation, but 
with the wrong measures: price controls and increasing the supply of food imports. (Figure 
5.1 illustrates this line of thought). The problem with the short-term-fix of price controls on 
basic products is that it often leads to food scarcity. And food scarcity in turn, will eventually 
become a threat to stability, exactly as it happened with dairy products not so long ago 
(Salmerón, 2011a). According to a Datanálisis report, f od scarcity in Venezuela has 
averaged 17% since the radicalisation of price controls set back in 2003 (Caripa, 2011). In 
reference to food imports, Commerce Minister Edmée Betancourt justifies the 50% budget 
increase needed to import food with the argument that i  is an essential ingredient to stop 
inflation (Deniz and Barreiro, 2011).  
 
 








































Based on recent poll data, the current government in Venezuela will probably not 
change in the near future. (Unless Chávez dies fromcancer). Furthermore, the public 
spending frenzy will probably never slow down. Taking these assumptions into consideration, 
the government in Venezuela will need to concentrate all of its efforts on stabilising the 
exchange rate system and encouraging private investment. It is a matter of simple logic, if 
inflation continues to flirt around the 30% barrier; the economy will collapse in an endless 
cycle of monetary devaluations, since all trading partners have single digit inflation rates. Oil 
revenues can prolong and even balance payment crisis, but eventually the chavismo 
administration is heavily dependent on decreasing inflat on. The far-reaching consequence of 
the chavismo downfall is that it will threaten the survival of ALBA, and more importantly, it 
will have a devastating impact on the integration of ALBA into MERCOSUR.  
Sceptics of the Venezuelan government argue that the strict exchange rate controls fall 
short of adding monetary stability. The most logical argument of attack is that the monthly 
limits set by the Sistema de Transacciones en Moneda Extranjera (Foreign Currency 
Transaction System, or SITME) are usually not enough to keep open the lines of credit. 
According to Jorge Botti, ex-President of CONSECOMERCIO and Director of CEDICE, the 
SITME is slow and highly bureaucratic, which eliminates any possibility of following a sound 
financial plan (Deniz, 2010a). Roberto León Parilli, President of the Alianza Nacional de 
Usuarios y Consumidores (ANAUCO), adds that the SITME is discriminatory only to those 
who have foreign accounts, which is a condition very difficult to satisfy after seven years of 
exchange rate controls (Deniz, 2010a). Deniz (2010b) also cites the following interview to 
Fernando Morgado, President of CONSECOMERCIO: “The rebound of oil prices has 
allowed the government to revitalise public spending a d liquidity; but if retailers cannot 
import on time, it is impossible to react to the eventual increase in demand. In other words, 
freezing the access to Dollars and throwing money i the street is like putting out a fire with 
gasoline, which reintroduces the nightmare of hyperinflation in our vocabulary.”  
In reference to low investments, ECLAC data sustain that out of the US$92 billion of 
foreign direct investment injected in the region for the period 2004-2008, which accounts to 
an extra 33% compared to the period 1999-2003, Venezuela only received US$6 billion, well 
below Chile’s US$53 billion, Colombia’s US$39 billion, and Peru’s US$17 billion 
(Salmerón, 2009). Private investments have in fact de reased tremendously in Venezuela 
since the chavismo administration took over in 1999. According to theC ntral Bank of 
Venezuela (BCV), from 1999 to 2008, real private investments decreased 40% (Tejero 
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Puntes, 2009b). For the first trimester of 2011, real private investment was 21% less 
compared to the same period of 2009, and 13% less compared to 2008 (Salmerón, 2011b).  
The exceedingly low private investment in Venezuela is partially mitigated thanks to 
increasing bilateral agreements –based on debt financ g in exchange for oil– with China. 
According to Finance and Planning Minister Jorge Giordani, commercial trade between China 
and Venezuela has skyrocketed from a very low starting point of US$175 million in 1999 to a 
remarkable US$8 billion in 2009 (El Universal, 2011). According to the Venezuelan national 
oil company (Petróleos de Venezuela, or PDVSA), oil shipments to energy-hungry China has 
steadily increased in recent years, from 86 thousand b rrels per day in 2008, to 188 thousand 
in 2009, and to 244 thousand in 2010 (Tovar, 2011a).  
To sum it up, bilateral agreements between governments are not enough. Inflation rate 
in Venezuelan will never reach single digits unless private investment is encouraged well 
beyond the current level. Mainly because production has to increase if there is any hope to 
transform the economy from demand-driven to supply-driven, which can only be achieved 
with the help of private investments. Statistics from the BCV show that industrial output in 
Venezuela decreased in the last five years. By the end of 2010, industrial output was at its 
lowest level since 2005. In fact, production was below in ten out of sixteen areas in which the 
BCV divides private industries, comparing 1997 to 2010. Salmerón (2011c) highlights these 
relevant pieces of information and even provides th following list of causes from well-
known analysts: exchange rate controls and limitations, subsidies to foreign competition 
caused by an artificially overvalued Bolívar, and a overall hostile environment that scares off 
private investments. Economist Asdrúbal Oliveros adds that uncertainty and mistrust are two 
factors that will prevent the Venezuelan economy to reach its full development (Tovar, 
2011b). 
Perhaps, the eventual acceptance of Venezuela as a full member of the South 
American trade bloc MERCOSUR would add some confidece to foreign and domestic 
private investors. Logic and empirical evidence holds a strong consensus on the subject. The 
inclusion of Venezuela into MERCOSUR’s massive trading block would increase the ratio of 
international trade to GDP. Increasing international trade in turn, would significantly improve 
the share of investment in GDP. In other words, private investment is linked to economic 
integration (Leamer, 1988; Romer, 1990), economic integration to economic growth (Romer, 
1986; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991), and economic growth to decreasing inflation 
(Kormendi and Meguire, 1985). The arguments have not changed much since Adam Smith. 
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That is, productivity and efficiency are encouraged by the increasing competition of a larger 
market and the specialisation that would be unprofitable in smaller markets. 
Another phenomenon that would increase investment rates and help stabilise the 
exchange rate in Venezuela is the implementation of the SUCRE as a hard currency among 
ALBA members. Named in honour of Venezuelan-born independence hero Antonio José de 
Sucre, the SUCRE is currently a virtual regional currency used in commercial transactions 
among ALBA countries. The SUCRE, born in Bolivia on 2009, was conceived as a measure 
to decrease the dependence on the US$. The value deriv s from a basket of currencies from 
the member countries, weighted accordingly to the relative size of the economies. The core 
operation of the SUCRE is a central payments clearinghouse managed by an agent bank 
selected by the Regional Monetary Council. The terms of payments through the clearinghouse 




5.4   FEASIBILITY ARGUMENTS 
 
5.4.1   ALBA and MERCOSUR 
 
Regional trade arrangements can be organised in five distinctive types: (1) free trade 
agreement, (2) customs union, (3) common market, (4) monetary union, (5) and economic 
union. Starting from the less beneficial type, free trade agreement, the subsequent type builds 
upon the socioeconomic integration policies of the previous one. That is, the US for example, 
will benefit from a single fiscal policy of an economic union. Plus the benefits of a single 
currency that comes from a single monetary policy, such as the EU. Plus free restrictions on 
labor or capital movement of a common market, such as the former European Economic 
Community. Plus the common external tariffs and the harmonisation of regulations of a 
custom union, such as MERCOSUR. Plus the non-tariff barriers between member nations of a 
free trade agreement, such as NAFTA.   
From the previous list, MERCOSUR fits as a custom union, while NAFTA fits 
perfectly as a free trade agreement. ALBA, however, is different from anything we have seen 
so far. This is due mainly because ALBA is based on bartering rather than free trade. In 
ALBA, each country gives according to what it has and receives according to its needs. For 
example, ALBA’s two founding countries, Venezuela and Cuba, exchanged oil for expertise 
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in education and public health, in line with their respective wants and possibilities (Sader, 
2008: 20). Fortunately, as its name implies, ALBA is also based on the Bolivarian ideology. 
And Bolivarianism is basically based on Latin American unity.  
The key to the integration of ALBA into MERCOSUR, however, is that both blocs 
share a common leftwing ideology rooted on four principals. The first and foremost is 
Bolívar’s utopian dream of the social, economic, and military union of Latin America. As the 
region undisputed leader, Brazil was very clear about this last issue by proposing a national 
defence council during the constituting summit of theUnión de Naciones Suramericanas 
(South American United Nations, or UNASUR) held in Brasília on May 2008, and later 
approved on December 2008. It should be noted that UNASUR did not pass its first real tests 
by failing to vigorously condemn the 2009 coup d'état in Honduras and the seven US military 
bases recently installed in Colombian soil. 
The remaining four encompassing leftwing principals are: (2) to increase social 
spending, especially in education for the poor, such as the Bolivian literacy program that 
according to UN criteria claims to have almost eliminated illiteracy; (3) to forcefully reject 
IMF and Washington sponsored neoliberal policies, such as the Argentinean fiery opposition 
to the FTAA during the Fourth Summit of the Americas at Mar del Plata in November 2005; 
(4) to encourage socialised properties and political participation of the masses, such as small 
cooperatives and community councils in Venezuela; (5) to increase government intervention 
in the economy by nationalising natural resources and strategic businesses, such as the 
Venezuelan nationalisations at of key players in the p one (Cantv), electric (Elecar), and 
banking (Banco de Venezuela) industries.  
 
 
5.4.2   Leftwing Governments and WSF 
 
Assuming that left to their own will, without subordination to foreign manipulation, the 
desperate poor in Latin America will probably choose redistributive governments. 
Interestingly enough, many Latin American democracies already have started to follow this 
path by electing high social spending leftwing governments into Presidential office. The list 
of leftwing Presidents elected by democratic means now adds up to at least eleven countries. 
In all started in Venezuela with Hugo Chávez in 1998; Chávez won two more Presidential 
elections in 2000 and 2006, and one recall referendum in 2004. Argentina with Néstor 
Kirchner in 2003 and wife Christina Fernández in 2007 and 2011. Bolivia with Evo Morales 
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in 2005; Morales won a recall referendum in 2008 with 67%. Ecuador with Rafael Correa in 
2006 and 2009. Uruguay with Tabaré Vázquez in 2004 and ex-guerrilla “Pepe” Mujica in 
2009. Nicaragua with Daniel Ortega in 2006 and 2012. Paraguay with Fernando Lugo in 
2008. El Salvador with Mauricio Funes in 2009. Peru with Ollanta Humala in 2011. And 
before the 2009 coup d'état, Honduras with Manuel Zelaya in 2005. (The list excludes Raul 
Castro, because Cuba is not a free democracy).  
The eleventh country in the list is Brazil with the Lula da Silva phenomenon in 2002 
and 2006, and ex-urban guerrilla Dilma Rousseff in 2010. It is important to recognise the 
following undeniable truth: the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party, or PT) is closer 
to the Marxist populism in Venezuela than to rightwing governments that have close ties with 
the US such as Mexico, Costa Rica, Panamá, and Colombia (French, 2009). As a matter of 
fact, the deep relationship between Brazil and Venezuela has gone well beyond trade, which 
by the way has more than quadrupled to about US$6.5 billion per year since Lula took over in 
2003.  
In repeated occasions, Brazil has served as a vital guarantor of Chávez in the face of 
his enemies, just as it has supported the radical so ialist government of Evo Morales, despite 
the abrupt nationalisation of Brazilian state-owned oil enterprise Petrobras interests’ in 
Bolivia (French, 2009: 358). More importantly, Brazil not only backed Venezuela’s 
controversial bid for a seat on the UN Security Council, but also, the two governments 
worked together to create the Banco del Sur, where a part of the national reserves are 
expected to go (Cameron, 2009: 344). Recently, Brazil went over the US in three relevant 
issues: (1) in attempting to broker an agreement with Iran on nuclear energy; (2) by criticising 
US for installing seven military bases in Colombia; (3) and by recognising the Palestinian 
state with its pre-1967 boundaries. “For U.S. hardliners, Lula strayed too far from acceptable 
diplomacy. During his last stretch in office, in the words of the Wall Street Journal, Lula 
pursued an increasingly anti-American foreign policy.” (Ellner, 2011).  
The icing in the cake came when President Dilma Rousseff did not attend the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos (Switzerland) to host the World Social Forum (WSF) in 
Porto Alegre (Brazil) from 24-29 January 2012, despit  the fact that Brazil is one of the rising 
stars in the global economy. Ironically, while Davos praised capitalism as the best alternative, 
the slogan at the WSF was “the capitalist crisis.” Latter that week, President Rousseff 
travelled to Cuba to meet with Fidel Castro and sign a series of mutual agreements with 
President Raul Castro. Fortunately, Brazil and the WSF exist, and fortunately both serve as a 
natural space of encounter based on horizontality and autonomy for the plural lefts in Latin 
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America (French, 2009: 363-364). The Partido dos Trabalhadores and the WSF are not 
defined by opposition to capitalism per se, but to neoliberalism. That is, it is not defined by 
opposition to all capital, but to domination by capit l.  
 
 
5.4.3   The 2011 Latinobarometro Report 
 
The 2011 Latinobarómetro Report, released on 28 October 2011, is an annual public opinion 
survey by a non-profit NGO based in Santiago de Chile t at involves some 19,000 interviews 
in 18 Latin American countries, which represents more than 400 million inhabitants. The 
2011 survey received support from a number of international organisations and governments, 
including the Organisation of American States (OAS), la Corporación Andina de Fomento 
(CAF), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), the Danish government, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), la Agencia 
Española de Cooperación Internacional (AECI), and the US Department of State.25  
Overall, the 2011 Latinobarómetro Report sustain that countries with leftwing 
governments tend to perform better on inequalities and democracy institutions indicators. As 
a matter of fact, eight out of the first ten countries ranked in the following four key indicators 
are governed by leftwing governments (refer to Table 5.3): “justice in income distribution”, 
“country governed for the common well of all”, “trust in the government,” and “satisfaction 
with democracy.” (The coincidence is considered to be significant from any statistical 
perspective). The four key performance indicators are considered crucial to stability, which 
implies that leftwing governments in Latin America are in a good position to stay in power 
the necessary time needed to undertake radical constitutional reforms aimed at regional 
integration. At the very least, leftwing governments in the region should enjoy the popular 
support needed to reject future attempts of the neoliberal movement to institutionalise the 
FTAA.    
                                                
25 The 2011 Report is available at http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATContenidos.jsp. 
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Table 5.3   Rank in Key Stability Indicators 
 
Country
Justice in income 
distribution
 Country governed 
for the common well 
of all 




Argentina 10 5 6 2
Bolivia 8 6 10 15
Brazil 13 8 8 9
Chile 18 12 13 12
Colombia 16 10 11 16
Costa Rica 5 13 7 6
Cuba N/A N/A N/A N/A
Dominican Republic 17 18 17 11
Ecuador 1 4 2 4
El Salvador 9 9 5 10
Guatemala 11 11 18 18
Honduras 15 16 16 14
Mexico 12 15 15 17
Nicaragua 6 2 12 8
Panamá 2 7 3 3
Paraguay 7 14 9 7
Perú 14 17 14 13
Uruguay 4 1 1 1
Venezuela 3 3 4 5  
 
 
The two inequality indicators, “justice in income distribution” and “country governed 
for the common well of all,” respond to following questions: “how fair you think that income 
distribution is in (country)?;” and “generally speaking, will you say that (country) is governed 
for a few powerful groups in their own benefit, or is governed for the common well of all?” 
For the first indicator, figures range from just 6% in Chile who considers distribution is fair to 
the 43% in Ecuador who take this view (here only “very fair” and “fair”). For the second 
indicator, the perception that a government governs on behalf of the majority is considered 
central to stability. 
 The remaining indicators, “trust in the government” and “satisfaction with 
democracy,” responds to the following questions: “would you say you have a lot, some, a 
little or no trust in the Government?;” and “in general, would you say that you are very 
satisfied, quite satisfied, not very satisfied or nt at all satisfied with the working of the 
democracy in (country)?” These last two indicators relate how citizens perceive the state and 




5.4.4   Heritage of Bolivarianism 
 
The following impressive news report was released on 07 August 2011 as the main argument 
with which the BBC chose Simón Bolívar as the most outstanding American (north, central, 
and south): “With only 47 years of age, he fought 472 battles being defeated only 6 times, he 
took part in 79 big battles with the great risk of dying in 25 of them. He freed 6 nations, rode 
123 kilometres (more than what was sailed by Columbs and Vasco da Gama together) was 
the Head of State of 5 nations, took the torch of Liberty for a lineal distance of 6,500 
kilometres (this distance is approximately half turn to the Earth). He travelled 10 times more 
than Hannibal, 3 times more than Napoleon, and the double of Alexander the Great. His ideas 
of liberty were written in 92 proclamations and 2,632 letters. The most incredible is that most 
of them were simultaneously dictated in different languages to several secretaries. The most 
important is that the army he commanded never conquered only liberated!"  
 The most accurate account of Bolívar’s legacy is Lynch’s (2006) pragmatic 
masterpiece.26 Different from previous biographies, Lynch (2006) emphasizes the importance 
of class and racial inequalities as a driving force to Bolívar’s unstoppable quest for liberty and 
justice, with the argument that Venezuela was dominated by born Spaniards and recent 
generations of Venezuelan white elite, which only accounted for about .5% of the total 
population. Lynch (2006), however, makes two bias mistakes. In the first place, by calling 
Hugo Chávez a fake Bolivarian revolutionary, just after Chávez changed the name of the 
country to Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (page 304). And in the second place, by 
undermining the strong influence of free-thinker Simón Rodríguez on Bolívar’s life. Ludwig 
(1942) and Masur (1960), on the other hand, stress he influence of Rodríguez on a young 
Bolívar and argue that as an admirer of Holbach and Rouseau, Rodríguez was a strong 
advocate of placing sovereignty in the hands of the people. In 1819, at the Angostura 
Congress, Bolívar claimed: “Blissful is the citizen that has convened national sovereignty to 
exercise his absolute will.”  
 Lynch (2006) argues that on top of the anti-imperialist and anti-liberalist ideology, 
Bolívar’s dream was to unite the newly liberated territories. Way ahead of his time, Bolívar 
had the grandiose idea of uniting Latin America under a common government linking all the 
states in a confederation as a necessary counterweight to the growing power of the US 
                                                
26 The works of Vicente Lecuna (1870–1954) deserve special recognition, but are less reader-friendly.  
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(Buxton, 2005: 440). One year before his death in 1830, Bolívar prophesized that the US 
seemed destined by Providence to plague Latin America w th miseries in the name of 
freedom. Regrettably, Bolívar lived to see his dream vanished when the short-lived nation 
called Great Colombia was divided into Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Guyana, 
and some territories of Peru and Brazil. Two centuries after Great Colombia’s dismantle, 
Bolívar’s dream has a good chance to become a reality; but only if the “good” and “bad” lefts 
in Latin America integrate into an institutionalised regional trade arrangement, more 




5.5   ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
5.5.1   Political Trilemma 
 
Slowly but surely, the region is reviving Bolivar’s dream to unite an independent and socially 
responsible Latin America. A united Latin America with self-determination to dictate its own 
political and socioeconomic path or at least to be fre from the onerous terms set by the IMF, 
WB, and WTO. The trade-off here is actually straightforward. In theory, a market-oriented 
economy cannot coexist with redistributive democracies in a sovereign developing nation. 
That is, according to the political trilemma by Rodrik (2002), nation state, democratic politics, 
and economic freedom are mutually incompatible. At most, only two out of three can coexist 
at the same time. (Refer to Figure 5.2). 
 
 
Figure 5.2   Political Trilemma “pick two, any two” 
 
Deep Economic Integration 
        
   
 
       




Nation state is the self-determination to govern without any supranational intervention. 
Democratic politics is when public policy decisions are made by those that are directly 
affected by them. And deep economic integration is ba ically to adopt the orthodox 
Washington Consensus neoliberal prescription of stabilis tion, privatisation, and 
liberalisation. That is, to stabilise the monetary system by devaluing local currencies and 
eliminating capital flows controls and to tighten the budget by cutting social spending and 
replacing inefficient state enterprises with privately owned corporations, to the open market 
by liberating prices and slashing imports tariffs, and to liberalise the economy by relaxing 
labor legislations and minimising regulations restrictions.  
Most countries fall somewhere between any two corners of Rodrik’s political 
trilemma. For example, the EU chose to integrate and erect an extensive welfare system of 
social insurance, which fits perfectly somewhere betwe n “deep economic integration” (top 
corner) and “democratic politics” (bottom-right corne ). However, by foregoing “nation state” 
or self-determination, the EU member countries lost autonomy, namely on monetary and 
immigration issues. The US, on the other side of the Atlantic, chose a completely different 
strategy. The US has in fact reached momentary unipolar superpower status with an extra 
dose of the neoliberal recipe for economic development, especially when it comes down to 
free trade agreements, and strong self-determination to do whatever it takes in the 
international arena. However, by foregoing socially responsible policies, the US lags behind 
on inequalities; which can be measured by a terribl Gini coefficient historical track record in 
comparison to the EU, especially against eastern Euopean countries.  
Perhaps, the best option for Latin America is not to mimic the EU welfare liberal 
democracy, or the US nationalistic free trade. Perhaps, a third path focused on regional 
integration among leftwing governments is probably the best choice for Latin America. 
Maybe the orthodox Washington Consensus prescription of liberalisation, privatisation, and 
stabilisation, is simply not the best solution to Latin America’s daunting array of problems. 
Maybe Latin America should learn from its recent traumatic experience with orthodox 
Washington Consensus policies, and reconsider the possibility of a third path; instead of 
embarking in another suicide neoliberal trip. The economic collapse of Mexico in 1994, 
Brazil in 1999, and Argentina in 2002, contributes to the ongoing debate whether market-
oriented policies, especially FTAs, could ever produce real improvements in living conditions 
for a developing country’s poorer citizens (Di Tella and Vogel, 2004a; 2004b). 
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To put the political trilemma into some practical use, I slightly modified its structure 
and the title words, without changing the original meaning. “Deep economic integration” was 
changed to “neoliberalism” and was placed on the far-right corner. “Democratic politics” was 
changed to “populism” and was place on the far-left corner. And “nation state” was changed 
to “nationalism” and was placed above all on the top c rner. (Refer to Figure 5.3). This slight 
modification of Rodrik´s political trilemma reveals two relevant issues. First, the three most 
relevant regional trade arrangements in Latin America fit perfectly in one of the three corners. 
And second, populism becomes the key factor that divides MERCOSUR and ALBA. In other 
words, the “American Political Trilemma” implies that if extreme populism moderates its 
economic agenda towards the encouragement of private investment and stabilising the 
exchange rate system, the gap between MERCOSUR (the “good” left) and ALBA (the “bad” 
left) would automatically narrow down. In practical terms, if Venezuela is accepted into 
MERCOSUR and/or the SUCRE becomes a hard currency among ALBA members, the 
integration of Latin America’s plural lefts will imediately follow. 
 
 
Figure 5.3   American Political Trilemma 
 
       Nationalism  
      
        ALBA          NAFTA 
    
 
                  Populism      Neoliberalism 
           MERCOSUR  
 
 
5.5.2   Evaluation Matrix 
 
Ellner’s (2010) matrix serves the purpose of evaluating the performance of government and to 
understand the existence of a “back door” to integration phenomenon of Latin America, 
which is not explored in this analysis because of its low probability of materialising into 
practice. That is, just as Venezuela holds the key to integrate ALBA into MERCOSUR, 
Argentina holds the key to integrate MERCOSUR into ALBA. This is due mainly because 
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Argentina lies somewhere between the two criterias of the matrix: “liberal democracy” and 
“radical democracy.” (Refer to Table 5.4). 
The legacy of Evita and the piqueteros phenomenon in Argentina are a constant 
remainder that the mobilisation of the popular sectors of society is a strong part of the 
Argentinean gene. This implies that judged by the “radical democracy” criteria, and similar to 
ALBA countries, the Argentinean government scores significantly better compared to being 
judged by the “liberal democracy” criteria. The Latinobarómetro Report (2011: 13) actually 
divides Latin American leftwing governments in three ideological types: (1) “center-left”, (2) 
“21st-century socialist left”, (3) and Argentina simply as “the left” somewhere in between.  
 
 
Table 5.4   Evaluation Matrix 
 
Liberal         
Democracy






















“Radical democracy” emphasizes quantity over quality or the majority rule by 
increasing the participation of the popular sectors of ociety. “Liberal democracy” emphasizes 
an institutionalised system of checks and balances that boosts national production and is hard 
on corruption at the same time, which is the main secret to Uruguay’s outstanding overall 
performance. “Social prioritisation” or social national planning encourages a 
workers/management scheme in SOEs, such as the empresas mixtas in Venezuela. In contrast, 
“pragmatic decision-making” targets production efficiency mainly through the opening of the 
economy to global competition by means of FTAs such as NAFTA.  
For example, judged by “liberal democracy” standards, the chavismo government has 
failed to substantially increase production and has moved very slowly towards 
institutionalisation (Ellner, 2010: 77). However, judging by standards associated with “radical 
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democracy” and “social prioritisation,” which puts emphasis on the participation of the 
popular sectors of the population that were formally excluded and on guiding strategic 
national production towards social objectives in detriment to the efficiency incentives of 
profit-seeking, the chavismo government fares much better (Ellner, 2010: 80).     
    
 
 
5.6   CONCLUSIONS 
 
The twentieth century marked the beginning of Latin America’s second independence. Instead 
of Europe, the US was the loosing side this time . Ellner (2011) supports this fact with three 
arguments. First, the CELAC will eventually serve as a parallel organisation of political 
dialogue to the US-dominated OAS. Second, Latin American nations have broadened 
commercial ties with countries like China, Russia, and Iran. And third, Latin America has 
resolved major internal conflicts without US inputs, including Bolivia’s nationalisation of 
Brazilian oil and gas interests, coup attempts in Ve ezuela and Ecuador, Colombia’s 
incursion in Ecuadorian territory, and an overthrown government in Honduras, which not-by-
chance was a former full member of ALBA. The next frontier to conquer for the plural lefts in 
Latin America, now that the colossal step of partial independence from the US has finally 
been taken, is to institutionalise a regional trade rrangement more significant than a one-
sided FTA. Instead of free trade, which only responds to the interests of international capital 
(Cole, 2010: 325), the integration of Latin America’s plural lefts should emphasize the fight 
against poverty, inequalities, and social exclusion. (Or in Bolívar’s terms: imperialism, 
liberalism, and slavery).  
Nearly two centuries ago, Simón Bolívar united half of South America into The Great 
Colombia; but a handful of greedy caudillos quickly dissolved Bolívar’s dream into four 
countries and parts of two more. Today Latin America is facing its second window of 
opportunity to unite, and just as it did before, it all started with the rise of Bolivarianism in 
Venezuela. Amazingly, just two years into his meteoric rise to power, Chávez was the only 
head of State at the Third Americas Summit in Quebec to vote against Clinton’s proposal for 
the FTAA in 2001. This groundbreaking event deserves more credit, given that FTAs with the 
US is the fundamental issue that divides rightwing a d leftwing governments in Latin 
America, the line that separates governments which ave signed deals of this kind such as 
Mexico, Costa Rica, Colombia and Panama, from leftwing governments that are more 
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interested in regional integration such as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Ecuador or Nicaragua (Sader, 2008). 
Different from previous popular movements rise to power in the region, including 
Salvador Allende in Chile, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, Getulio Vargas in Brazil, or Juan 
Perón in Argentina, the chavismo popular support is financed with exceedingly high oil 
revenues. In fact, the combination of favorable oil prices, the recapture of oil sovereignty by 
charging higher royalties, and the nationalisation of strategic oil-related companies, fuelled a 
public spending bonanza that increased fiscal expenses at an average annual rate of 73% 
between 2004 and 2008 (Figueroa, 2008: 8). Naturally, the expansionary spending program 
sparked the inflation flame in Venezuela to the extreme of becoming the country with the 
highest inflation rates in Latin America, and the second highest in the world.  
High inflation is usually the end-result of an oversized public sector and fiscal 
disarray. Any program that does not attack these two direct causes will surely fail (Fernández, 
1991: 143). However, attacking the problem from this perspective is unrealistic in big 
spending populist Venezuela. The issue is that while economic populism may be 
expansionary-Keynesian, it is also opportunistic by nature; hence, it can also find a way to 
actually succeed in improving social welfare without causing runaway inflation. It all boils 
down to the following argument: as the undisputed leader of the hard-left in Latin America, 
the integration of ALBA into MERCOSUR is dependent o  moderating the Venezuelan 
economy by controlling runaway inflation through the encouragement of private investments 
and the stabilisation of the highly uncertain exchange rate system. That is, if high inflation is 
not controlled in Venezuela, the economy will eventually collapse as predicted by the 
classical four phase theory of populism. The collapse of the Venezuelan economy will in turn 
generate a series of harmful spillover effects on the integration phenomenon of Latin 
America’s plural lefts.    
One practical measure to cure the inflation disease in Venezuela and contribute to the 
integration of leftwing governments in Latin America is the implementation of the SUCRE as 
a hard currency among ALBA members. In addition to helping stabilise the highly uncertain 
Venezuelan exchange rate system with the SUCRE, an immediate investment booster would 
be the acceptance of Venezuela into MERCOSUR’s massive trading block. These 
propositions support Levine and Renelt’s (1991: 955) findings, which strongly sustain that the 
ratio of trade to output is robustly and positively correlated with the share of investment, and 
that share of investment is the most significant empirical linkage to economic growth, which 
implies an important two-link chain between economic union and growth through investment. 
 106 
Share of investment in GDP is in fact the most significant explanatory factor of economic 
growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992: 950). More significant than government consumption, 
poverty traps, education, and stable political system . As a final remark, nowadays that the 
odds for integrating Latin America’s plural lefts are better than ever, it should not come as a 
surprise that with this new reality on its own backyard the north is shivering at the possibility 
of a united Latin America, owner and administrator of gigantic reserves of oil, water, fertile 
land, and oxygen. (Refer to Table 5.5).  
 
 
Table 5.5   Integration of MERCOSUR and ALBA 
 
 Population Territory GDP (PPP)   Water      Oil 
     (2010)   (sq km)     (2009) Resources   Reserves 




  Brazil  201,103,330 8,514,877 $2,025 B 8,233 12.6 B 
  Argentina 41,343,201 2,780,400 $558 B 814 2.3 B 
  Uruguay   3,510,386 176,215   $44 B 139 - 
  Paraguay  6,375,830 406,752   $28 B 336 - 
 
ALBA 
  Venezuela 27,223,228 912,050  $350 B 1,233 153 B 
  Ecuador 14,790,608 283,561  $108 B   432   4 B 
  Bolivia    9,947,418 1,098,581 $45 B   622  465 M 
  Nicaragua   5,995,928 130,370 $17 B   197 - 
  Cuba  11,477,459 110,860   $111 B 38  197 M 
  Dominica  72,813 751   $1 B  - - 
  S. Vinc. & Gren.   104,217    389   $2 B  - - 
  Antigua & Barbu.    86,754    443   $2 B  - - 
 
MERCOSUR + ALBA 
Total 322,031,172 14,415,249  $4,033 B 12,044  172 B 
   
USA 310,232,863   9,826,675 $14,430 B   3,069 21.3 B 
EU 492,387,344   4,324,782 $14,510 B    N/A   5.5 B 
China  1,330,141,295   9,596,961  $8,789 B   2,829 15.7 B 
 







VI   GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The four papers presented in the central chapters of this Doctoral Thesis answer the following 
general questions: (1) what is the relationship betwe n corruption and population per first-tier 
subnational government?; (2) to what extent and why has flawed decentralisation contribute 
to the generalisation of corruption in Venezuela?; (3) and what are the institutional 
implications to Latin America’s integration phenomenon of the PSUV’s structural 
consolidation, the acceptance of Venezuela into MERCOSUR, and the creation of the SUCRE 
as a hard currency among ALBA members. 
The first general question implies that countries which have more subnational 
governments relative to their population are perceived to be more corrupt. As an answer to 
this relevant issue a viable institutional reform to control corruption would be to decrease the 
number of subnational governments by consolidating unpopulated units.27 The arguments 
vary from the probability that financial resources in relatively small subnational governments 
are usually not enough to finance public expenditures (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006); to the 
likelihood that corrupt subnational governments in developing countries are frequently 
governed and managed by incapable authorities and inefficient public servants (Prud’homme, 
1995), who in turn are usually more susceptible to be captured by the corrupt local private 
elite (Tanzi, 1995).  
In theory, centralisation enables a more homogeneous delivery of public services, 
which in turn reduces inequalities among subnational regions in a country. The ultimate 
solution, however, is not to re-centralise because a c rtain degree of decentralisation is always 
essential to improve the quality of government. Thesolution is not to decentralise either, or to 
deconcentrate or even to privatise because a simultaneous interaction of the four is necessary 
for the efficient functioning of the government. Deconcentration increases the benefits 
derived from economies of scale by strengthening the hierarchical relationship between 
national offices and field staff, while privatisation also introduces the profit motive as a factor 
of efficiency. Selecting the optimal mix between the four is, however, extremely difficult.  
                                                
27 The findings are statistically significant and robust to a wide range of controls. 
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If selecting an optimal mix between decentralisation, centralisation, deconcentration, 
and privatisation is extremely difficult, then selecting the optimal mix between the different 
types of decentralisation may well be an impossible goal. Having said this, a good rule of 
thumb is to reinforce and strengthen subnational institutions, namely, the administrative 
(fiscal decentralisation), legislative (decision decentralisation), political (control 
decentralisation), and democratic (electoral decentralisation) institutions.  
Decentralising public policies could strengthen subnational institutions by following a 
five-step strategy: (1) encourage fiscal decentralisation by increasing autonomy, especially tax 
collecting autonomy; (2) encourage decision decentralisation by clearly identifying the 
functions assigned to the different tiers of governme t; (3) encourage control decentralisation 
by empowering regional and local institutions to become potential veto players through the 
national legislature; (4) encourage electoral decentralisation by institutionalising democratic 
elections within every tier of government; (5) and limit structural and division 
decentralisation by decreasing the quantity of subnatio al governments with the consolidation 
of poor and unpopulated units. 
Although decentralisation behaves different in each country, the five-step 
decentralisation strategy aimed at improving subnatio l institutions applies to a broad range 
of countries, including federal and unitary states. The logic seems to be irrefutable: less but 
more powerful and autonomous regional governments strengthen subnational institutions 
(administratively, legislatively, democratically, and politically), which in turn increases the 
incentives that combat corruption, such as improving the system of checks and balances. 
To support this analytical claim, the quantitative evidence found in the second chapter 
(first paper) was then further explored in the third chapter, but instead of statistically 
analysing a cross-country comparison of regional governments, municipalities in Venezuela 
were used as the case study unit of analysis. As suspected, municipal atomisation (defined as 
newly created local units of government in relatively poor and scarcely populated small 
territories) came up as a relevant factor associated to increasing corruption. But municipal 
atomisation was not the only relevant decentralisation-related issue that led to more 
corruption. The increasing number of subnational burea crats in Venezuela was also a 
significant factor that dominated most focus groups discussions. The problem is relatively 
simple, on average Venezuela is not even close to the efficiency limit set by Chile of 500 
citizens per local government employee. In addition o municipal atomisation and increasing 
local bureaucracy, the case study on flawed decentralisation and corruption in Venezuela 
identified the lack of local revenue autonomy as a possible source of corruption, and suggests 
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that an efficiency enhancing government measure would be to empower the newly 
consolidated local governments to change sales or property tax rates.     
Venezuela is an interesting phenomenon. And not just because of the dramatic 
changes taking place there. Venezuela is in fact a feasible case since the government in power 
has repeatedly proposed the reduction of subnational units (namely local governments) as a 
measure to dismantle the rigid and obsolete subnational bureaucratic system. It is also a fact 
that the Venezuelan political economy has the cash and the popular support to counterweight 
the significant social costs of a radical reform that would decrease the number of subnational 
public employees. According to the recent Latinobarmetro Report, Venezuela leads the 
region in “the difference of GDP growth between 2010 and 2011” of 5.9 percent, from -1.4 
percent to 4.5 percent (p. 24).28 Venezuela is also first in “support for democracy” (p. 38); 
third in “fairness in distribution of income” (p. 34) and “democracy guarantees the fair 
distribution of wealth” (p. 60); and fourth in “confidence in the government” (p. 51). 
The secondary papers of this Doctoral Thesis lack the empirical rigour found mostly 
in the first, but are full of rich economic and political details. The third paper (chapter Nº 4) 
explores the structural consolidation of the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United 
Socialist Political Party of Venezuela, or PSUV) as a significant step towards a constructive 
democratic system. The consolidation of the PSUV, however, is only the first step. In order to 
become an institutionalised leftwing political party such as the Workers’ Party in Brazil or the 
Justicialist Party in Argentina, the PSUV has to evlve into an independent phenomenon more 
significant than its founding leader bonding effect. Consequently, to reach this objective, 
internal voices within the PSUV have to be harnessed rather than suppressed, and 
headquarters in Caracas has to enforce a clear division of power. The fourth paper identifies 
the following two domestic causes of the recent stagflationary episode (years 2009 and 2010) 
in Venezuela: (1) exchange rate uncertainty, and (2) low private investment.  
It is important to note that one specific limitation present in any study concerning the 
corruption and decentralisation is that the measurements tend to ignore key issues, such as 
cost of living, real salaries, index of wellbeing, and the happiness of the consulted individuals, 
while incorrectly concentrating on the economics of pecific corrupt activities, such as 
bribery. And since corruption is a criminal activity, he methodologies have to be sustained on 
the subjective perceptions of questionnaires and surveys which distort any possibility of 
achieving precise measurements.  
                                                
28 On average, Latin America decreased 1.2 percent less in 2011 compared to what it had grown in 2010. 
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The intrinsic problem with relying on the perception f bribery is that bribery has 
different meanings to different people. Even within countries bribery varies greatly depending 
on the nationality of the corrupt individual. For example, it is common for foreign 
businessmen to pay sums of money far in excess for the exact building permit compared to 
the money paid by local entrepreneurs. On top of these relevant limitations to measure 
corruption with bribery, quantifying the real impact of corruption on society based mainly on 
the cases of bribery is also very misleading. For example, what is more corrupt? To pay a 
restaurant waiter an extra tip for a beachfront window table in Rio de Janeiro, to resale tickets 
for a baseball game in Santo Domingo, to collect traffic bribes by a low paid police officer in 
La Paz, or the multi-billionaire military contracts of the USA Department of Defence. Based 
solely on the amount of money, then there should be no doubt what is more corrupt. 
The direction of causality also presents a significant limitation that is very hard to 
solve because decentralisation alone can be a causefor corruption. It is common for corrupt 
national governments in developing countries to promote decentralisation as a political tool to 
cloud poor public performance, divide and weaken subnational political opposition or, simply, 
create new governments as means of additional income. 
One final limitation that should always be taken into consideration is that reversing the 
effects of flawed decentralisation by encouraging the transfer of decision-making powers, 
including real control over revenues, to subnational, democratically elected tiers of 
government, could ignite separatist tensions, especially in developing areas with precarious 
institutions. Bolivia is especially relevant here because the decentralisation reforms that took 
place a few decades ago with the drawing of boundaries nd the creation of subnational 
institutions are now becoming the building blocks for the legitimisation of separatist 
movements. Moreover, the 1993 Popular Participation and Administrative Decentralisation 
reform sponsored by President Sánchez de Lozada was the starting point of the now infamous 
half moon. One half is rich as a result of gas, and the other half is Indian and is predominantly 
poor. 
Finally, this Doctoral Thesis also introduces opportunities for further research. For 
example, the statistical findings of the first paper offer a fantastic opportunity to further test 
and explore the negative relationship between corruption and education. Because it does not 
support the classical theories of corruption, as is the case with the insignificant effect of three 
traditionally significant controls of corruption: income inequalities, liberty of press, and 
openness to trade. Furthermore, the four decentralisation-related factors of corruption 
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identified in the second paper, could become the starting point to focus on one of the factors, 
such as the creation of community councils. 
In reference to the third and fourth paper, where it lacks empirical rigour is vastly 
compensated by great opportunities for future research. For example, the two stagflationarry 
causes identified in the fourth paper (exchange rate uncertainty and low private investmnt) 
could serve as the theoretical background to a statistic l paper. Even more significant, the 
fourth paper introduces the integration phenomenon of Latin America. Specifically, it 
suggests that the development of Venezuela is highly dependent on its eventual acceptance as 
a full member of MERCOSUR’s massive trading block (Brasil, Argentina, Uruguay, and 
Paraguay) and on the institutionalisation of the SUCRE as a hard currency among ALBA 
members (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Cuba, Dominica, Saint Vincent & the 
Grenadines, and Antigua & Barbuda). MERCOSUR and the SUCRE are very significant to 
Venezuela. This is due mainly because the acceptance of Venezuela into MERCOSUR’s 
single market would increase trade and direct investm nt in the long run. And also because 
the institutionalisation of the SUCRE as a hard currency would solidify the monetary union 
among ALBA members and would immediately help stabilise the highly uncertain 
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